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1. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 341(e)(3) (stating in relevant part that “[t]he appellant must include a
concise  statement of the applicable standard of review for each issue, with citation to
authority, either in the discussion of the issue in the argument or under a separate heading
placed before the discussion in the argument”).  Appellees need to include a discussion of the
standard of review only “to the extent that the presentation by the appellant is deemed
unsatisfactory.”  ILL. SUP. CT. R. 341(f).  
2. Timothy P. O’Neill, Standards of Review in Illinois Criminal Cases: The Need for Major
Reform, 17 S. ILL. U.L.J. 51 (1992) [hereinafter O’Neill, Illinois Criminal Cases ]. 
3. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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Kathleen L. Coles*
Six years have passed since the Illinois Supreme Court amended Rule
341 to require that appellants include in their legal briefs a statement of the
applicable standard of review for each issue on appeal.1  In adopting this
amendment, Illinois courts somewhat belatedly joined a national trend focusing
heightened attention on a difficult yet critical aspect of appellate practice: the
degree of deference an appellate court should give to various determinations
of courts, juries, and administrative agencies when the propriety of those
determinations is on appeal.
A key goal of proponents of the 1997 rule change was to promote just
such increased attention.  In a 1992 article recommending that Rule 341 be
amended, Professor Timothy O’Neill of The John Marshall Law School
decried the general lack of adequate discussion and analysis of the appropriate
level of appellate review in Illinois criminal cases and contrasted that lack of
attention to the growing debate over the issue in the federal courts.2  After
examining numerous criminal cases where Illinois appellate courts either
ignored the applicable standard of review entirely or applied the manifest
weight of the evidence standard3 reflexively without analysis, Professor
O’Neill stated:
[T]he point is not that Illinois is necessarily wrong on every issue.  The
problem is that Illinois courts refuse to acknowledge the conflicts involving
standards of review in criminal cases.  Moreover, by refusing to acknowledge
the conflicts, they also avoid providing principled reasons for the positions
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4. Id. at 77.
5. Id. at 82.
6. Professor O’Neill might also have pointed to the relative paucity of discussion of the issue
in Illinois law reviews, journals, and other professional publications.  That academic and
professional silence in Illinois may now be slowly ending.  In addition to the 1992 O’Neill
article, supra note 2, and Timothy P. O’Neill & Susan L. Brody, Taking Standards of Review
Seriously: A Proposal to Amend Rule 341, 83 IL L .  B.J. 512 (1995), see JEFFREY A.  PARNESS,
IL L I N O I S  CIVIL PROCEDURE § 15–3 (1998); Hugh C. Griffin & Hugh S. Balsam, The Standard
of Review in Civil Cases in Illinois: More Than Meets the Eye,  8 APP. L.  REV. 1  (2002–2003).
The bulk of the commentary continues to be found in publications aimed primarily at
practitioners.  See, e.g., Timothy P. O’Neill, High Court Climbs Toward the Light on Proper
Review Standards, 147 CHI. DAILY L.  BULL. 24 (Feb. 2, 2001) [hereinafter O’Neill, High
Court Climbs]; Thomas H. Fegan, Identifying Standard of Review a Matter of Common Sense,
144 CHI. DAILY L.  BULL. 16 (Jan. 23, 1998).
7. O’Neill, Illinois Criminal Cases , supra note 2.  In urging Illinois appellate judges to begin
their legal opinions with an analysis of the standard of review, Professor O’Neill pointed with
approval to the practice of the Ninth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals.  Id. at 82–83.  Many
jurisdictions now require that appellants state the applicable standard of review in their briefs.
See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(9)(B);  HI ST  RAP  RULE 28(b)(5); PA ST  RAP  RULE 2111;
UT  R RAP 24(a)(5); see also  STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, 1  F E D E R A L
STANDARDS OF REVIEW § 1.02, at 1–7 to 1–9 & n. 57 (3d ed.1999) (discussing the inclusion
of standards of review in appellate briefs).
8. O’Neill & Brody, supra note 6.
9. Id. at 550.  Specifically, the authors concluded that Illinois courts have been “far too lax” in
addressing standards of review in civil cases, thereby ignoring important policy decisions and
forcing the bar “to play a guessing game” as to the degree of deference the courts would
accord to decisions below.  Id. 
they hold.  Illinois courts have for years abdicated their responsibilities in
this key area of the law.4
In proposing solutions to “the sorry state” of Illinois law,5 Professor O’Neill
noted that appellate lawyers were also partially responsible, 6 and he proposed
that all appellate briefs and all appellate judicial opinions be required to address
the proper standard of review.7
In 1995, then-Associate Dean and Professor Susan L. Brody of John
Marshall joined Professor O’Neill in advocating an amendment to Supreme
Court Rule 341.8  Summarizing the need for a rule requiring the parties to brief
standards of review in all appeals, the two authors expanded their attack on the
then-current state of standard of review jurisprudence to include Illinois courts’
treatment of the issue in civil,9 as well as criminal, cases: 
Both civil and criminal appellate decisions in Illinois often lack serious
discussion of the appropriate standard of review; indeed, reviewing courts
frequently decide issues without mentioning any standard of review.  Other
decisions may mention one or even several standards, but then fail either  to
define or to explain their use.  Worse yet, Illinois courts sometimes use the
same standard of review for questions that deserve different degrees of
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10. Id. at 512.
11. Id. at 513.
12. Id. at 550.  The authors also repeated Professor O’Neill’s earlier recommendation that
Illinois appellate judges should begin their decisions with a discussion of the applicable
standard of review.  Id.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra notes 117–19 and accompanying text.  Although there is no universally accepted
definition, mixed questions of fact and law, broadly defined, involve the application of rules
of law to one or more “basic” or historical facts and  factual inferences. 
15. Parts I and II are not intended as a comprehensive analysis of the complexities and nuances
of the various federal standards of review.  To place the recent Illinois developments in
context, however, it is necessary to have at least a basic understanding of those federal
standards.  For further study of federal standards of review in depth, an excellent place to
begin is with the comprehensive treatise by Professors Childress and Davis.  1 C HILDRESS &
DAVIS, supra note 7.  More basic overviews are contained in Patrick W. Brennan, Standards
of Appellate Review, 33  DEF. L.  J. 377 (1984); Steven Alan Childress, A 1995 Primer on
Standards of Review in Federal Civil Appeals, 161 F.R.D. 123 (1995) [hereinafter Childress,
A 1995 Primer], and Martha S. Davis, A Basic Guide to Standards of Judicial Review , 33 S.
D.  L.  REV. 468, 469 (1988) [hereinafter Davis, A Basic Guide].  See also  M ICHAEL E. T IGAR
& JANE B. T IGAR, FEDERAL  APPEALS:  JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE §  5 .1  (3 r d  ed. 2003);
George A. Somerville,  Standards of Appellate Review, 15 Litigation 23 (1989).  One goal of
this article is to provide an additional single-source overview of Illinois and federal courts’
handling of mixed questions of fact and law as a reference for Illinois courts and practitioners,
as well as others interested in the development of Illinois standards of appellate review.     
deference.  Finally, Illinois courts sometimes apply a particular standard of
review inconsistently.  Thus, lawyers receive inadequate direction from our
reviewing courts.10
It was the expressed hope of the authors that requiring appellants to brief the
issue of the applicable standard of review would “force both Illinois judges and
attorneys to confront issues that have been ignored for far too long”,11 thereby
improving Illinois appellate jurisprudence.12 
Since its publication, the Brody & O’Neill article has been cited by the
Illinois Supreme Court and Illinois appellate courts in several significant
decisions.13  Under its guise, the Illinois Supreme Court has introduced a new,
intermediate, “clearly erroneous” standard of review in some cases involving
so-called mixed questions of fact and law.14  Despite the apparent increased
attention to standards of review, however, the reasoning of recent cases has
not always been clear, and a number of questions remain unanswered. 
The goal of this article is to chronicle and assess developments in Illinois
standards of review since the publication of the O’Neill and Brody article in
1995, with particular emphasis on the standard of review for mixed questions
of fact and law in civil cases.  Because recent changes in the applicable
standards of review in Illinois have been largely based on federal precedents,
Part I contains an overview15 of federal standards of appellate review with
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16. For purposes of comparison and to explain the genesis of various standards of review, the
article also describes the standard of appellate review applicable to jury determinat ions  a t  the
federal and state levels.  Because of constitutional and historical considerations, the appellate
courts have less flexibility in varying those standards in the jury context.  See infra notes
52–53 and accompanying text. 
17. The term “functional approach” is derived from United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195,
1204 (9th Cir. 1982).  See also 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra  note 7, § 2.13, at 2–74.
respect to determinations by trial courts and administrative agencies.16  Turning
to the underlying purposes and rationales for standards of review, Part II
describes the limitations of the traditional “fact versus law” distinction as a
method of choosing applicable standards of review and compares the so-called
“functional approach”17 for determining the appropriate standard.  Part II then
discusses federal courts’ treatment of mixed questions of fact and law under
both the traditional and functional approaches.  Against this backdrop, Part III
compares the traditional Illinois standards of review applicable to conclusions
of law and findings of fact by various decision-making bodies, focusing
principally on Illinois Supreme Court decisions.  Part IV then chronicles and
analyzes Illinois developments in the supreme court’s treatment of mixed
questions since 1995.   Included is an analysis of the process by which the
court appears to be changing standards of review for mixed questions of fact
and law.
Part V analyzes the potential impact of the Illinois Supreme Court’s
adoption of a new, intermediate standard of review.  This article recommends
that the supreme court take further steps toward articulating the functional or
policy grounds that underlie the court’s designation of the level of deference
to accord to determinations of mixed questions by trial courts and
administrative agencies, taking into account the ways in which Illinois decision-
making bodies do and do not share similar institutional concerns with their
federal counterparts.  The article also recommends that the court take further
steps to clarify the source, scope, and applicability of the new intermediate
standard of review.  Part VI of the article concludes that Illinois law governing
standards of review is no longer in quite such a “sorry state.”  Nevertheless,
treatment by Illinois courts of mixed questions of fact and law on appeal is
indeed “mixed up” at present in that divergent approaches are prevalent and
the reasons for the divergence are often unclear.  Thus, further efforts by the
c ourts to clarify the meaning and scope of the new standard would benefit
decision-makers and practitioners alike.
I.  OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL STANDARDS OF APPELLATE
REVIEW
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18. Although the principal focus of this article is on the standards of review applicable to
appellate courts, similar rules and policies often apply to other reviewing bodies.  See, e.g.,
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995) (discussing standard of review
applicable to district court review of matters decided in arbitration).
19. See, e.g., 1 CHILDRESS &  DAVIS, supra note 7,  § 1.01, at 1–2; Davis, A Basic Guide, supra
note 15, at 469 (standard of review “denotes  the degree of deference that a reviewing court
gives to the actions or decisions under review”).
20. See, e.g., Martha S. Davis,  Standards of Review: Judicial Review of Discretionary
Decisionmaking,  2 J. APP. PRAC. & P ROC. 47, 47–48 (2000) [hereinafter Davis, Standards
of Review] (describing “standard of review” as a statement of the power of both the appel la te
court and the tribunal below); 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 1.01, at 1–3 (“Whether
looked at as an enabler and legitimator of review, or as a limit on the reviewer, the
fundamental notion behind a standard of review is that of defining the relationship and power
shared among judicial bodies”). 
21. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, The Power of District Judges and the Responsibility of Courts
of Appeals, 3 GA. L.  REV. 507, 517–519 (1969) [hereinafter Carrington, Power of District
Judges] (using scope of review to refer to deferential tests);  Martin B. Louis, Allocating
Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified
View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C.L.
REV. 993, 997 (1986) (using scope of review to refer to the division of power and
responsibility between the trial and appellate level). 
22. J. Dickinson Phillips, Jr., The Appellate Review Function: Scope of Review ,  LA W  &
CONTEMP . PROBS.,  Spring 1984, at 1.  See also 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 1.03,
at 1–17 to 1–19  (explaining that the more precise use of the term “scope of review” focuses
on what issues an  appellate court will consider, rather than the deference that will be accorded
the decision-maker’s determination of those issues).  Other topics that should be distinguished
from standards of review include burdens of proof, the scope of judicial review of legislative
actions, and appellate jurisdiction.  See,  e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prod. of Ca., Inc. v. Constr.
Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 622–623 (1992) (discussing differences between
burdens of proof and standards of review); 1  CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 1.03, at
1–19 to 1–24 (explaining distinctions between above concepts).  
A.  Standards of Review Generally
The term “standard of review” is most frequently, and perhaps most
clearly, described as the degree of deference an appellate court18 will accord
to the actions or decisions of a jury, a trial court, an administrative agency, or
another decision-maker.19  Viewed from a different perspective, the term also
refers to the respective powers and responsibilities of the appellate court and
the tribunal whose actions or decisions are under review.20  Although the terms
“standard of review” and “scope of review” are sometimes used
interchangeably,21 the latter term, in its narrower meaning, refers to the
particular actions or omissions by the decision-maker that are or are not
subject to review on appeal.22  In the words of one commentator, “standard of
review” refers to the “depth or intensity” with which lower court decisions are
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23. Phillips, supra note 22, at 1.
24. For example, the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant
part that “no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.”  U.S. CONST . amend. VII.
25. E.g., 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(E) (administrative agency fact-findings may not be set aside if
supported by substantial  evidence); 28 U.S.C. §157(c)(1) (district judge in bankruptcy cases
must review the bankruptcy judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law de novo if a party
raises objections thereto).
26. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (findings of fact in a non-jury trial can only be set aside if “clearly
erroneous”); ILL SUP. CT. R. 366 (2002).
27. E.g . , Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986).  See also Louis, supra note 21, at  999
(observing that the jury standard of review is judicially created)presumably based on its
common law origins).
28. In general, mixed questions of fact and law are a “hybrid” of the first two categories.  Davis,
A  Basic Guide, supra note 15, at 470.  See infra Part II.A.
29. Davis, A Basic Guide, supra, note 15, at 468–471.  In an effort to give appellate counsel and
others a fundamental understanding of the language and thrust of the rules governing standards
of review, Professor Davis has prepared a guide that includes a simplified chart.  The chart
identifies four basic types of proceedings: civil, criminal, formal administrative, and informal
administrative.   It also identifies five basic decision-makers: jury, agency, judge,  master, and
magistrate.   Within those categories, the chart summarizes the basic standards of  review
applicable to issues of fact, law, and discretion, as well as the hybrid category of mixed
questions of fact and law.  Id.
30. See infra Part III.
31. A separate, but related, body of law and literature analyzes the standard of appellate review
applicable to discretionary decisions.  See generally 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, ch.
4. Discretionary decisions have been described as those that are left to the choice of the
decision- maker from an array of alternatives.  Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the
Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 636–37 (1971).  See generally
Davis, Standards of Review, supra note 20.  T he standard of review applicable to
discretionary decisions is generally highly deferential and falls under the rubric “abuse of
discretion.”  See Davis, A Basic Guide, supra  note 15, at 480.  For a helpful overview of
subject to review on appeal, while “scope of review” refers to the “breadth of
the review function.”23
The sources of standards of appellate review include constitutions,24
statutes,25 court rules,26 and judicial decisions.27  In general, standards of
review at both the state and federal level fall into three categories, depending
on whether the issue on appeal is a question of law, a question of fact, or a
challenge to a discretionary decision.28  Under both federal and state law, the
particular standard of review applicable to each category depends on both the
type of proceeding that gave rise to the issue and the identity of the original
decision-maker.29  Within this general structure, however, the federal and state
standards of review vary in several notable respects.30
B.  Basic Federal Standards of Appellate Review of Conclusions of Law31
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appellate review of discretionary decisions and some of the leading Supreme Court cases, see
Davis, Standards of Review , supra note 20.
32. Brennan, supra note 15, at 407.
33. See 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 2.14, at 2–79 (de novo review reflects the
appellate courts “power, ability, and competency to come to a different conclusion on the
record as determined below”).  See discussion of appellate court functions and expertise in
Part II infra.
34. See 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 2.14, at 2–79 (“no particular deference” given);
Richard H.W. Maloy, ‘Standards of Review’)Just the Tip of the Icicle, 77 U.  DE T .  MERCY L.
REV. 603, 611 (2000) (“little or no” deference given). 
35. See, e.g., Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231–233 (1991) (using the terms de
novo, plenary, and independent review interchangeably) ;  1  CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note
7, § 2.13, at 2–79; see also Louis, supra note 21, at 993 (determinations of law are ordinarily
reviewed “freely or independently” when appealed); Maloy, supra note 34, at 611 (questions
of law receive “plenary” or “independent” review).  This article uses all four terms
interchangeably to refer to the standard of review applicable to questions of law and certain
other issues.
36. See Davis, A Basic Guide, supra note 15, at 476 (also noting a “presumption of regularity”
in the proceedings below); 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 2.14, at 2–81 to  2–82
(adding that appellate courts extend “practical deference” in some cases).
Deciding questions of law is the particular province of the courts, with the
federal appellate courts playing the pre-eminent role.  In fact, determining
questions of law is “the very essence of the appellate court’s role”32 and
reflects the appellate courts’ inherent power, ability, and competency.33  As
a corollary to this ultimate power of determination, federal appellate courts
need give little, if any deference, to the conclusions of law of the original
decision maker.34  They are hence free to substitute their judgment for that of
the tribunal below.  This power of federal appellate courts and other reviewing
bodies to decide questions of law without according deference to prior decision
makers is often referred to as de novo review.  Alternative formulations refer
to “free,” “plenary,” or “independent” review.35
There are two principal exceptions to the general rule of de novo or free
review of questions of law at the federal level.  The first is a type of practical
deference that appellate courts often give to interpretations of common law
and statutory legal principles below, regardless of the identity of the decision
maker.  Here, despite the availability of free review, reviewing courts have
demonstrated an implicit tendency to affirm, rather than reverse, and they
often accord deference to the original decision-maker out of notions of
comity.36
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37. Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) establishes a “presumptive
‘floor’”  under appellate review of administrative agency determinations.  T IGAR & T IGAR,
supra note 15,  § 5.11, at 298.  5 U.S.C. Section 706, entitled “Scope of review,” provides:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action. The reviewing court shall (1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed; and (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional  right, power,
privilege,  or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right; (D) without observance of procedure
required by law; (E) unsupported by substantial evidence. . . ; or (F) unwarranted by
the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing
court.  In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole
record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the
rule of prejudicial error.
5 U.S.C. § 706.  The standards of review applicable to the determinations of a particular
federal  administrative agency may be set forth in the agency’s enabling act, which may vary
from or supplement the APA standards.  T IGAR & T IGAR, supra note 15.  The APA standards
of review may be applied by analogy even where they are not directly applicable.  2
CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 14.01, at 14–2.
38. Adding to the sometimes confusing use of terminology in this area, the degree of judicial
deference to administrative agency determinations is generally referred to as “scope of
review,”  rather than “standard of review.”  BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §
10.01 (3d ed. 1991); Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards,
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 679 (2002) (using scope of review to refer to the degree of
deference accorded administrative agency determinations).  See supra notes 21–23 and
accompanying text.  Because administrative agencies act in both quasi-legislative and quasi-
judicial capacities, the federal rules governing the applicable scope of review are quite
complex.  Professors Childress and Davis have identified seven different levels of review
ranging from de novo review to no review.  2 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 15.01, at
15–2.  The judicial decisions interpreting these rules have been universally characterized as
inconsistent and confusing.  See, e.g.,Ronald M. Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in
Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.  J. 1, 1 & n.1 (1985–1986) (judicial explanations of scope of
review have been characterized by academics as  “vacuous and chaotic”).  For more in-depth
discussions of the scope of review in federal administrative law cases, see 2 CHILDRESS &
DAVIS, supra note 7, ch. 14; RICHARD J. P IERCE ,  JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 3.1
to 3.6; 11.1 to 11.4 (2002); LOUIS L.  JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF AD MINISTRATIVE ACTION
(1976); SCHWARTZ, supra, ch. 10.
The second exception arises in connection with judicial review of
conclusions of law by administrative agencies.37  Here, there has historically
been a strong tendency)albeit of uncertain scope)to give deference to
administrative agency interpretations of statutes and regulations within the
agencies’ purview.38  In this regard, the federal judiciary and administrative
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39. Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARV. L.  REV. 239, 239 (1955).  The
courts’ primary law-making role has long been circumscribed by two factors: recognition of
the administrative agencies’ expertise and the pressures of crowded dockets.  SCHWARTZ,
supra note 38, at 624–25.  The second exception thus reflects a policy decision to accord
some or substantial  deference to the legal conclusions of administrative agencies in various
instances to take into account that comparative expertise and reduce the number of cases
with lengthy and complex records pending on appellate dockets.  Id.  See also Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (“It  is well established that an agency’s construction of its
own regulations is entitled to substantial  deference.”); Carrington, Power of District Judges ,
supra note 21, at 518 (administrative agencies have their own role to play in formulating
federal policy and are entitled to “some deference” with respect to their legal conclusions);
Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U.  PA. L.  REV. 549,
562–67 (1985) (describing factors courts rely on in determining whether to defer to agency
interpretations);  Levin, supra  note 38, at 4 (courts have primary authority for resolving
questions of law, but “at  least some weight” should be accorded to the agency’s
interpretation).
40. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain,
89  GEO. L.J. 833 (2001) (Chevron “dramatically expanded the circumstances in which courts
must defer to agency interpretations of statutes”).   See generally PIERCE, supra note 38, §§
3.1 to 3.6. 
41. 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).  Chevron employs a two-pronged analysis.  First, a court reviewing
an agency interpretation of a statute must inquire whether Congress has directly addressed the
precise question in issue.  If so, both the court and the agency must effect congressional
intent.  If the statute leaves a “gap,” however, the court must look for an explicit or implicit
congressional delegation of authority to the agency to “elucidate” the statute by regulation.
If there is such a delegation, the resulting agency regulation or interpretation is given
“controlling weight” unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”
Id. at 842–844.  In determining the reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation, the
reviewing court “need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it
permissibly could have adopted . . . or even the reading the court would have reached if the
question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.”  Id. at 843 n. 11.  In other words, a
court may not substitute its own interpretation  when the agency has interpreted the statute
or rule in a “reasonable fashion.”  City of Chicago v. FCC, 199 F.3d 424, 428  (7th Cir.
1999); see Consol. Gas v. Supply Corp. v. FERC, 745 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.  1984) (court
can disregard interpretation that “black means white,” but “if the choice lies between dark and
light grey, the conclusion of the agency . . . in favor of one or the other will have great
weight”).  But see Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 508 (1992) (“Deference
agencies have been said to share the role of pronouncing and making law, with
the court as “senior partner.”39
The historic  tendency of federal courts to accord no deference, some
deference, or substantial deference to agency legal interpretations on an
informal basis has been significantly altered in the last twenty years by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.40  In Chevron, the Supreme Court stated that where
a statute administered by an agency is silent or ambiguous, a court may not
substitute its own interpretation of the statute in place of a “reasonable
interpretation” by the agency.41  From that dicta a substantial, and sometimes
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does not mean acquiescence.”).
42. See, e.g., 2 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 15.13, at 15–13 (finding “no discernible
pattern” in the manner in which Chevron has been applied); Merrill & Hickman, supra  no te
40, at 920 (Chevron produced “an extraordinary amount of confusion” as to when it applies).
43. Although commentators have disagreed as to its source, this mandatory deference to agency
legal interpretations is likely derived from the intent of Congress.  See Merrill & Hickman,
supra note 40, at 836 (concluding that the Chevron doctrine is legislatively mandated). 
44. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229, 237 (2001) (important, though not sole,
indicia of Congressional delegation of authority to fill statutory gaps is enactment of notice-
and-comment rule-making or formal adjudicatory proceedings); see also City of Chicago v.
FCC, 199 F.3d at 429, (an agency’s statutory interpretation commands deference regardless
of whether it is a result of adjudicative proceedings or rulemaking).
45. 533 U.S. at 227 (footnotes omitted).   Such judicial deference to agency views may range from
“great  respect” to “near indifference,” according to the Court.  Id.  In support of this flexible
level of deference, the Court cited Skidmore v. Swift &  Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), which some
had thought was replaced by Chevron.  See Merrill & Flickman, supra note 40, at 856–857.
The Court thus made clear that Chevron had not supplanted the earlier Skidmore decision.
533 U.S. at 235–238; see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
46. See Sch. Dist. of Wisc.  Dells v. Z.S., 295 F.3d 671, 674 (7th Cir.  2002) (Posner ,  J . )  ( in
ordinary appeals of administrative action, judicial review of “pure” issues of law is plenary
unless Chevron commits the question to the agency).
contradictory,42 body of precedent has grown, in which strong and mandatory
deference is accorded to interpretations by federal administrative agencies of
the statutes and regulations they administer.43
Although there have been some exceptions, the Chevron doctrine of
mandatory deference has generally been applied in instances where an
administrative agency has been empowered by Congress to engage in formal,
rather than informal, rule-making or adjudication that results in rules with the
force of law.44  The Supreme Court has recently made clear, however, that
even if the mandatory deference under Chevron is not invoked, courts may
nevertheless continue to accord a discretionary form of deference to an
agency’s statutory or rule interpretation, based on factors such as “the degree
of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and
. . . the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”45  In areas where these two
forms of deference are not invoked and where other rules or considerations
do not require deference, federal appellate courts retain their power of de
novo review of agency determinations of law.46
C.  Basic Federal Standards of Appellate Review of Findings of Fact
In contrast to the general rule that conclusions of law are reviewed freely
and without deference to the original decision-maker, findings of fact are, with
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47. The principal exception is the so-called “constitutional fact” doctrine.  See infra note 148
and  accompanying text.  In some other instances, facts can be retried by a reviewing tribunal.
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(vii) (2003) (de novo review of agency denial of request for
information); 28 U.S.C . § 157(c)(1) (district  judge in bankruptcy cases will review the
bankruptcy judge’s findings of fact de novo if a party raises objections thereto). 
48. See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) (jury has power to determine the facts
and court has power to determine the law); George C. Christie, Judicial Review of Findings
of Fact, 87 NW .  U.  L.  R E V . , 14, 14 (1992) (same).  This section of the discussion begins with
the standard of review applicable to factfinding by juries because the standard of review
applicable to findings of fact by administrative agencies is largely drawn from the jury
precedents.  See infra note 65. 
49. In civil trials, the results of jury deliberations may take the form of a general verdict, which
in actuality constitutes a mixed finding of fact and law that incorporates factual inferences.
See infra note 145.  To supplement a general verdict, a jury may be asked to make specific
findings in response to written interrogatories about issues of fact necessary to reach the
verdict.  FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b).  Alternatively, a jury may simply return a special verdict in
the form of a special written finding on each issue of fact.  FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a).  The trial
court then enters a  judgment based on the special verdict.  The same standard of review
applies irrespective of the form the jury’s findings take.  See 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra
note 7, § 3.10, at 3–79.  Findings of advisory juries are, however, reviewed under the clearly
erroneous rule. FED. R. CIV. P.  52(a).  
50. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 15, at 381; Christ ie,  supra note 48, at 15; Clark & Stone,
Review of Findings of Fact , 4 U. CHI. L.  REV. 190, 193 (1937).
51. U.S. CONST . art. III, § 2[2].  Article III provides in relevant part that “[I]n all the other
Cases, the supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”  Id.  See Brennan, supra
note 15, at 395 (fear of usurpation of jury power combined with Seventh Amendment requires
few exceptions,47 given some level of deference by federal reviewing courts.
In the federal judicial system, the degree of deference varies with the identity
of the original fact-finder.  In general, determinations of fact by juries and
administrative agencies receive the most deference and those by federal trial
courts receive the least.  
1.  Findings of Fact by Juries and Administrative Agencies: the
Substantial Evidence Rule
It is a truism that questions of law are for the judge to decide, while
questions of fact are for the jury.48  At trial, jurors hear the evidence, receive
instructions from the judge as to the applicable rules of law, deliberate among
themselves to weigh the evidence, apply the law to the facts, and then render
a verdict.49  For reasons grounded in history and the Constitution,50 the jury’s
decision at the end of that process will prevail except under limited
circumstances.  
Although the United States Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over
both law and facts,51 the Seventh Amendment protects against judicial
24 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 28
a “hands- off” style of judicial review).
52. U.S. CONST . amend. VII.  See Louis, supra  note 21, at 997 n. 19 (Seventh Amendment
preserves the right to trial by jury as it existed in 1791).  The Seventh Amendment right to
trial by jury in civil actions is not applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1875).  Therefore, states may regulate courts in their
own way.  Id. 
53. 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 3.01, at 3–2.  Procedurally, the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a verdict is often raised when the appellant asserts on appeal that it was
error for the district  court judge to deny a motion for a judgment as a matter of law under
Rule 50.  FED. R. CIV. P. 50.  See, e.g., SIBIA Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225
F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir.  2000); Wichman v. Board of Trustees, 180 F.3d 791 (7th Cir.  1999).
Sufficiency questions are also raised when a trial court grants a motion for a judgment as a
matter of law under Rule 50, taking the case away from the jury.  Rule 50 empowers a court
to grant such a motion if a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally
sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to have found for that party on that issue.  FED. R. CIV.
P. 50(a)(1).  See 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 3.01, at 3–3 (explaining the
relationship between Rule 50 and the jury standard of review).  Decisions to grant or deny
motions for judgment as a matter of law are reviewed de novo on appeal.  Lane v. Hardee’s
Food Systems, Inc., 184 F.3d 705, 707 (7th Cir. 1999). 
54. 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 3.01, at 3–8 (courts restating reasonableness review
as a  substantial evidence test “intend no real difference in meaning or result”); 9A CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE A N D  P ROCEDURE § 2524, at
265–66 (2d ed. 2003) (substantial evidence test is unlikely to result in any significant
differences in result from the reasonableness test); Brennan, supra note 15, at 387 (substantial
evidence is a test of both sufficiency and reasonableness). 
incursions into the right to trial by jury by restricting the examination of facts
tried by a jury to the common law standards in existence at the time the
Constitution was adopted.52  Hence, under long-standing interpretations by the
United States Supreme Court, jury verdicts are given great deference.  Jury
verdicts are not unassailable, however, and can be reviewed by trial or
appellate courts within “a limited range.”53  The standard of review applicable
to jury verdicts in civil trials generally goes under the rubric  of the
“reasonableness” test or the “substantial evidence” test.  Although the wording
and focus of the two tests appear on the surface to vary, they are generally
regarded as the “flip-sides” of the same inquiry.54  When viewed from the
perspective of reasonableness, the courts inquire whether reasonable minds
could reach different conclusions based on the evidence presented to the
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55. 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 3.01, at 3–6.  This formulation of the reasonableness
test  appears to represent the authors’ synthesis of the many cases expounding the test.  As
with most standards of review, courts have described the jury standard under a number of
different formulations .   See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prod. of Ca., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers
Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993) (reasonableness standard requires the reviewer to
sustain a factual determination “unless it is so unlikely that no reasonable person would find
it to be true”); Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1960)
(“Where a jury has tried the matter upon correct instructions, the only inquiry is whether it
cannot be said that reasonable men could reach differing conclusions on the issue.”); Collins
v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 335 (7th Cir.  1998) (a jury verdict will be overturned only if the
court concludes that “no rational jury” could have found for the prevailing party); Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Falgoust, 386 F.2d 248, 253 (5th Cir.  1967) (“the standard for reviewing a
jury verdict is whether the state of proof is such that reasonable and impartial minds could
reach the conclusion that the jury expressed in its verdict”).  These varying formulations of
the test range from helpful to outright wrong.  See 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, §
3.02, at 3–11 to 3–15; 3–19 to 3–21.
56. Brennan, supra note 15, at 381 (explaining that the substantial evidence standard arose from
Supreme Court cases dating back to Lancaster v. Collins, 115 U.S. 222, 225 (1885)).  Courts
also describe the substantial evidence test using different, and sometimes misleading,
formulations.  See 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 3.10.
57. A. B. Small Co. v. Lamborn & Co., 267 U.S. 248, 254 (1925).
58. La Montagne v. Am. Convenience Prods., 750 F.2d 1405, 1410 (7 th Cir.  1984) (citing
Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969)). 
59. See Brennan, supra note 15, at 384 (adding that a jury verdict is reversible if the supporting
evidence is “inherently impossible, opposed to the laws of nature, or clearly  incredible”). 
jury.55  If reasonable minds could differ, the jury’s conclusion prevails and the
verdict must stand. 
Approaching the question from the opposite side of the coin, the courts
review a jury’s verdict to determine whether there is a sufficient evidentiary
basis)in other words, “substantial evidence”)to support it.56  In an early case,
the Supreme Court characterized the substantial evidence test as requiring
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.”57  The Seventh Circuit has described the test as the
process of  “determining whether the evidence to support the verdict is
substantial; a mere scintilla of evidence will not suffice. ”58  Regardless of the
precise wording used to define the test, a jury verdict will not be overturned if
it is found to be supported by substantial evidence.  On the other hand, a
verdict is reversible if it does not have a sufficient evidentiary basis, either
because there is a mere scintilla of supporting evidence or there are simply no
facts in support.59
A judicial determination that a verdict is supported by substantial evidence
does not mean that the court is weighing the evidence in the traditional sense.
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60. See, e.g., Lane v. Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 184 F.3d 705, 707 (7th Cir. 1999) (reviewing
court may not resolve any conflicts in testimony or weigh evidence, except to the extent
necessary to determine if there is substantial evidence in support of a verdict); La Montagne
v. American Convenience Prods., 750 F.2d at 1410 (although an appellate court weighs the
evidence to determine if it is substantial, it does “not weigh the evidence as a jury would,
attempting to find a preponderance on one side or the other”).
61. 530 U.S.133 (2000). 
62. By this holding, the Court resolved a conflict among the circuit courts of appeal over whether
it  was necessary to review only the evidence supporting the verdict or the entire record.  Id.
at 149–50.  See 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 3.13. 
63. 530 U.S. at 150.  In support, the Court cited Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986) (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of
legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of the judge”).
64. See 530 U.S. at 153 (finding that the appellate court had impermissibly substituted its
judgment for that of the jury’s).   For further analyses of the standard of review applicable to
findings of fact by juries, see, e.g., Fleming James, Jr., Sufficiency of the Evidence and Jury-
Control Devices Available Before the Verdict , 47 VA. L.  REV. 218 (1961);  Eric Schnapper,
Judges Against Juries)Appellate Review of Federal Civil Jury Verdicts, 1989 WIS. L.  REV.
237.
65. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 633 (“When the courts were confronted with cases
involving  challenges to the legality of agency acts, they had at their disposition the fully
developed law of appellate review of lower courts as well as that governing the respective
roles of judge and jury . . . . [I]t was not surprising that the judges proceeded by analogy with
the principles that had been constructed by their predecessors in the above-mentioned fields,
particularly that of appellate court review.”).  There are, however, subtle differences in the
substantial  evidence test as applied in the administrative law context that take into account
the standard of proof required to prevail in agency tribunals.  2 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra
note 7, §  9.03, at 9–13.
That task is the jury’s prerogative.60  The Supreme Court recently re-
emphasized this and other limitations on the role of a court reviewing the
sufficiency of a jury verdict in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,
Inc.61  After holding that a reviewing court must look at all the evidence in the
record to determine its sufficiency,62 the Court stated that the reviewing body
must “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it
may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.”63  Thus, an
appellate court may not substitute its judgment as to the weight of the evidence
for that of the jury, even if the court would have reached a different
conclusion.64 
The standard of review applicable to findings of fact by federal
administrative agencies generally parallels and draws from the standard
applicable to findings of fact by juries in civil cases.65  Although it may not
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66. A determination of the weight of the evidence is the responsibility of the agency.  St. Joseph
Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 51 (1986).
67. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (even as to matters not requiring
administrative expertise, the court may not displace the agency’s choice between “two fairly
conflicting views”); Sims v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 424, 428 (7th Cir. 2002) (court may not
substitute its judgment for the agency’s by reconsidering facts, re-weighing evidence, or
resolving disputes of fact).
68. Depending on the applicable statute, the federal reviewing court of first instance may be
either a district court or a federal appellate court.
69. Section 706(1)(2)(E) of the APA specifically provides that the reviewing court shall “hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . unsupported
by substantial  evidence . . .”  In making its determination, the court must review the whole
record or those parts of it cited by a party.  Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. at
488.  See also 2 CHILDRESS &  DA V I S,  supra note 7, § 14.01, at 14–5 (stating that the most
frequent standard of review for administrative fact findings of all types is “substantial
evidence on the record as a  whole”).  The “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review in
APA § 706(2)(a) applies in general to agency fact findings and policy choices in informal
administrative proceedings.  Davis, A Basic Guide, supra note 15, at 479.
70. Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (emphasis added); Sims
v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d at 428 (“Evidence is substantial  when it is sufficient for a reasonable
person to conclude that the evidence supports the decision.”).  The substantiality
determination is based on the whole record, including the evidence opposed to the agency’s
position.  Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. at 488.  To be substantial, the evidence
must be more than a mere scintilla.   Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S 150, 162 (1999); Scott v.
Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir.  2001).  See supra  notes 58–59 and accompanying
text.
71. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 162; Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d at 593.  See also Universal
Camera Corp. v. NRLB, 340 U.S. at 490 (Congress has imposed on the courts the
responsibility for assuring that an agency “keeps within reasonable bounds”).
weigh the evidence66 or substitute its judgment for that of the  agency,67 a
federal court68 will review the administrative record to determine if there is
substantial evidence to support the agency’s findings.69  Substantial evidence
is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to
support a conclusion.”70  Thus, like the jury standard of review from which it
is derived, the “flip side” of the substantial evidence requirement in
administrative law cases is a reasonableness requirement.  Although the
substantial evidence test accords “great deference” to an agency’s
determination of facts, the reviewing court must do more than act as a “rubber
stamp.”71   
2.  Findings of Fact by Federal District Courts: The Clearly Erroneous
Standard of Review
In contrast to the substantial deference accorded to findings of fact by a
jury or an administrative agency on appeal, the factual findings of a federal
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72. See Edward H. Cooper,  Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing and Rationalizing the Resources of
Appellate Review, 65 NO T R E  DA M E  L. REV. 645, 650 (1988) (the findings of trial court judges
are given “somewhat less deference” than findings of a jury).
73. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).  Rule 52(a) states in relevant part:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon  . . . . Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the
witnesses.
Id. (emphasis added).  The italicized language in the quotation was added by amendment in
1985 to resolve the dispute over the validity of the “documentary evidence” exception that
many federal appellate courts had grafted onto the clearly erroneous rule.  See infra note 91
and accompanying text.     
74. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 15, at 398–403; Ellen E. Sward, Appellate Review of Judicial
Fact-Finding, 40 U.  KAN. L.  REV. 1, 39–40 (1991).  Some of the confusion and debate over
the scope and application of the clearly erroneous rule has been attributed to the historical
origins of Rule 52(a), which date back to the split between courts of law and courts of equity.
See Judge John F. Nangle, The Ever Widening Scope of Fact Review in Federal Appellate
Courts — Is the“Clearly Erroneous Rule” Being Avoided?, 59  WASH .  U.  L.Q. 409, 411–13
(1981).  For a recap of the history of the promulgation of the clearly erroneous rule, see
Charles Richard Calleros, Title VII and Rule 52(a): Standards of Appellate Review in
Disparate Treatment Cases)Limiting the Reach of Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 58 TUL. L.
REV. 403, 409–412 (1983); Clark & Stone,  supra note 50, at 193; Cooper,  supra note 72,
at 647–649; Nangle, supra, at 411–413; Sward, supra, at 18–20.  The equitable roots of Rule
52(a) were recognized by the Supreme Court in United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
75. 333 U.S. 364 (1948).  Gypsum has been repeatedly cited by the Supreme Court over the
years. See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001); Concrete Pipe & Products,
Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993); Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1984); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 284 n.
14 (1982); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969).  Some
commentators have criticized the Court’s attempt to elaborate on or explain the supposed
plain meaning of the term “clearly erroneous.”  See Nangle, supra  note 74, at 415. Cf. United
States v. Alum. Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 433 (2d Cir. 1945) (Learned Hand, J.) (finding it
“idle” to attempt to define “clearly erroneous”).
district court judge are treated with somewhat less deference72 and are
reversed if they are “clearly erroneous” within the meaning of Rule 52(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.73  The meaning and scope of the term
“clearly erroneous” have at times been the subject of intensive debate.74  In
United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,75 the Supreme Court attempted
to amplify the plain language of Rule 52(a) by explaining that “a finding is
‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
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76. Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 395.
77. 470 U.S. 564. 
78. 470 U.S. at 573–574 (citations omitted).   See also Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456
U.S. 844, 857 (1982) (appellate court cannot substitute its interpretation for that of trial
court simply because the reviewer might construe the facts or resolve ambiguities differently).
79. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 395 U.S. at 123 (adding that appellate court’s
function is not to decide issues of fact de novo).
80. The federal courts of appeal have developed a variety of other explanations and sub-tests
under Rule 52(a), although the helpfulness and accuracy of many of them have been
quest ioned.   See 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 2.06.  A widely quoted example
comes from Parts &  Electric Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Electric Inc. , 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th
Cir.  1988), in which the court stated that “[t]o be clearly erroneous, a decision must strike
us as more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must . . . strike us as wrong with the force
of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish . . . .”  The Seventh Circuit has since backed away
from the potential  ramifications of this characterization of Rule 52(a).  See Carr v. Allison
Gas Turbine Div., 32 F.3d 1007, 1008 (7th Cir.  1994) (in spite of “colorful language” in prior
decisions, the clearly erroneous test does not impose an insuperable burden on appellant);
Santa Fe Pac. Corp. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 22 F.3d 725 (7th Cir.
1994) (despite the possible impression conveyed by the dead fish language, the clearly
erroneous rule is not a rubberstamp).  Professors Childress and Davis contend that the dead
fish test is “probably unhelpful, arguably wrong, and likely a fluke of rhetoric.”  1 CHILDRESS
& DAVIS, supra note 7, § 2.06, at 2–34 (the dead fish test “should be left to flounder”).
81. 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993).
82. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 500 (1984).
mistake has been committed.”76  In Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,77 the
Supreme Court further observed:
If the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the
record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even
though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have
weighed the evidence differently.  Where there are two permissible views of
the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly
erroneous.  This is so even when the district court’s findings do not rest on
credibility determinations, but are based instead on physical or documentary
evidence or inferences from the facts.78
The authority of a federal appellate court when reviewing trial court findings
of fact is therefore circumscribed by the deference the court must give to the
trial court’s determination.79 
The amount or degree of that deference has been described by the
Supreme Court in different ways.80  In Concrete Pipe & Products, Inc. v.
Construction Laborers Pension Trust,81 for example, the Court stated that
the standard is “significantly deferential.”  Elsewhere, the Court has described
the clearly erroneous rule as a “presumption of correctness”82 and has stated
that the rule means the appellate court must place “primary weight” on the trial
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83. Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960).  See also Amadeo v.
Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 223 (1988) (Court has stressed that the clearly erroneous review standard
is a “deferential one”).  Deferential review does not mean, however, that the appellate court
acts as a “rubber stamp.”  Cook v. City of Chicago, 192 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir.  1999); Santa
Fe Pac. Corp. v. Central States, S.E.  & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 22 F.3d at 726. See also
Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., 32 F.3d at 1008 (appellate court scrutiny of district court
fact findings is deferential, but “not abject”).
84. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 400 (1990).
85. See supra Part I.C.1.
86. See, e.g.,1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 2.07 (discussing confusion between two
standards and noting that facts supported by substantial evidence may nevertheless leave an
overall  conviction of mistake); Brennan, supra note 15, at 396 (given the history of Rule
52(a), the inference is compelling that clearly erroneous is a broader standard than substantial
evidence); Calleros, supra note 74, at n. 40 (analytical distinction between two standards
exists and practical difference should also be recognized); Davis, A Basic Guide, supra note
15, at 476 (cases stating that findings supported by substantial evidence cannot be clearly
erroneous are “simply wrong”).   Despite the analytical differences between the clearly
erroneous and substantial  evidence standards, many have questioned whether there is any
signifi cant practical difference.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Trigg, 28 F.3d 639, 643 (7th Cir.  1994)
(Posner,  J.) (expressing suspicion that the verbal distinctions between the forms of deferential
review have little consequence in practice and suggesting that there are only two standards:
deferential and plenary review); Carrington, Power of District  Judges, supra note 21,  a t  520
(difference between the clearly erroneous and substantial evidence test is “insubstantial”);
Louis, supra note 21, at 1002 (differences, if any, between the deferential standards of review
are “slight and incapable of precise articulation”); Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Non-Jury
Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 55 CALIF. L.  REV. 1020, 1024 n. 33 (1967) (debatable
whether differences in terminology are very meaningful as a practical matter).   But see 1
CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 2.07, at 2–37 (important distinctions between two
standards should remain); Calleros,  supra note 74, at n. 40 (practical difference between
substantial evidence and clearly erroneous rule should be recognized). 
87. A finding of fact that is not supported by substantial  evidence will also be clearly erroneous.
See, e.g., 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 2.07, at 2–35 to 2–36;  Nangle,  supra note
74, at 419.
88. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Products, Inc. v. Constr.  Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602,
623 (1960) (review under the clearly erroneous standard is “significantly deferential,” while
review under the substantial  evidence or reasonableness standard is “even more deferential”);
Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., 32 F. 3d 1007, 1008 (7th Cir.  1994) (to overturn a finding
court’s factual conclusions.83  The Court has also observed that, in practice,
the clearly erroneous standard of review requires an appellate court to affirm
“any district court determination that falls within a broad range of permissible
conclusions.”84
Although the above explanations of the meaning and scope of “clearly
erroneous” are strongly reminiscent of the Court’s descriptions of the
substantial evidence rule applicable to jury verdicts and administrative agency
findings of fact,85 the clearly erroneous and substantial evidence rules are not
coterminous.86  Thus, a finding of fact may be supported by substantial
evidence87 and still be clearly erroneous.88  Put another way, the clearly
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of fact under the clearly erroneous rule, it is not necessary to conclude that the finding meets
the “no reasonable” person standard described in Concrete Pipe); Case v. Morrisette,  475 F.2d
1300, 1307 (D.C. Cir.  1973) (a finding of fact is clearly erroneous if without substantial
evidentiary support; “beyond that” a finding is clearly erroneous even if supported by
evidence, if the reviewer has the “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake has been
made).  But see 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 3.07, at 2–37 (concluding that the
clearly erroneous and substantial  evidence tests are moving closer where conflicts over the
credibility of the evidence are in issue).  
89. See, e.g., Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 714 (1986) (if appellate court
believed district  court misapplied law to facts, it could have reversed on that basis); Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 n. 14 (1982) (if district court findings rest on erroneous
view of law, Rule 52(a) does not apply and findings may be set aside); United States v. Singer
Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 194 (1948) (to the extent a conclusion results from the application
of an improper standard to the facts, it may be corrected as a matter of law). 
90. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
91. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 573, 573–574 (1985) (described in the text
supra at note 77).  Prior to Anderson v. City of  Bessemer Ci ty and the 1985 amendments to
Rule 52(a), a number of courts had by-passed the clearly erroneous rule and reviewed findings
of fact de novo when the findings were based solely on undisputed facts or documentary
evidence.  See, e.g., Swanson v. Baker  Indus., Inc., 615 F.2d 479, 483 (8th Cir. 1980); Orvis
v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1950).  In part, this “documentary evidence” exception
refl ected the practice in equity prior to the adoption of Rule 52(a), but the rationale for
continuing the practice was that appellate courts were equally competent to draw inferences
from written evidence such as admissions or documents as were the trial courts.  See, e.g.,
Brennan, supra note 15, at 397 (noting that cases relying on undisputed or documentary
evidence are akin to earlier cases in equity); Sward, supra note 74, at 40 (describing the equal
competency rationale).
92. See Childress, A 1995 Primer ,  supra note 15, at 129 (Swint, 456 U.S. at 287, indicates
strongly  that factual inferences in general are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard).
93. See infra at notes 101–112 and accompanying text.
erroneous standard of review is less deferential than the substantial evidence
rule in some unquantifiable degree.
The clearly erroneous rule does not shield findings of fact that rest on
erroneous interpretations of the law.89  So-called “constitutional facts” may
also be subject to a less deferential standard of review.90  The Supreme Court
has now made clear, however, that findings of fact based solely on
documentary evidence are subject to Rule 52(a)’s deferential standard of
review, and Rule 52(a) has itself been amended to codify that principle.91  The
Court has also applied the clearly erroneous standard to factual inferences 92
and certain ultimate facts.93  But the question whether the clearly erroneous
standard applies to all, or even most, ultimate facts and mixed questions of fact
and law in the federal court system remains open, as discussed in Part II of
this article.
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94. See, e.g., Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 110 (1995) (proper characterization of
question as one of fact or law is “sometimes slippery”); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113
(1985) (appropriate methodology to distinguish questions of fact and law “has been, to say
the least, elusive”).  In a very recent addition to the extensive literature discussing the
analytical distinction between “fact” and “ law,” Professors Allen and Pardo argue that there
is none.  Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction,  97 NW.
U.  L.  REV. 1769 (2003).  Rather than a distinct ontological or qualitative category, questions
of “law” are, in their view, “part  of the more general category of factual questions.”  Id. at
1770.    
95. See, e.g., Steven A. Childress,  Constitutional Fact and Process: A First Amendment Model
of Censorial Discretion, 70 TUL. L.  REV. 1229, 1310 (1996) [hereinafter Childress,
Constitutional Fact ]; Calleros, supra note 74, at 412; Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional
Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L.  REV. 229, 233 (1985) .   See also Sward, supra note 74, at 11
(distinguishing fact from law is “notoriously difficult” and law and fact are frequently
intertwined).   But see Allen & Pardo, supra note 94, at 1801 (to the extent there is a
continuum, legal facts are at one end and non-legal facts are at the other).
96. See, e.g., Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. at 110 (under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) governing
federal  habeas corpus proceedings, the statutory reference to “facts” means “basic, primary
or historical facts”); Louis, supra note 21, at n.3 (discussing definitions of “historical fact”);
infra note 118.
97. In Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506 (1953), Justice Frankfurter explained basic facts as
referring to “a recital of external events and the credibility of their narrators.”
98. See supra Part I.B.
II.  DEFINITIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACHES TO MIXED
QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW: FEDERAL COURTS
GRAVITATE TO THE LATTER
A.  The Limitations of the Fact/Law Distinction
The general rule that conclusions of law are reviewed freely on appeal,
while conclusions of fact receive varying degrees of deference, presents a
seemingly simple and straightforward dichotomy.  Both analytically and in
practice, however, the distinction between “fact” and “law” is far from clear
cut.94  Instead of a dichotomy, therefore, the concepts of fact and law are
more accurately viewed as a continuum95 on which the issues at each end are
more or less clearly delineated, but the proper identity of those in the middle
quickly becomes blurry.
At one end of the continuum are what are often referred to as “pure,”
“basic,” or “historical” facts.96  These tend to be facts of the “who, what,
where, why, and when” variety, such as the weather conditions on the date of
an accident or the identity of witnesses to a will.97  At the other end of the
continuum are “pure” questions of law, such as the constitutionality of a statute
or the correct choice between two conflicting legal rules.98
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99. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 291 (clearly erroneous rule applies to factual
inferences from undisputed basic facts).  See also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. at 287
(Rule 52(a) does not divide facts into categories). 
100. Ultimate facts have been defined as “simply the result reached by processes of legal reasoning
from, or the interpretation of the legal significance of, the evidentiary facts.” Bullock v.
Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 266 F.2d 326, 330 (5th Cir.  1959).  See also Foy v. First Nat’l
Bank, 868 F.2d 251, 254 (5th cir. 1989) (ultimate facts involve “the application of a legal
standard to the lay person’s idea of ‘t he facts of the case’”).  But see Sward, supra note 74,
at 29 (ultimate fact is a “factual conclusion, drawn from subsidiary facts, to which a legal
consequence applies”).  The most frequently quoted definition of mixed questions of fact and
law comes from Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. at 288.  See infra note 119.  Despite
the confusing explanat ion in  Swint, many ultimate facts appear to be either coterminous with
or a subset of mixed questions of fact and law, as traditionally defined.  See infra notes
112–119 and accompanying text. 
101. 456 U.S. 273.
102. Id. at 275.
103. James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1997). 
104. Id. at 275.  
On the factual end of the continuum, simple factual inferences based on
circumstantial evidence are also “facts.”  For example, there may be no direct
testimony at trial from witnesses who observed that a traffic light was green
at the time of an accident.  However, if witnesses testify that all of the cars
stopped in traffic  in the right lane began simultaneously to move forward just
before a collision, and no person was present in the intersection directing
traffic, a fact finder would be justified in inferring from this circumstantial
evidence that the traffic  light had turned green.  Simple factual inferences of
this type are generally considered solidly within the province of the original fact
finder.99
The classification and treatment of factual inferences quickly becomes
more confusing and controversial, however, when basic facts and simple
inferences blend into and become part of a finding of  “ultimate facts” or
“mixed questions of fact and law.”100  The Supreme Court may have helped
to generate some of the confusion in this regard by its language and reasoning
in the oft-quoted Pullman-Standard v. Swint case.101  In that case, the Court
seemed at times to distinguish ultimate facts from mixed questions of fact and
law.  At other times, it equated the two.
The issue on appeal in Swint was whether a union seniority system had
been adopted with the intent to discriminate on the basis of race and color.102
Applying a multi-factor test from a Fifth Circuit case,103 the district court found
that any differences in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
arising from the seniority system did not result from an intent to discriminate.104
In reversing the district court’s judgment on appeal, the Fifth Circuit reached
the opposite conclusion with regard to each of the principal factors determined
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105. Id . at 277, 282–85.  The standard of review applied by the Fifth Circuit in Swint was
somewhat confusing.  After stating that it was left with “the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake” had been made, the court referred to FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) in a footnote and quoted
language from East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332, 339 (5th Cir.  1975).  Romine had
characterized the existence or non–existence of discrimination as “essentially a question of
fact.  But Romine also characterized the issue of discriminatory intent as “a question of
“ultimate fact” because it is the “ultimate issue for resolution” under Title VII.  Id.  The
Romine court then stated that in reviewing district  court findings it would make an
independent determination of allegations of discrimination, although it conceded that it was
bound by findings of “subsidiary fact” that were not clearly erroneous.  Id . at 533 n. 6; 456
U.S. at 285. 
106. 456 U.S. at 285–86.
107. Id. at 287.  The Court was responding to opinions from the Fifth Circuit such as  Romine, 518
F.2d 332, that reviewed subsidiary facts deferentially and “ultimate facts” de novo.  
108. 456 U.S. at 287–88.
109. Id. at 289 (emphasis added).  The Court was arguably conceding in the quoted passage that
discriminatory intent was a type of mixed question of fact and law, but not one that lent itself
to non-deferential review.  At a minimum, the Court seemed to indicate that at least some
“ultimate” facts would be considered mixed questions of fact and law.  See Calleros, supra
note 74, at 437 (Swint case should not be applied automatically to every finding of
discriminatory intent).   The overlapping nature of mixed questions and ultimate facts is also
indicated in footnote 16 to the Swint opinion, in which the Court referred to the Fifth
Circuit’s tendency to treat ultimate facts as “only another way of stating a standard of review
with respect to mixed questions of law and fact.”  Acknowledging that the Supreme Court had
itself treated “ultimate facts” as independently reviewable in Baumgartner v. United States ,
by the district court and held that there was “no doubt” that a discriminatory
purpose existed.105 
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision, agreeing with
the petitioners that the appellate court had erroneously made an independent
determination of the existence of a discriminatory purpose.106  The Court first
observed that Rule 52(a)
does not make exceptions or purport to exclude certain categories of factual
findings from the obligation of a court of appeals to accept a district court’s
findings unless clearly erroneous.  It does not divide facts into categories; in
particular, it does not divide findings of fact into those that deal with
“ultimate” and those that deal with “subsidiary” facts.107  
In several passages, the Court then attempted to distinguish findings of
discriminatory intent from “mixed questions” of fact and law.  At one point, the
Court stated flatly that the question of whether the differential impact of the
seniority system reflected discriminatory intent was not a mixed question of
fact and law.108  A few passages later, however, the Court asserted that the
presence of discriminatory intent is not “a mixed question of law and fact of
the kind that in some cases may allow an appellate court to review the facts
to see if they satisfy some legal concept of discriminatory intent.”109  The
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322 U.S. 665 (1944), the Court concluded that Baumgartner  “did not mean that whenever
the result in a case turns on a factual finding, an appellate court need not remain within the
constraints of Rule 52(a).”  456 U.S. at 286 n. 16.  Rather, the Court said, Baumgartner’s
discussion of ultimate facts referred to “findings that ‘clearly impl[y] the application of
standards of law.’”  Id.  Because the Court found that the discriminatory intent issue in Swint
was a question of “pure fact,” Baumgartner  was not applicable.  Id. 
110. 456 U.S. at 289–290.  Professors Childress and Davis have interpreted the intent question in
Swint as being “in the nature of a fact conclusion (e.g., Mary did A, B, and C; therefore, Mary
intended D).”  2 CHILDRESS &  DAVIS, supra note 7, § 7.05, at 7–40.  Under this view, intent
is not a mixed question because it does not necessarily require the application of law.   Id.  Put
another way, intent is “ a fact question preliminary to the application of law to the fact of
intent rather than involving some legal definition of intent.”  Id. (emphasis supplied).   To
the extent that the Court in Swint was saying that discriminatory intent means actual intent,
without reference to legal principles, the application of a deferential standard of review is
consistent with the treatment of other findings of “fact” and seems non-controversial.
Whether the intent question in Swint truly was independent of any reference to legal
principles is, however, debatable.  See infra note 112.  Moreover, the term “ultimate fact”
is often used broadly to characterize questions that involve the application of law to fact.  See
supra note 100; infra note 117.  Thus, one apparent impact of the Swint  decision is that any
analysis of the standard of review for ultimate facts must specify whether the broad or the
narrow definition of “ultimate fact” is applicable.    
111. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982).  Later in the opinion, however, the
Court stated that “ whether an ultimate fact or not, discriminatory intent . . . is a factual
matter subject to the clearly erroneous rule.”  Id. at 293 (emphasis added). 
112. See supra note 110.  Although the Supreme Court indicated that the appellate court in Swint
had addressed the issue of discriminatory intent as one of fact “ unmixed with legal
considerations,” 456 U.S. at 286 n. 16, that characterization of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion
is questionable.   See Sward, supra note 74, at 32 (Fifth Circuit may have thought it was
deciding a mixed question that had legal aspects that were uncertain). 
113. See, e.g., Weiner,  supra note 86, at 1022 (because mixed questions cannot be “meaningfully
described” as law making or fact finding, terminology is not useful for analysis, and appellate
courts may simply affix labels without further comment).   See also Cooper,  supra note 72,
at 658 (courts “adhere to the fiction that all determinations are reviewed either as if rulings
of law or as if findings of fact”). Professors Allen and Pardo contend that the only distinction
between the categories of law, fact and mixed questions is allocative, not analytic.  Allen &
Pardo, supra note 94, at 1805–06.    
Court then went on to say that discriminatory intent under Title VII “means
actual motive; it is not a legal presumption to be drawn from a factual showing
of something less than actual motive.”110  Referring to the issue of
discriminatory intent at other points in the opinion as ultimately one of “pure
fact,” the Court held that the district court’s findings on discriminatory intent
could only be reversed if clearly erroneous.111
Notwithstanding the Court’s confusing and somewhat contradictory
explanation in Swint, “ultimate facts” appear to be questions of “pure fact” or
are otherwise treated deferentially primarily because the courts elect to place
them on the fact, rather than the law,112 side of the continuum for standard of
review purposes.113  In other words, the federal courts have not developed a
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114. See, e.g., Cooper,  supra note 72, at 658 (“obvious response” to law application process would
be to create a third and “presumably intermediate” standard of review); Louis, supra note 21,
at 998 (mixed questions “might justify a third or intermediate scope of review”).  Illinois
courts seem to be following this approach by reviewing at least some mixed questions under
what is, for the state courts, a new and different intermediate standard of review.  See infra
Part IV.
115. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982).
116. See, e.g., Louis ,  supra note 21, at 1003 (“division of power over mixed questions has been
neither simple nor consistent, even though the process of law application itself does not vary
from one context or venue to another”).  See infra Part II.C.
117. For example, Professor Louis equates “ultimate facts” with the application of law to fact and
mixed questions.  Louis, supra note 21, at 993, 1002.  He generally uses the term “ultimate
fact” to refer to all three concepts and characterizes them as neither “fact” nor “law,” but
rather “intermediate adjudicative determinations that combine elements of fact and law.”  Id.
at 1002.
118. Professor Monaghan notes that the law/fact distinction is used to describe three different
functions: “law declaration, fact identification, and law application.”  Monaghan, supra note
95, at 234.  The law declaration function leads to propositions that are general in character,
whereas fact identification is a case-specific inquiry into what happened that does not
significantly implicate legal principles.  Id. at 235.  Professor Monaghan describes law
application as “residual  in character” and states that it involves relating legal standards of
different or intermediate standard of review for a widely recognized third
category of issues that involve both factual and legal components.114  Thus,
courts adhering to the traditional linguistic  categories to determine the
applicable standard of review must ultimately choose to treat “grey” mixed
questions as either “black” issues of “fact,” subject to deferential standards of
review, or “white” issues of “law,” subject to de novo review.  
The Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulties of this process of
categorization in Swint when it observed:
The Court has previously noted the vexing nature of the distinction between
questions of fact and questions of law.  Rule 52(a) does not furnish particular
guidance with respect to distinguishing law from fact.  Nor do we yet know
of any other rule or principle that will unerringly distinguish a factual finding
from a legal conclusion.115
This “vexing nature” of the law-fact distinction is sometimes reflected in
disagreements over what term and definition to use to characterize questions
that involve elements of both fact and law, as illustrated in Swint itself.  It is
also reflected in the continuing inability of the appellate courts, as well as the
Supreme Court, to agree on a rule or principle for determining what standard
of review to apply to questions that involve elements of both fact and law.116
Nevertheless, most commentators now agree that there is a third category
of legal issues variously called ultimate facts,117 law application,118 or mixed
2003] Mixed up Questions 37
conduct to evidentiary facts.  Id. at 236.  By Professor Monaghan’s definition, law
application is “situation-specific” and does not involve the “generalizing feature of law
declaration.”  Id.  See also Cooper,  supra note 72, at 657–58 (in addition to findings of fact
and questions of law, it is now common to recognize a third category called “law application”
that shares characteristics of fact-finding and law-making); Weiner,  supra note 86, at 1022
(many trial court determinations involve neither reconstruction of past events/conditions nor
declaration of broad principles, but rather fall into a third category of “law application” in
which the court relates the governing legal standard to historical facts).  But see Allen &
Pardo, supra  note 94, at 1806 (law application, like “law,” is part of the category of “facts”).
119. For example, Professor Davis characterizes the law/fact distinction as “a spectral problem of
law, fact, and mixed questions of fact and law, plus the possibility of a discretionary decision.”
Davis, A Basic Guide, supra  note 15, at 472.  She describes mixed questions as those that
involve the application of law to fact.  Id. at 474.  See also Christie,  supra note 48, at 14
(courts traditionally distinguish among questions of law, questions of fact, and mixed questions
of law and fact).  The term “mixed question” is also used frequently by the Supreme Court,
which generally recites the definition from Pullman-Standard v. Swin t  that mixed questions
of law and fact are “questions in which the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule
of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or to put
it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not
violated.” 456 U.S. at 290 n.19 (1982).  See also Suzy’s Zoo v. Commissioner,  273 F.3d 875,
877 (9th Cir.  2001) (“A mixed question of law exists when primary facts are undisputed and
ultimate inferences and legal consequences are in dispute”).
120. See, e.g., Louis, supra note 21, at 1007 (policy-oriented approach to mixed questions is
superior); Monaghan, supra note 95, at 237 (“real issue” in treatment of mixed questions is
allocative, not analytic); see infra Part II.C.  See also Allen & Pardo, supra note 94.  Because
the institutional  factors are essentially the same (although they may carry different weight),
Part II draws at times on criminal, as well as civil, cases.  
questions of fact and law.119  Moreover, in determining what standard of
review to apply to this third category (referred to generically in this artic le as
“mixed questions” or “mixed questions of fact and law”), the federal courts
and commentators are increasingly employing a functional or policy-oriented
analysis to support their choice.120  The following section summarizes the
functional considerations that have traditionally been applied to explain the
allocation of responsibility to declare “law” and to find “facts” in the federal
judicial system.  Part II.C. then discusses the ways in which these functional
considerations have been used to analyze the appropriate standard of review
for mixed questions.
B.  The Functional or Policy Oriented Approach to Selecting Federal
Standards of Review
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121. For other functional and policy considerations that influence the choice of standards of
review,  see infra notes 127 and 136.  For an extensive discussion of the various policies and
rationales underlying the choice of standard of review, see Sward,  supra  note 74.  See also
Cooper, supra note 72, at 649–657 (discussing the institutional factors that affect the
allocation of responsibility between trial and appellate courts and noting that these factors
change over time and vary from one case to another).
122. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (fact/law distinction has at times turned on a
determination of whether one judicial actor is better positioned to decide an issue).  See also
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559–63 (1988) (analyzing which judicial actor is best
positioned to determine whether attorneys fees should be awarded under federal statute).  
123. 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982).  See also Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991)
(Rule 52(a) defers to the trial judge’s “unchallenged fact-finding ability”).  Commentators
have, however, questioned the degree to which trial judges and juries can accurately judge a
witness’s credibility.  See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 72, at 650 (finding “room to wonder”
whether the ability to observe demeanor enhances fact finding); Sward, supra note 74, at
20–21 (questioning common belief that opportunity to observe demeanor makes fact finder
more competent to judge credibility).
124. Concrete Pipe and Prods. v. Constr.  Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993).  See
also  Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 402 (1990) (issues involving credibility
are normally treated as factual matters); Calleros, supra note 74, at 419 (trial court’s general
advantage over appellate court in making findings of historical fact is greatest when findings
are based on evaluation of credibility of witnesses who have given conflicting testimony
before the judge). 
125. Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 623.  In Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, the Supreme Court
indicated that the deferential “clearly erroneous” standard of review under Rule 52(a) requires
even greater deference when a trial court’s findings of fact are based on credib i l i ty
determinations.  470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985).  Explaining the reasons for this greater deference,
The principal policy considerations taken into account by the federal
appellate courts in determining the optimal degree of deference to be accorded
to the tribunal below can be broken down into three broad, often overlapping
factors: comparative expertise, resource allocation, and considerations of
fairness.121  These factors have in turn been boiled down in many cases to the
single question of which decision-maker is better positioned to assume the
ultimate power of decision over a particular issue.122 
In explaining the allocation of power and responsibility in the federal
judicial system, the policy consideration of perhaps the greatest longevity and
emphasis is the original fact-finder’s superior ability to make credibility
determinations.  In Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc. , for
example, the Supreme Court noted that Federal Rule 52(a) is based on the
“unique opportunity” given to the trial court judge to evaluate witnesses’
credibility and weigh the evidence.123  The Supreme Court has also observed
that the fact finder in the “usual case” is in a better position to make judgments
about the reliability of evidence than is a reviewer acting solely on basis of a
written record.124  As the “most obvious example,” the Court pointed to the
fact finder’s ability to evaluate the credibility of live witnesses.125 
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the Court noted that “only the trial judge can be aware of the variations in demeanor and
tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener’s understanding of and belief in what is
said.”  Id.  The Court added, however, that factors other than demeanor and inflection may
affect the decision whether to believe a witness, such as the existence of documents or
objective evidence that contradicts the witness’s testimony.  A trial judge therefore cannot
“insulate” findings of fact from appellate review simply by labeling them credibility
determinations.  Id.  See also supra note 123.
126. Professor Sward suggests that competency considerations do not always weigh strongly in
favor of trial judges.  For example, a panel of appellate judges may be more competent than
a single trial judge to bring to bear a common human understanding to the process of finding
facts.  Sward, supra note 74, at 21.  Appellate judges on specialized courts such as the Federal
Circuit may also have a deeper understanding of specialized facts than a single trial judge.  See
id. at 22.
127. 470 U.S. at 574; Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 714 (1986) (quoting
Bessemer City with approval).  In cases discussing the standard of review for discretionary
decisions that involve significant factual components, the Supreme Court has also pointed to
various functional advantages of trial courts that extend beyond their superior ability to make
credibility determinations.  In Buford v. United States , 532 U.S. 59, 64–65 (2001), for
example, the Court found that district  judges are better positioned than appellate judges to
determine whether prior convictions should be consolidated for purposes of applying federal
sentencing guidelines because they are more familiar with trial and sentencing practices and
with relevant state and federal procedures.  In addition, district judges are more familiar with
case-specific factual details and nuances, on which “ legal results” in sentencing decisions
depend heavily.  Id. at 65.  See also Cooter , 496 U.S. at 402 (trial court is better situated than
reviewing court to marshal facts relevant to the imposition of sanctions under FED. R.CIV. P.
11 because it is familiar with the issues and litigants);  Pierce, 487 U.S. at 560  (by
participating in settlement conferences and other pretrial activities, trial court may have
insights not conveyed by the record into matters such as reliability of particular evidence);
Cone v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 216 (1947) (trial judge has “feel” for case
that no printed transcript on appeal can convey).
128. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir.  1982).  In addressing the proper
function of appellate courts, Professor Wright observed that there is universal agreement that
one function is “to discover and declare — or to make — law.”  Charles Alan Wright, The
Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L.  REV. 751, 779 (1956–1957). 
On other occasions, however, the Supreme Court has indicated that the
ability to make credibility determinations is not the only justification for
delegating fact finding responsibility to the original fact finder.  In Anderson
v. City of Bessemer City, for example, the Supreme Court observed that the
rationale for deferring to a district court’s finding of fact is not limited to the
trial judge’s superior ability to make credibility determinations:126 experience
gathered in fulfilling the trial judge’s central role as fact finder leads to fact-
finding “expertise” generally.127
In contrast to the functional considerations governing fact finding, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a widely cited decision, has identified several
structural advantages that appellate courts enjoy over trial courts in deciding
questions of law.128  First, appellate judges are better able to concentrate on
legal questions because they are not required to perform the time-consuming
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129. McConney, 728 F.2d at 1201.  In Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991)
(holding that district court determinations of state law are reviewed de novo), the Supreme
Court observed that district judges presiding alone over fast moving trials must necessarily
devote much of their energy and resources to evidentiary matters.  Burdened by the logistics
of trial advocacy, trial counsel is also hampered in its ability to supplement judicial research
into legal issues.  Thus, district judges often have to resolve complicated legal questions
without the benefit of lengthy reflection or extensive information.  Id. at 231–32 (quoting
Dan T. Coenen, To Defer or Not to Defer: A Study of Federal Circuit Court Deference to
District Court Rulings on State Law, 73 MINN. L.  REV. 899, 923 (1989)).
130. McConney, 728 F.2d at 1201.  The Supreme Court has observed that appellate courts “are
structurally suited to the collaborative juridical process that promotes decisional accuracy.”
Russel l , 499 U.S. at 232.  In addition to the fact that appellate judges are able to devote their
primary attention to legal questions, the Court noted that the parties’ briefs ordinarily
provide more information and analysis on appeal than they do at trial because legal issues
become more focused.  Id.  Most importantly, the use of multi-judge appellate panels allows
“reflective dialogue and collective judgment.”  Id. 
131. Professor Sward has characterized this ability of appellate courts to form binding precedents
as a very important functional reason for allocating ultimate power to them to decide legal
questions.  This allocation promotes fairness by imposing uniform legal principles throughout
broad geographic regions and, if the Supreme Court speaks, over the nation as a whole.  See
Sward, supra note 74, at 14–15.
132. Id.  Similar functional advantages seem to support the allocation of primary responsibility
for determining legal questions in administrative law cases on the reviewing courts.  Here,
however, there is a countervailing consideration: administrative agencies frequently bring
their own expertise and experience to the process of interpreting the laws they administer.
Hence, federal courts have increasingly given deference to administrative agency
determinations of law.  See supra notes 37–45 and accompanying text.
133. Allocating the power to declare law to appellate courts is also efficient because they have
broader authority and can resolve an open legal question for an entire region by deciding a
single case.  See Sward, supra note 74, at 15.
process of hearing evidence. 129  Second, appellate panels of at least three
judges hear every case, bringing to bear a collaborative, deliberative process
that reduces the risk of judicial error on questions of law.130  Third, appellate
decisions become controlling precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis and
affect rights of future litigants, whereas rulings on factual issues usually
concern only the immediate parties to a case. 131  “Sound judicial
administration” therefore supports a concentration of appellate resources on
ensuring that legal determinations are correct.132   
Related to considerations of competency and expertise are issues of
resource allocation designed to ensure that each actor in the judicial system
has the optimal setting in which to perform its predominant function.  As noted
above, for example, the fact that federal appellate decisions become controlling
precedent affecting rights of future litigants dictates that appellate resources
should primarily be directed to the process of ensuring that legal determinations
are accurate.133  In a world of finite judicial resources, the more time that
appellate courts spend delving into factual records to review the correctness
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134. Conversely, the time available to trial courts and other primary decision-makers to
concentrate  on legal questions is more limited given the additional pressures they face in
reviewing pleadings, adjudicating discovery disputes, hearing motions, taking evidence, and
undertaking the many other tasks involved in administering the pre-trial and trial process.
See supra note 129. 
135. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 72, at 649 (constantly increasing number of appeals requires
continual reexamination of balance between appellate courts’ law-declaring and corrective
functions); Louis, supra note 21, at 998 (crowded dockets and “temporal inability” of
appellate courts to immerse themselves in every case record necessitate deference to most
trial level determinations with substantial  factual components).   Cf. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax
Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990) (deference to trial court in determining FED. R. CIV. P. 11
sanctions “will streamline the litigation process by freeing appellate courts from the duty of
reweighing evidence and reconsidering facts”).  One of the principal concerns advanced by
critics of the constitutional  fact doctrine, discussed infra note 148, is that indiscriminate
application of the doctrine to all, or even many, cases involving constitutional issues would
overwhelm the dockets of the appellate courts.  See, e.g.,  Monaghan, supra note 95, at
246–247; Adam Hoffman, Note ,  Corraling Constitutional Fact: De Novo Fact Review in
Federal Appellate Courts, 50 DUKE L.J. 1427, 1445–56 (2001).
136. Duplicative fact finding at trial and then on appeal would also burden litigants.  See Anderson
v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574–575 (1985) (because parties have been required
to concentrate energies and resources on persuading a trial judge that their respective factual
accounts are correct, forcing them to persuade three more appellate judges “is requiring too
much”).   See also Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The
Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L.  R E V . 542, 567 (1969)
[hereinafter Carrington, Crowded Dockets] (describing the economic costs of appeals and the
potential  risk of eroding rights by extensive use of the process of review).  Other
commentators have focused on the potential  adverse impact of expanded appellate review
on the prestige and morale of trial court judges .   See, e.g., Nangle, supra note 74, at 426–427
(attributing the public’s perceived lack of confidence in trial courts primarily to “the
increasingly cavalier attitude of appellate court s in reversing trial court decisions” and noting
that there has been a consequent lowering of the morale of district court judges).  See also
Carrington, supra, at 567 (appellate court must keep in mind the need to preserve dignity and
significance of trial court proceeding); Cooper ,  supra  note 72, at 652 (deferential scope of
review enhances prestige of trial courts and forces parties to take initial trial seriously). 
137. Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr.  Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) (adding
that the second proceeding would render the first “ultimately useless”).  See also Pierce v.
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 560 (1987) (even if trial judge’s full knowledge of facts can be
of fact-finding,134 the less time they have to spend on their primary law-
declaring function.135
From the perspective of the judicial system as a whole, moreover,
significant additional resources would be required if appellate courts routinely
duplicated the trial courts’ fact-finding process, even if appellate review was
limited to reviewing the transcript of the proceedings below.136  Thus, the
Supreme Court has observed that a policy of giving deference to the original
fact finder’s conclusions of fact “makes sense because in many circumstances
the costs of providing for duplicative proceedings are thought to outweigh the
benefits.”137
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acquired by appellate court, that learning process often involves “unusual expense”);
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 552, 575 (1985)(duplication of trial judge’s
efforts on appeal would contribute only negligibly to accuracy of fact determination “at  a
huge cost in diversion of judicial resources”); Sward, supra note 74, at 24 (deferential review
of fact finding reflects a judgment that trial courts are sufficiently competent and fair that
extensive appellate review would be inefficient, producing little if any change in outcome of
cases at great cost).   But see John C. Godbold, Fact Finding by Appellate Courts — An
Available and Appropriate Power , 12 Cumb. L. Rev. 365 (1982) (describing a number of
instances in which appellate courts properly engage in fact finding).  
138. See, e.g., Louis, supra note 21, at 998; 1013 (attributing growing deference to fact finders
to “the litigation explosion”).  Concerns about the impact of the increasing appellate court
caseload are long-standing.  See generally Carrington, Crowded Dockets, supra note 136
(analyzing the perceived threat to the federal appellate courts’ institutional role from a
burgeoning case load).  Increased numbers of appeals may also increase the workload of the
trial courts.  See, e.g., Wright, supra note 128, at 780 (in addition to time and expense
involved in taking appeals themselves, successful appeals that lead to new trials add to burden
of over-crowded trial courts, and interlocutory appeals delay cases interminably).   
139. See, e.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990) (deferential review of
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 determinations will “discourage litigants from pursuing marginal appeals,
thus reducing the amount of satellite litigation”). 
140. Appellate courts are free to correct legal errors below.  The dispute here relates to the
appellate courts’ role in correcting factual errors.  Sward, supra note 74, at 17.  For a
discussion of the controversy surrounding the appellate courts’ corrective function, see
Calleros, supra note 74, at 421–422 (concluding that “the arguments in favor of at least
limited review for correctness are persuasive”).
141. Sward,  supra  note 74, at 25.  Professor Carrington notes that “[t]he precise accuracy of the
fact-finding may be of utmost concern to the litigants, but it is of little general concern to
others than the parties if an isolated mistake occurs in the judicial re-creation of events in
dispute.”  Carrington, Power of District  Courts, supra note 21, at 518.  He later concedes,
however, that even the “purest” factual findings should not be completely immune from
appellate review.  Id. at 519.  See infra notes  143–144 and accompanying text. 
A second consideration that impacts the allocation of resources within the
federal appellate system and that may influence decisions as to the applicable
standard of review is the pressure on the courts resulting from an apparently
ever-increasing caseload.138  Deferential standards of review that make it
more difficult to change the outcome of cases on appeal tend, at least in
theory, to reduce the number of appeals and allow appellate courts more time
to focus on their law-declaring function in those cases that are appealed.139
A countervailing although controversial factor revolves around the
appellate courts’ corrective function.140  This factor focuses on the importance
of ensuring justice for particular litigants in a particular case.141  As previously
indicated, a system in which reviewing courts duplicate the fact-finding process
in every case on appeal in order to correct any factual errors made below may
not be cost-effective.  On the other hand, a review system that gives complete
deference to fact-findings below may lead to an unacceptable number of
incorrect decisions and may ultimately undermine the public’s faith in the
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142. See Carrington, Power of District  Courts, supra note 21, at 519 (some “marginal  check” on
unfairness or lack of skill of trial judge should be supplied “in the interests of litigants and in
the public interest in providing them with reasonable satisfaction in the process); Sward, supra
note 74, at 25–26 (discussing values underlying the appellate courts’ corrective function).
The importance of providing a mechanism for at least some  error correction on appeal of
findings of fact is reflected in the fact that federal reviewing courts generally do not give
absolute deference to decisions below, but rather review for clear error or lack of substantial
evidence in support of a fact finder’s determination.  See supra  Part I.C. In discussing a
related issue,  commentators have observed that appellate courts may also quietly give
heightened scrutiny to the determinations of particular district judges where experience
indicates that their determinations are colored by bias, incompetence or other indicia of
untrustworthiness .   E.g . , Cooper, supra note 72, at 655–56 (adding that it is best to trust
appellate courts to use their power of searching review in such cases “wisely but
surreptitiously”).
143. Carrington ,  Power of District  Judges, supra note 21, at 519.  See also Cooper,  supra note 72,
at 657 (appellate courts cannot completely avoid the task of ensuring a “plausible fact
platform” for declarations of law).  
144. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 22, at 2 (“proper” scope of review depends on whether
corrective or law-declaring function is deemed more appropriate); Nangle, supra note 74, at
427 (commentators often emphasize the law-making function to the exclusion of the
corrective function); authorities cited supra  note 142.  See also Cooper,  supra note 72, at
649 (proper balance between the corrective and law-making functions “is not self-evident”).
For a discussion of the appellate courts’ corrective function in constitutional  cases, see
Monaghan, supra note 95, at 268–270.  See also Louis, supra note 21, at 1027 (for mixed
questions that are determinative of constitutional  rights “even occasional wrong results are
arguably unacceptable” and free appellate review may be justified).
fairness of the judicial system.142  Moreover, absolute deference would
potentially undermine the appellate courts’ law-declaring function by allowing
the trier of fact to “subvert” the law with hostile findings.143  The most serious
debates over the appropriate standard of review therefore often revolve
around disagreements over the relative importance of the appellate courts’
corrective function.144
The foregoing functional considerations have all been brought to bear on
the question of what standard of review should be applied, not only to questions
of “pure” law and “pure” fact, but also to mixed questions of fact and law.
Although very useful in framing and feeding the discussion and analysis, the
functional or policy-oriented factors nevertheless do not inevitably lead to a
single, undisputed solution to the “vexing” and “slippery” problem of how to
treat mixed questions, as the following section illustrates.
C.  Federal Standards of Review for Mixed Questions of Fact Under
Functional Analysis
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145. 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra  note 7, § 2.18, at 2–100.  The discussion in this section
principally revolves around the standard of review applicable to findings of mixed questions
by federal district  court judges.  Because of constitutional, historical and other factors, juries
in federal civil cases are generally allocated the responsibility for applying law to facts, and
their resulting determinations are generally reviewed deferentially under the substantial
evidence rule.  See Louis, supra note 21, at 996–97 & n. 19 (describing the constitutional,
historical and functional considerations that underlie judicial deference to jury determinations
of many mixed questions);  supra notes 51–64 and accompanying text.  See also 1 CHILDRESS
& DAVIS, supra note 7, § 3.05, at 3–41 (deferential jury standard of review “usually subsumes
any real distinction among facts, inferences, ultimate facts, or mixed law-fact questions”).
Nevertheless,  some mixed questions are either taken away from the jury initially or are
reviewed on appeal under a  non-deferential standard.  See Louis, supra note 221, at 1002–04;
1008.  See generally 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 3.09.  Federal courts have also
generally reviewed applications of law to facts by administrative agencies under the same
deferential standard as agency findings of historical fact.  See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns,
Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130–131 (1944) (mixed questions are treated with same deference as
historical facts); Tellepsen Pipeline Serv. Co. v. NLRB, 320 F.3d 554 (5th Cir.  2003) (court
must sustain agency’s application of its legal interpretations to facts of particular case when
result is supported by substantial evidence based on record as whole).  See generally Louis,
supra note 21, at 995 & n.11; 1007–1008; supra notes 65–71 and accompanying text.
Deferential review of administrative determinations of mixed questions is consistent with the
federal trend toward giving deference to administrative determinations of questions of law
under the Chevron doctrine.  See notes 40–44 and accompanying text.
146. 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 2.18, at 2–100 to 2–101.
One reason that choosing the proper standard of review for mixed
questions is “vexing” is that much is ultimately at stake.  As explained by
Professors Childress and Davis, if all conclusions containing some legal
reasoning are reviewed under a non-deferential standard of review, the trial
court’s role as fact finder may be usurped.145  Conversely, “if all conclusions
shaded by case facts are called fact, the appellate court may find that in its
law-making role it has little left to do; all decisions will be practically finalized
at trial.”146
Some reviewing courts, including the Supreme Court in certain contexts,
have utilized a functional analysis to determine which mixed questions will
receive deferential review and which will not.  Many of the Supreme Court’s
most extensive policy discussions of the standard of review for mixed
questions are contained in decisions raising constitutional issues.  Although the
balancing of institutional concerns may not lead to the same choice of standard
of review in non-constitutional cases, the reasoning of the Supreme Court’s
decisions nevertheless sheds light on the factors that influence the federal
choice of the standard of review for mixed questions generally.
One key factor in the Supreme Court’s analysis has been the perceived
need for heightened appellate scrutiny of some mixed questions because of
their impact on the appellate courts’ law declaring function.  In Bose Corp. v.
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147. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
148. Id. at 514.  The issue of actual malice as treated by the Court in Bose is considered by many
commentators to fall within a special category of so-called “constitutional  facts” that are
reviewed de novo.  The derivation of the phrase “constitutional fact” and the history of the
development of the constitutional fact doctrine of de novo review are described in Monaghan,
supra note 95, at 247–263 & n.17.  See also Hoffman, supra note 135, at  1445–56
(summarizing the evolution and current status of the constitutional  fact doctrine).  The
constitutional fact doctrine is an area of uncertain scope and origin.  See generally 1
CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 2.19; Louis, supra note 21, at 1031–32.  Although it
has clearly been applied to some mixed questions implicating constitutional  rights, the
doctrine may also apply to historical facts as well, at least in First Amendment cases.  See,
e.g., Childress, Constitutional Fact, supra note 95, at 1229.  
149. See supra notes 100–119 and accompanying text.
150. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 501 n.17 (1984). 
151. Id .  at 502.  Professor Monaghan criticized this aspect of the Court’s opinion in Bose,
pointing out that emphasis on the necessity for case-by-case adjudication would require de
novo review of most claims under the Bill of Rights.  Monaghan, supra note 95, at 243.
Professor Monaghan finds the true “driving impulse” in Bose to be the Court’s concern with
protecting First Amendment values.  Id. 
Consumers Union,147 for example, the Supreme Court emphasized the
importance of its law-declaring function when it held that a trial court’s
determination that a defendant in a defamation case acted with “actual malice”
would be reviewed de novo rather than under the deferential clearly erroneous
rule.148  Without clearly indicating whether it was treating the presence of
actual malice as an “ultimate fact” of the type found in Swint or as a mixed
question,149 the Court in Bose emphasized the extent to which some apparent
findings of “fact” implicate the Court’s law-declaring function:
A finding of fact in some cases is inseparable from the principle through
which it was deduced.  At some point, the reasoning by which a fact is
“found” crosses the line between application of those ordinary principles of
logic and common experience which are ordinarily entrusted to the finder of
fact into the realm of a legal rule upon which the reviewing court must
exercise its own independent judgment.  Where the line is drawn varies
according to the nature of the substantive law at issue.  Regarding certain
largely factual questions in some areas of law, the stakes)in terms of impact
on future cases and future conduct)are too great to entrust them finally to
the judgment of the trier of fact.150
 
In support of its decision to review the issue of actual malice independently, the
Court explained that the content of the “actual malice” rule is “given meaning
through the evolutionary process of common-law adjudication.”151  The Court
added that when the governing standard is provided by the Constitution, the
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152. Bose, 466 U.S. at 503.
153. 474 U.S. 104 (1985). 
154. 474 U.S. at 113 (citing Bose, 466 U.S. 485, and Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665).
155. 474 U.S. at 113–14 (citing Monaghan, supra note 95).
156. 474 U.S. at 114.  As one example, the Court cited the Bose case, 466 U.S. at 503.  The Court
also noted that it had on “rare occasions” justified more piercing scrutiny as a method of
compensating for bias or other shortcomings of the trier of fact.   474 U.S.  a t  114.   See infra
note 161.  Conversely, the Court stated that it had resolved close questions in favor of
deferential review when the issue turned largely on evaluations of witness demeanor and
credibility.  474 U.S. at 114. 
157. Id. at 115.
158. Id. at 116. 
159. Id. at 116–17.  The Court indicated, however, that findings of subsidiary facts such as the
length of the defendant’s interrogation should be reviewed deferentially.  Id. at 117. 
160. Id. at 117.
Court’s role in defining the limits of the standard through case-by-case
adjudication is “of special importance.”152
The Supreme Court undertook a more extended functional analysis in
Miller v. Fenton,153 a habeas corpus action challenging the voluntariness of
a confession.  Acknowledging the “elusive” nature of the fact/law
distinction,154 the Court attributed much of the difficulty in making the
distinction to the “practical truth” that the decision to assign a label “is
sometimes as much a matter of allocation as it is of analysis.”155  The Court
then observed that where a question “falls somewhere between a pristine legal
standard and a simple historical fact” and where Congress has not spoken, the
distinction between fact and law “at times has turned on a determination that,
as a matter of sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better
positioned than another to decide the issue in question.”156
In supporting its decision to review de novo the issue of the voluntariness
of a confession, the Court referred in part to “nearly a half century of
unwavering precedent” and to indications of congressional intent.157  Turning
to a more analytical approach, the Court noted that the voluntariness of a
confession has “always had a uniquely legal dimension” and a “hybrid quality”
that subsumes a complex of values.158  The Court downplayed that approach,
however, by emphasizing that, because assessments of credibility and
demeanor were not critical to resolving the ultimate issue of voluntariness, the
state-court judge was “not in an appreciably better position” than the reviewing
court to determine whether the confession was obtained in a constitutionally
permissible manner.159  Finally, the Court indicated that its corrective function
was strongly implicated because of an elevated risk “that erroneous resolution
of the voluntariness question might inadvertently frustrate the protection of the
federal right.”160 Although it professed confidence in state court judges, the
2003] Mixed up Questions 47
161. Id. at 117–118.  Professor Monaghan and others have also noted that the Supreme Court has
more rigorously scrutinized the application of law to facts where it has perceived a need to
curb “systemic bias” by other judicial actors.  Monaghan, supra, note 95, at 272–73.  See also
supra note 156. 
162. See, e.g., 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra , note 7, § 2.18, at 2–99 & n.14 (many mixed
questions are reviewed by the Court de novo, but other issues that seem to be mixed questions
are reviewed deferentially without discussion).   Nevertheless, the Court often emphasizes the
Miller v. Fenton functional approach when it is discussing the standard of review for mixed
questions generally.  1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra, § 2.13, at 2–76. 
163. See, e.g., Krizek v. Cigna Group, Inc., 345 F.3d 91(2d Cir. 2003); Phansalkar v. Andersen
Weinroth & Co., 344 F.3d 184, 199 (2d Cir. 2003); Weaver v. Shadoan, 340 F.3d 398, 405
(6th Cir. 2003) (mixed questions and “ultimate facts, based upon the application of legal
principles to subsidiary facts” are reviewed de novo); Besta v. Beneficial Loan Co., 855 F.2d
532, 533 (8th Cir. 1988) (plenary review of mixed questions). 
164. Some of the leading decisions explaining the rationale for reviewing mixed questions under
deferential standards come from the Seventh Circuit.  In Cook v. City of Chicago, 192 F.3d
693, 697 (1999), for example, Judge Posner observed that plenary review of mixed questions
is appropriate only in two situations: when there is a perceived need for uniformity across
cases or when the issue raised is of such importance that second guessing the initial decision
maker is justified.  See id.  In explaining why functional factors pointed to deferential review
of the trial judge’s invocation of laches in the Cook case itself,  Judge Posner noted that
“[u]niformity is important at the level of doctrine, so that people are given clear guidance
on conforming their behavior to law, but much less so at the level of the application of
doctrine to particular facts, a level at which meaningful uniformity is unattainable because no
two cases are alike.”  Id.  Concluding that it was unlikely that a case with “identical facts”
would recur, that the correct application of the laches doctrine was not “of such transcendent
importance” as to merit more rigorous scrutiny, and that the trial judge was better positioned
to make the decision, the court in Cook reviewed the trial judge’s determination deferentially,
resolving reasonable doubts in favor of the trial judge’s ruling because of the latter’s “greater
immersion in the case.”  Id.  See also Thomas v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d
305, 307 (7th Cir.  2002) (“divergent applications of law to fact do not unsettle the
law)doctrine is unaffected)a heavy appellate hand in these cases is unnecessary to assure the
law’s clarity and coherence”);  Bergersen v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 109 F.3d 56, 61
(1st Cir.  1997) (some deference should be afforded lower court’s ultimate determination of
mixed question because fact-finder is closer to evidence and may have a superior “feel”; value
Court nevertheless noted its “important parallel role in protecting the rights at
stake.”161
Where constitutional issues are at stake, the importance of protecting the
appellate courts’ law-declaring and corrective functions often tends to weight
the scale in favor of deferential review of mixed questions.  Although the
Supreme Court has relied on functional considerations in other decisions not
involving constitutional considerations, its express or implied treatment of mixed
questions has not been consistent.162  This same pattern is reflected in the
federal courts of appeal.  In some circuits, all or most mixed questions are
treated as questions of law and are reviewed by the appellate courts de
novo.163  Conversely, some federal circuits treat the majority of mixed
questions as questions of fact, subject to deferential review.164   
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of precedent is also limited “since the next shake of the kaleidoscope will produce a different
fact pattern”); Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602, 605–06 (7th Cir.  1986) (Posner,  J.) (appellate
court’s primary responsibility is to maintain law’s uniformity and coherence)a responsibility
which is not invoked when “the only question is the legal significance of a particular and
nonrecurring set of historical events”).  See generally Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decision
Making and the Proper Role of Federal Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict , 64
S. C. L.  REV. 235 (1991) (advocating adoption of the Seventh Circuit approach).
165. See, e.g., Scully v. US WATS, Inc., 238 F.3d 497, 505 (3d Cir. 2001) (narrative facts
reviewed for clear error; whether District  Court correctly applied state’s presumption of at-
will employment reviewed de novo); Theriot v. United States, 245 F.3d 388, 394 (5th Cir.
1998) (findings of mixed law and fact in admiralty action reviewed in two stages: underlying
fact findings and factual inferences reviewed under clearly erroneous standard and legal
conclusion based on factual data reviewed de novo).
166. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 (1984).  The Seventh Circuit analysis
described supra note 164 is also essentially a functional analysis.  From the leading cases, it
appears, however, that the Ninth Circuit often finds that legal concepts predominate in mixed
questions, while the Seventh Circuit often finds that “particular” and non-recurring factual
patterns predominate.  Compare, e.g., Cook  v. City of Chicago, 192 F.3d at 696 (mixed
questions are generally reviewed deferentially), with Charter Communications Inc. v. County
of Santa Cruz, 304 F.3d 927, 930 (9th Cir.  2002) (mixed questions are generally reviewed de
novo).  Whether facts are deemed likely to recur or present issues of general applicability
may, however, depend on the level of generality with which they are described or framed.
The circuit courts’ differing conclusions may also reflect implicit presumptions about the
standard under which mixed questions should be reviewed.  See infra note 356 and
accompanying text. 
167. McConney, 728 F.2d at 1202.
168. Id.  See also Charter Communications Inc. v. County of Santa Cruz, 304 F.3d at 930 (mixed
questions are generally reviewed de novo unless they present “an ‘essentially’ factual
inquiry”); Consolidated Mfg. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue., 249 F.3d 1231, 1236 (10th
Cir.  2001) (mixed questions are reviewed de novo or for clear error depending on whether
Other appellate courts employ a more complicated analysis.  For example,
some courts expressly “bifurcate” mixed questions into two parts.  Findings of
basic  or historical fact, as well as factual inferences, are reviewed
deferentially, but the application of legal rules to the facts is reviewed de
novo.165  In contrast, the Ninth Circuit expressly employs a “functional
analysis” to determine the standard of review for particular mixed questions.
For each such question, the court refers to “the sound principles which underlie
the settled rules of appellate review” and determines whether the concerns of
judicial administration favor the trial judge or the appellate court.166    
To make this assessment, the court determines if application of a legal rule
to the facts requires an “essentially factual” inquiry.167  If so, deferential
review is appropriate.  On the other hand, application of a legal rule to the
facts may require the court to “consider legal concepts in the mix of fact and
law and to exercise judgment about the values that animate legal principles.”
If so, concerns of judicial administration favor the appellate court and the
question is reviewed de novo.168
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question is primarily factual or legal).
169. McConney, 728 F.2d at 1203.  
170. Id. (citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. at 288).
171. Id. at 1204.
172. Id.  For a more detailed analysis of the federal courts’ treatment of mixed questions of fact
and law, see generally 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 2.18.  For a description of the
treatment of part icular mixed questions, see generally 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7,
§§ 2.21 to 2.30.  For additional discussion of the comparative functional factors affecting the
standard of review for mixed questions, see Louis, supra note 21, at 1010–15.
Utilizing this analysis, the Ninth Circuit has noted that “[t]he predominance
of factors favoring de novo review is even more striking when the mixed
question implicates constitutional rights.”169  On the other hand, the court
identified two categories of cases in which deferential review is appropriate.
The first category involves cases where someone’s state of mind is the issue,
as in Swint.170  The second category consists of negligence cases.171  Aside
from this general guidance, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that a functional
analysis is not a “litmus test” that neatly categorizes all mixed questions.
Instead, the court characterized its approach as a “neutral test that accurately
reflects the concerns that properly underlie standard of review
jurisprudence.”172
In summary, federal courts generally recognize the existence of a separate
category of mixed questions and increasingly emphasize functional
considerations in determining the standard of review applicable to them. There
is, however, no general consensus on what that standard of review should be,
reflecting the complexity of the issues involved.  In contrast, Illinois courts
have generally been slower to recognize the existence of a separate category
of mixed questions, although that state of affairs is changing.  Following an
overview of traditional Illinois standards of review for determinations of “law”
and “fact” in the following section, Part IV of this article examines the Illinois
Supreme Court’s recent recognition of a new intermediate standard of review
for at least some mixed questions, while Part V probes some of the
ramifications of that development.
III.  ILLINOIS STANDARDS OF REVIEW OF CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND FINDINGS OF FACT IN CIVIL CASES UNDER
TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS
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173. Illinois has a constitutionally based three-tiered court system consisting of the Illinois
Supreme  Court, an appellate court divided into five districts, and a single body of circuit
courts of general jurisdiction serving judicial circuits consisting of one or more counties.  ILL.
CONST . art.VI, § 1 (“The judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court, an Appellate Court and
Circuit Courts.”);  id. § 2 (State is divided into five Judicial Districts for the selection of both
Supreme Court and Appellate Court judges); id. § 7(a)&(b) (describing structure of circuit
courts); id. § 9 (Circuit Courts have original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters).   See also
PARNESS, supra note 6, at § 1–1 (describing history and structure of Illinois court system).
The subject matter jurisdiction of the Illinois courts is generally defined constitutionally.  Id.
With some exceptions, the Illinois constitution does not specifically address the question of
who makes practice and procedure laws in Illinois, including those governing civil appeals,
although the primary responsibility appears to be shifting away from the legislature and
toward the judiciary.  See id. § 1–2 (discussing the complex structure and history of legislative
and  judicial responsibility for civil procedural law in Illinois).  See also Best v. Taylor Mach.
Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1078–79, 1091 (Ill. 1997) (describing separation of powers and
inherent powers of judiciary).  Under the Illinois Constitution, the legislature does share
power with the  judiciary to regulate judicial review of administrative agency decisions.  See
generally 6 NICHOLS ILL. CIV. PRAC. § 126.06 (2002) [hereinafter NICHOLS] (discussing
balance of power between supreme court and legislature regarding procedures for judicial
review of  administrative actions).  The sources of Illinois standards of review vary depending
on whether the original decision maker is a jury, circuit court judge, or administrative agency.
174. See supra Parts I & II.A.  Like the federal appellate courts, Illinois courts also recognize a
third category of decisions: those committed to the discretion of the original tribunal.  Such
discretionary decisions are generally reviewed under the very deferential “abuse of discretion”
standard.   For  a discussion of the Illinois standard of review for discretionary matters, see
PARNESS, supra note 6, § 15–3(d); NICHOLS, supra note 173, § 126.25.
175. Thus, Illinois’  deferential “manifest weight” standard for findings of fact has been
characterized as a “one-size-fits-all” or “all-purpose” rule.  O’Neill & Brody, supra note 6,
at 515, 517.  In contrast, findings of fact by federal district court judges are reviewed under
a less deferential standard than findings by juries and administrative agencies.  See supra Part
I.C. 
Illinois standards of appellate review173 have traditionally been based on
the fact/law dichotomy that has also been used in the federal appellate court
system.174  In general, questions of law have been reviewed in Illinois under
a non-deferential or de novo standard of review.  Findings of fact, as well as
many mixed questions of fact and law, have been reviewed under a deferential
standard.  Unlike the federal courts, however, Illinois courts have traditionally
applied a single deferential standard of review, regardless of the identity of the
original decision-maker.175  Thus, findings of fact by juries, circuit court judges
and administrative agencies have all traditionally been reviewed under the
“manifest weight of the evidence” standard described below.  
A.  De Novo Review of Conclusions of Law
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176.  “Any error of law affecting the judgment or order appealed from may be brought up for
review.”  ILL. SUP. CT.  R. 366(b)(1)(i). 
177. Appellate courts’ power of review over decisions by juries raises a somewhat different and
more complicated analysis.  In a jury trial, a judge instructs the jury as to the applicable law,
but the jury applies the law to the facts of the case.  To the extent the jury “makes law” as
part of the application process, its decision is reviewed under the deferential manifest weight
of the evidence standard of review.  See supra note 145.
178.  See, e.g. ,  In re Adoption of K.L.P., 763 N.E.2d 741, 744–45 (Ill. 2002) (decisions finding
a statute unconstitutional  are reviewed de novo); In re C.W., 766 N.E.2d 1105, 1113 (Ill.
2002) (same). 
179. See, e.g., Jarvis v. South Oak Dodge, Inc., 773 N.E.2d 641, 645 (Ill. 2002) (issues of statutory
construction are reviewed de novo).
180. See, e.g., In re Storment, 786 N.E.2d 963, 969 (Ill. 2002) (t he construction of supreme court
rules is a question of law reviewed de novo).
181. See, e.g., Murneigh v. Gainer, 685 N.E.2d 1357, 1362 (Ill. 1997) (orders granting summary
judgment on issues of law are reviewed de novo); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (Ill. 1992) (appeals from summary judgment rulings are reviewed
de novo). 
182. See, e.g., Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co., 776 N.E.2d 151, 159 (Ill. 2002) (orders granting motion
to dismiss an amended class action complaint under 735 ILL. COMP . STAT. 5/2–615 (1996)
are reviewed de novo); Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exch. v. Hodge, 156 N.E.2d 732, 735
(1993) (orders granting motion for involuntary dismissal under 735 ILL. COMP . STAT. 5/2–619
(2003) are reviewed de novo).
183. See, e .g . , Evans v. Shannon, 776 N.E.2d 1184, 1186 (Ill. 2002) (denials of motions for
judgment not withstanding the verdict, like adverse rulings on motions for directed verdict,
are reviewed de novo).
184. See, e.g., Bucheleres v. Chicago Park Dist., 665 N.E.2d 826, 831 (Ill. 1996) (whether person
owes duty of reasonable care under particular circumstances is issue of law for court and is
reviewed de novo).
185. See, e.g., Reda v. Advocate Health Care, 765 N.E.2d 1002, 1007 (Ill. 2002) (applicability of
evidentiary privilege and exceptions thereto are matters of law subject  to  de novo review).
For a more comprehensive discussion and listing of Illinois cases applying the de novo
standard of review, see generally NICHOLS, supra note 173, § 118.14.  See also PARNESS,
supra note 6, § 15.3(a).  
Like their federal counterparts, Illinois appellate courts have the ultimate
responsibility for deciding questions of law.176  Thus, they generally are not
required to defer to legal interpretations and conclusions of law made by circuit
courts, administrative agencies, and other original decision-makers.177
Particular types of legal questions that are subject to de novo review in Illinois
include the constitutionality of statutes,178 the correct interpretation of
statutes179 and rules,180 the appropriateness of decisions to grant motions for
summary judgment181  and motions to dismiss,182 and the appropriateness of
decisions to deny motions for a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding
the verdict.183  Other examples of questions of law subject to non-deferential
review include the existence of a legal duty184 and the applicability of statutory
evidentiary privileges.185
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186. In other decisions, however, the supreme court has not referred in any way to judicial
deference and has stated flatly that administrative agency interpretations of law are reviewed
de novo or  independently.  See, e.g., Raintree Health Care Ctr v. Ill. Human Rights Comm’n,
672 N.E.2d 1136, 1141 (Ill. 1996) (reviewing courts exercise independent review over agency
conclusions of law and statutory construction); People ex rel. Hartigan, v. Ill. Commerce
Comm’n, 592 N.E.2d 1066, 1074 (Ill. 1992) (stating without qualification that commission’s
interpretation of question of law is not binding on court).
187. E.g., Reed v. Kusper, 607 N.E.2d 1198, 1203 (Ill. 1992) (“generally recognized” that courts
give “substantial  weight and deference” to agency interpretations of statutes they administer
and enforce);  Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. State Dep’t of Employment Sec., 544 N.E.2d 772,
777 (Ill. 1989) (same). See also Denton v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 679 N.E.2d 1234, 1236 (Ill.
1997) (courts give “considerable deference” to agency interpretations of statutes they
administer);  Castillo v. Jackson, 594 N.E.2d 323, 330 (Ill. 1992) (courts give “substantial
weight” to agency interpretations).
188. E.g., Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Bd., 634 N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ill. 1994) (courts give
“substantial  weight and deference” to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes if charged
with the statute’s interpretation and administration); Abrahamson v. Ill. Dep’t of Prof’l
Regulation, 606 N.E.2d 1111, 1121 (Ill.1992)(same);  Ill. Consol. Tel. Co. v. Ill. Commerce
Comm’n, 447 N.E.2d 295, 300 (Ill. 1983) (same).
189. E.g., Ill. Consol. Tel. Co., 447 N.E.2d at 300 (though consistency and duration are not
requisites for according deference, agency statutory constructions that have been
“consistently adhered to” for a long time will often be treated deferentially).
190. E.g., Harrisburg-Raleigh Airport Auth. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 533 N.E.2d 1072, 1073–74 (Ill.
1989) (agency’s determination of question of law is entitled to “some deference”).
191. E.g., Shields v. Judges’ Ret. Sys., 791 N.E.2d 516, 518 (Ill. 2003) (as “general rule” courts
“accord deference” to agency interpretations of statutes they administer); Freeport v. Ill.
State Lab. Rel. Bd., 554 N.E.2d 155, 163 (Ill. 1990) (courts “defer” to construction of
ambiguous statute by administrative agencies); City of Burbank v. Ill. State Lab. Rel. Bd., 538
N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ill. 1989) (agency interpretation of statute is “generally accorded
deference”); City of Decatur v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees, 522 N.E.2d
1219, 1222 (Ill. 1988) (courts “accord deference” to agency statutory interpretations);
Northern Trust Co. v. Bernardi, 504 N.E.2d 89, 93 (Ill. 1987) (courts “defer” to construction
of ambiguous statutes by administrative agencies).
Despite the general rule that Illinois appellate courts review questions of
law de novo, the Illinois Supreme Court has stated on a number of occasions
that reviewing courts will give varying degrees of deference to conclusions of
law by administrative agencies.186  In some decisions, the court has explained
that reviewing courts will give “substantial weight or deference”187 to
administrative agency interpretations of the statutes they administer,
particularly if the statute is ambiguous188 or the agency’s interpretation is long-
standing.189  In other decisions, the court has indicated that agency
interpretations of law will be given “some deference”190 or simply
“deference.”191 
In most instances where the Illinois Supreme Court has discussed the
deference that courts will give to agency legal interpretations, the court has
gone on to emphasize that the agency’s interpretation of the law is not binding
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192. E.g., Shields v. Judges’ Ret. Sys., 791 N.E.2d at 518 (Ill. 2003) (though courts accord
deference, an agency’s statutory interpretation is not binding and will be rejected if
erroneous); Gem Electronics of Monmouth, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 702 N.E.2d 529, 532
(Ill. 1998) (though courts may give substantial deference, agency’s conclusions of law are not
binding on a reviewing court); Northern Trust Co. v. Bernardi, 504 N.E.2d at 93
(“fundamental” that erroneous constructions of statutes by agencies are not binding on
courts).   See also Castillo v. Jackson, 594 N.E.2d at 330 (deference to agency statutory
interpretation does not displace  judicial analysis); Freeport v. Ill. State Lab. Rel. Bd., 554
N.E.2d at 164 (“Reviewing courts may not rubber-stamp administrative decisions they deem
inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that frustrate the policy underlying the statute.”);
Harrisburg-Raleigh Ai rport  Auth. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 533 N.E.2d at 1074 (agency decisions
“based upon an erroneous, arbitrary or unreasonable construction of a statute cannot be
allowed to stand”). 
193. C f .  Gem Electronics of Monmouth, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 702 N.E.2d 529, 532 (Ill.
1998) (court “may give” substantial weight and deference to agency’s interpretation of
ambiguous statute it  administers and enforces).  At first glance, the supreme court’s decision
in Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, seems to indicate that agency actions are
subject to de novo revi ew only in “rare instances.”  524 N.E.2d 561, 576 (Ill. 1998).  Read
in context, however, the court appears to be summarizing the standards of review applicable
to matters committed to agency discretion, which are traditionally reviewed under very
deferential standards.  See supra n.31.
194. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.  Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  See supra
notes 40–44 and accompanying text.  Several Illinois Supreme Court decisions have cited
Chevron or its progeny with approval.  In two instances, the court was discussing the
deference to be given to federal agency interpretations of federal statutes.  See Busch v.
Graphic Color Corp., 662 N.E.2d 397, 407 (Ill. 1996) (discussing deference to be given to
federal agency interpretation of Federal Hazardous Substance Act); Spitz v. Goldome Realty
Credit Corp., 600 N.E.2d 1185, 1187 (Ill. 1992) (discussing deference to be given to Federal
agency interpretation of Federal Home Owners Loan Act).  Nevertheless, in Church v. Stat e,
646 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Ill. 1995), the Illinois Supreme Court held that the Illinois legislature
had expressly delegated to the Department of  Professional Regulation the authority to
determine which standards an applicant must meet in order to qualify for a private alarm
contractor’s license.  Citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, the Illinois Supreme Court stated in
Church  that where the legislature expressly or implicitly delegates the authority to clarify and
define a statutory provision to an agency, the court “should” give substantial weight to the
agency interpretation unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”
Church, 646 N.E.2d at 577.  The court in Church did not expressly include its usual caveat
that reviewing courts are “not bound” by the agency’s interpretation.  See supra note 192
and accompanying text.  The court did, however, cite Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of
Professional Regulation  in conjunction with Chevron, and Abrahamson did contain such a
caveat.  606 N.E.2d 1111, 1121 (Ill. 1992); 646 N.E.2d at 577.  As indicated supra note 43,
the Chevron doctrine is likely rooted in an interpretation of the legislative intent of the
United States Congress; thus, there appears to be no compelling reason to impose its
requirement of mandatory deference on Illinois reviewing courts absent a similar finding of
intent in the legislative history of the Administrative Review Law or the organic statutes
on the reviewing courts.192  Thus, it appears that the Illinois appellate courts’
policy of deference to administrative agency legal interpretations is an informal
one and is not a rule of mandatory deference193 similar to that accorded
federal administrative agencies under the Chevron doctrine.194    
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governing particular Illinois administrative agencies.  Even in the presence of such intent, the
shared legislative and judicial power over administrative agencies under the Illinois
Constitution should be taken into account in any interpretation that unduly restr icts  the
power of the Illinois Supreme Court to decide issues of law.  C f. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works,
689 N.E.2d 1057, 1079 (Ill. 1997) (“the legislature is prohibited from enacting laws that
unduly infringe upon the inherent powers of judges”).
195. 447 N.E.2d 295 (Ill. 1983).  The issue in the Illinois Consolidated Telephone case was
whether the commerce commission had jurisdiction over radio paging as a “public utility.”
After initially concluding that it did have jurisdiction, the commission contended on appeal
that it did not.  The Supreme Court considered and gave weight to the agency’s second
attempt at construing the statute and ultimately agreed with the agency’s interpretation.  Id.
at 299–301.  See also Abrahamson v. Ill. Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 606 N.E.2d at 1121
(citing Illinois Consolidated Telephone with approval).
196. 447 N.E.2d at 300.
197. See i d . ; Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Bd., 634 N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ill. 1994) (agencies
are “an informed source” of legislative intent and can make “informed judgments” based on
experience and expertise).
198. In delineating the scope of review of the Illinois appellate court, ILL. SUP. CT.  R.
366(b)(1)(ii) states: “Any error of fact, in that the judgment or order appealed from is not
sustained by the evidence or is against the weight of the evidence, may be brought up for
review.”  Rule 366 does not draw a distinction between factual errors by juries and those by
trial judges or other decision makers.  See NICHOLS, supra note 173, § 118.22.
199. Abrahamson v. Ill. Dep’t of Prof. Regulation, 606 N.E.2d at 1117.  See also Rhodes v.
Ill.Cent. Gulf R.R., 665 N.E.2d 1260, 1274 (Ill. 1996) (reviewing court may not reweigh the
evidence and substitute its judgment for the jury’s);  Zadereka v. Ill. Human Rights Comm’n,
545 N.E.2d 684, 688 (Ill. 1989) (finding it “axiomatic” that reviewing court may not reweigh
evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact).
In those instances where the Illinois Supreme Court has indicated that
judicial deference should be accorded to agency interpretations of the laws
they administer, the reasons given for that policy of deference are generally
functional.  In Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce
Commission, 195 for example, the court noted that “a significant reason” for
giving such deference is that agencies are in a position to make informed
judgments based on their experience and expertise.196  Agencies are also able
to provide informed guidance to the courts with regard to ascertaining
legislative intent.197  
B.  Deferential Review of Findings of Fact: The Manifest Weight of the
Evidence Standard
Although Illinois courts generally review conclusions of law under a non-
deferential standard, they review findings of fact deferentially.198  Thus,
appellate courts do not re-weigh the evidence on appeal or make independent
findings of fact.199  Nor do they substitute their judgment for that of the original
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200. Abrahamson v. Ill. Dep’t of Prof. Regulation, 606 N.E.2d at 1117.  See also Bazydlo v.
Volant, 647 N.E.2d 273, 276 (Ill. 1995) (reviewing court should not overturn trial court’s
findings “merely because it does not agree” or because it might have reached different
conclusion); Kalata v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 581 N.E.2d 656, 661 (Ill. 1991) (reviewing court
must not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact). 
201. E.g., Kalata, 581 N.E.2d at 661 (Ill. 1991) (courts of review defer to trial court’s factual
findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence).  See supra note 175.
202. Jury determinations are accorded great deference in Illinois, as they are in the federal judicial
system.  The right to a trial by jury in civil cases in Illinois derives in part from the Illinois
Constitution.  See ILL. CONST . art I, § 13 (“right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall
remain inviolate”); Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc. 643 N.E.2d 734, 753 (Ill. 1994)
(constitutional  right to a jury applies only to actions where the right existed under English
common law at the time the first Illinois constitution was adopted).  In other instances, a
right to trial by civil jury is specifi cally authorized by the Illinois legislature.  See generally
PARNESS,  supra note 6, §§ 57(1)–(26)  (discussing the history and scope of the right to trial
by jury in civil cases in Illinois).  Although they give deference to jury verdicts, reviewing
courts nevertheless have the authority to set aside a verdict if contrary to the manifest weight
of the evidence.  See Olson v. Chicago Transit Auth., 115 N.E.2d 301, 303 (Ill.1953) (tracing
judicial power to review jury verdicts back to English common law precedents). 
203. The power to adopt rules governing appeals of decisions by Illinois administrative agencies
is shared by the legislature and the judiciary.  See supra note 173.  Many administrative
agency appeals are governed by the Illinois Administrative Review Law.  735 IL L .  C OMP .
STAT. §§ 5/3–101 to 3–113 (2002).  The Act’s provisions generally apply to administrative
action of a judicial or quasi–judicial nature. NICHOLS, supra note 173, § 126.03.  See also id.
§ 126.03 (discussing act’s scope).  Section 5/3–110 of the Administrative Review Law
provides that administrative agency findings of fact are deemed to be prima facie true and
correct.  735 ILL. COMP . STAT. § 5/3–310 (2002).  See infra note 282.  The supreme court
has interpreted this provision to mean that the reviewing court is limited to ascertaining
whether the findings and ultimate decisions of an administrative agency are against the
manifest weight of the evidence.  E.g., Davern v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 269 N.E.2d 713, 714
(Ill. 1970).  Where an organic statute does not expressly adopt the Administrative Review
Law provisions for judicial review or otherwise provide for a form of review, agency
determinations may be appealed via a common law writ of certiorari.  The standards of review
under the writ are “essentially the same” as those under the Administrative Review Law.
Hanrahan v. Williams, 673 N.E.2d 251, 253–54 (Ill. 1996).
decision-maker or reverse a determination simply because an opposite
conclusion is reasonable or the reviewing court might have ruled differently.200
Rather, reviewing courts examine findings of fact or judgments solely to
determine whether they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.  As
noted earlier, the manifest weight of the evidence standard is applied uniformly
to findings of fact in Illinois regardless of whether the original decision-maker
is a trial judge,201 jury,202 or administrative agency.203 
Although there is no question that “manifest weight of the evidence” is a
deferential standard of review, it is not as clear  on its face what the term
“manifest weight of the evidence” means or how the standard should be
applied in practice.  In recent years, the Illinois Supreme Court seems to have
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204. Appellate court characterizations of the manifest weight of the evidence rule applicable to
jury verdicts and trial court determinations are less uniform.  Compare, e.g., Monier v.
Winkler,  511 N.E.2d 246, 250 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (manifest weight of the evidence is “that
weight which is clearly evident, plain and indisputable”),  with Raclaw v. Fay, Conmy & Co.,
668 N.E.2d 114, 116 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (for trial court judgment to be against manifest
weight of evidence, appellant “must present evidence that is so strong and convincing as to
overcome, completely, the evidence and presumptions, if any, existing in the appellee’s
favor”).  See generally NICHOLS, supra note 173, § § 118.15, 118.21 to 118.27; 118.33 to
118.37 (citing a number of Illinois cases describing the manifest weight of the evidence rule).
In defining or  explaining the manifest weight standard of review in jury cases, a number of
appellate court decisions state that verdicts are against the manifest weight of the evidence
if they are “palpably erroneous.”  E.g., Young v. City of Centreville,  523 N.E.2d 621,628
(Ill. App. Ct. 1988).   The derivations of this particular explanation of the manifest weight
rule are not clear, as the Illinois Supreme Court has used the term “palpably erroneous” or
variations thereof relatively infrequently.  But see, e.g., Forest Pres. Dist. v. Galt, 107 N.E.2d
682, 684 (Ill. 1952) (whether jury verdict is against manifest weight of the evidence requires
either a “clear and palpable mistake” or a showing that the verdict was the result of passion
and prejudice).   The terms “palpable,” “clear” and “manifest” are, however, basically
synonymous.  See WEBSTER’S NE W  UN I V E R S A L  UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY  1290 (one
definition of “palpable” is “clear to the mind; obvious; evident, plain”).  Thus, the appellate
court gloss on the meaning of the manifest weight of the evidence rule does not appear to
reflect an attempt to change its scope.  Nevertheless, indiscriminate use of terms such as
“ palpably erroneous” and “clearly erroneous” in defining manifest weight of the evidence
risks confusion with the more deferential “clearly erroneous” rule.  See supra Part I.C.2, infra
Part IV.
205. Technically, civil jury verdicts and circuit court judgments following trial without a jury are
a  form of “mixed question” in that they typically involve the application of legal rules to
the facts presented at trial to reach an over-all determination of liability or no liability.  As
discussed in the following section, the manifest weight of the evidence standard has
traditionally been applied to many mixed questions in Illinois.  See infra note 232 and
accompanying text.  The same or similar definitions of manifest weight of the evidence seem
to be employed regardless of whether the judgment as a whole or a particular finding of fact
is under review. 
206. Snelson v. Kamm, 787 N.E.2d 796, 815 (Ill. 2003).  Other supreme court decisions use the
same or substantially the same definition.  E.g., Leonardi v. Loyola Univ., 658 N.E.2d 450,
461 (Ill. 1995) (judgment on jury verdict is against manifest weight of evidence only when
opposite conclusion is “apparent” or when findings “appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or
not based on evidence”); Maple v. Gustafson, 603 N.E.2d 508, 512–13 (Ill. 1992) (quoting
lower court opinions holding that a jury verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence
if opposite conclusion is clearly evident or jury findings are unreasonable, arbitrary and not
based on any of the evidence).  
settled on a relatively uniform204 definition of “manifest weight of the
evidence” when speaking of jury verdicts.205  Thus, a jury verdict is deemed
to be against the weight of the evidence “where the opposite conclusion is
clearly evident or where the findings of the jury are unreasonable, arbitrary,
and not based upon any of the evidence.”206  The same or virtually the same
definition has also been applied in a number of recent supreme court cases
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207. E.g., Bazydlo v. Volant, 647 N.E.2d 273, 277 (Ill. 1995) (judgment in bench trial is against
manifest weight of the evidence only when “opposite conclusion is apparent” or findings
“appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence”).  At times, however, the
supreme court explains the manifest weight standard for bench trials in other terms.  E.g .,
Suburban Bank v. Bousis, 578 N.E.2d 935, 942 (Ill. 1991) (“In general, great weight is
attached to the trial judge’s factual findings.”)
208. T here is a similar lack of uniformity in definitions and explanations of the manifest weight
of the evidence standard in administrative law cases at the intermediate appellate court level.
Compare,  e .g ., File v. D & L Landfill, Inc., 579 N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(administrative decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if opposite result
is  “clearly evident, plain, or indisputable from a review of the evidence”), with EPA v.
Pollution Control Bd., 624 N.E.2d 402, 404 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (if “any evidence fairly
supports” its action, agency decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence).  See
also Berry v. Edgar, 548 N.E.2d 575, 578 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (reviewing court’s sole
function is to determine if agency’s decision is “just and reasonable in light of the evidence
presented”). Tracing back the various judicial glosses on the meaning of “manifest weight of
the evidence” gives glimpses at times of a process similar to the proverbial office rumor mill.
Thus, by the time a definition has been repeated, explained and rephrased over a number of
years, the result sometimes bears little resemblance to the original source.  Cf. Anderson  v .
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 264–65 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (in another
context, comparing the Court’s reasoning to the children’s game of “telephone,” where a
message is repeated from person to person to person, so that eventually, “the message bears
little resemblance to what was originally spoken.”).   Another factor that helps to engender
confusion is reliance on federal precedents of dubious relevance.  In one instance, for
example, a court held that to find an administrative agency decision against the manifest
weight of the evidence, the reviewing court must determine that “no rational trier of fact
could have agreed” with the agency decision.  Agans v. Edgar, 492 N.E.2d 929, 933 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1986).  In support of this interpretation, the court relied on a United States Supreme
Court case reviewing the record in a habeas corpus proceeding to determine whether the
evidence supported a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 933–34 (citing
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)).
209. Abrahamson v. Ill. Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 606 N.E.2d 1111, 1117 (Ill. 1992).  This
formulation reflects part of the definition in Snelson , 787 N.E.2d at 815, but omits the
reference to findings that are unreasonable, arbitrary or not based on evidence.   See supra
note 206 and accompanying text.  See also Ceres Ill., Inc. v. Ill. Scrap Processing, Inc., 500
N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. 1986) (trial court finding is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence
if,  after viewing the evidence in light most favorable to prevailing party, conclusions opposite
to those reached below are “clearly evident”).  Other administrative law cases state that a
decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion is “clearly
apparent,” a phrase that seems synonymous with “clearly evident.”  See, e.g., Jack Bradley,
reviewing judgments, as well as particular findings of fact, rendered by circuit
courts in bench trials. 207
There appears to be less uniformity in the definitions and explanations of
“manifest weight of the evidence” used by the Illinois Supreme Court when
determinations of Illinois administrative agencies are under review on
appeal.208  One frequently cited administrative agency decision states that
agency findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the
opposite conclusion is “clearly evident.”209  Other opinions state that the
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Inc. v. Dep’t of  Employment Sec., 585 N.E.2d 123, 128 (Ill. 1991).
210. Chief Judge v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees, 607 N.E.2d 182, 185 (Ill.
1992).  This definition seems most prevalent in cases in which the agency’s decision relates
to a matter that is committed to agency discretion, but that also requires accompanying
determinations of fact.  To the extent that it requires extreme deference to agency findings,
the “no rational trier of fact” definition of manifest weight of the evidence arguably should
be confined to cases governed by the abuse of discretion standard of review, which is generally
considered the most deferential of the various standards.  See supra note 174. 
211. E.g., Benson v. Indus. Comm’n, 440 N.E.2d 90, 93 (Ill. 1982) (test for determining if agency
decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence is whether there is “sufficient factual
evidence in the record” in support).  See also Ceres, 500  N.E.2d at 4 (citing cases that
indicate the manifest weight standard requires more than a showing that there is “sufficient
evidence” to support a contrary judgment);  EPA v. Pollution Control Bd., 427 N.E.2d 162,
169 (Ill. 1981) (where there was adequate supporting evidence and “no substantial contrary
evidence,” agency’s finding was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence).  Other
supreme court cases, particularly the older ones, offer a variety of other defin i t ions  and
explanations of the manifest weight standard of review in administrative law cases.  See, e.g.,
Davern v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 269 N.E.2d 713, 714 (Ill. 1970) (reviewing court is limited
to a determination whether agency’s final decision “is just and reasonable in light of the
evidence presented”); Fenyes v. State Employee’s Ret. Sys., 160 N.E.2d 810, 813 (Ill. 1959)
(court’s function in reviewing administrative agency findings is comparable to that presented
where court is called upon to determine whether there is “competent evidence” to support
judgment of lower court); Liberty Foundries Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 25 N.E.2d 790, 794 (Ill.
1940) (court may not substitute its judgment for that of an agency unless agency’s findings
are “clearly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence”).
212. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
manifest weight of the evidence standard applies only if the reviewing court
determines that “no rational trier of fact” could have reached the conclusion
reached by the agency.210  In yet other instances, the court explains the
meaning of the manifest weight standard by reference to the degree of
deferenc e being accorded to the administrative agency or the sufficiency of
the evidence in support of the agency’s decision.211  It is not clear whether
these different explanations and approaches reflect differing degrees of
deference to be accorded to particular findings of fact by administrative
agencies or whether they are simply different formulations of the same basic
standard.
Even if the various alternative explanations of the “manifest weight of the
evidence” standard are discarded in favor of universal adoption of the
definition of manifest weight of the evidence often used in cases reviewing
findings by juries and trial courts,212 that definition itself raises questions of
interpretation.  For example, it is not clear from some decisions how one tells
whether the opposite conclusion is “clearly evident” without weighing the
2003] Mixed up Questions 59
213. As indicated earlier, the supreme court has emphasized that reviewing courts do not “reweigh
evidence.”  See supra note 199 and accompanying text.  The court has hence rejected a line
of decisions in the appellate court that reviewed agency determinations to determine if they
were supported by a preponderance of the evidence.  Eastman Kodak Co. v. Fair Employment
Practices Comm’n, 426 N.E.2d 877, 884 (Ill. 1981).  Nevertheless, the supreme court itself
has sometimes conveyed the impression, perhaps inadvertently, that it is in fact weighing
evidence by seeming to hold that an appellant has or has not met his burden of proof.  E.g.,
Jack Bradley, 585 N.E.2d at 128, 132 (after stating that the manifest weight standard applies,
court later states its belief that appellant “failed to carry its strict burden of proof” and
therefore agency had “substantial  basis” for its decision); Griffitts Constr. Co. v. Dep’t of
Labor, 390 N.E.2d 333, 336 (Ill. 1979) (after finding “that  plaintiff has not met its burden
of proof,” court holds that agency’s decision is not against the weight of the evidence and “is
supported by the evidence”).  See also  Bazydlo v. Volant, 647 N.E.2d 273, 277 (Ill. 1995)
(under auspices of manifest weight standard, supreme court rejects trial court’s determination
in bench trial that appellants  d id  not  meet “clear and convincing” evidence burden of proof,
on grounds that fact finder may not “arbitrarily or capriciously reject unimpeached
testimony”).  
214. The supreme court sometimes states that findings are not against the manifest weight of the
evidence when or if there is “evidence to support” them.  Abrahamson, 606 N.E.2d at 1117;
Fenyes, 160 N.E.2d at 813.  This could imply that any evidence, even a mere scintilla,  is
sufficient.
215. E.g., Brown v. Zimmerman, 163 N.E.2d 518, 523 (Ill. 1960) (findings and judgment of trial
court will not be disturbed on review “if there is any evidence in the record to support such
findings”).
216. See supra notes 140–144 and accompanying text.
217. In closely contested cases where substantial evidence is presented on both sides, the manifest
weight of the evidence standard of review clearly protects the fact-finder’s ultimate
determination from reversal on appeal in the ordinary case governed by the preponderance
of the evidence burden of proof.   See, e.g., Kalata v. Anheuser-Busch Co., 581 N.E.2d 656,
661 (Ill. 1991) (where evidence is close and findings must be determined from credibility of
witnesses, reviewing court will defer to trial judge’s findings of fact).  The cases are more
contradictory, however, in explaining where on a continuum between no evidence and a
preponderance of the evidence there is a sufficient quantum of evidence to require deference
to the fact-finder’s determination.
evidence. 213 Assuming that the reviewing court does not weigh the evidence
sub silentio, but merely checks to see if a sufficient quantum of evidence
supports a finding or judgment, it is not clear how much evidence and of what
quality is needed.214  If any evidence is sufficient, as some cases indicate, 215
it is arguable that the reviewing courts have completely abdicated their
corrective function216 except in those instances where the fact-finder acted
arbitrarily, unreasonably, or out of bias or prejudice.217  Conversely, if the
focus of the manifest weight of the evidence standard shifts to an inquiry of
whether an opposite conclusion to that reached by the fact-finder is clearly
evident, that change in focus seems to lead to the conclusion that the decision
actually reached by the fact finder is clearly wrong or clearly erroneous.  If so,
it is not clear on its face how the manifest weight of the evidence test differs
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218. All word tests have inherent limitations.  See, e.g., 1  CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, §
1.01, at 1–2 (word formulations do not say much until reviewing courts give them life through
discussion and application).   Reviewing courts and practitioners who handle a number of
appeals no doubt develop a “feel” for how the standards of review are interpreted and applied
in practice.  For the less experienced, however, the meaning and scope of “manifest weight
of the evidence” are not self-evident.  A profusion of tests on tests is not necessarily helpful,
as alternative or additional explanations tend often to cause more confusion than clarity.
See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 948 (“it is undesirable to make
the law more complicated by proliferating special review standards without good reason”);
1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 2.04, at 2–26 (“Tests-on-tests may, in the long run,
cloud the real scope [of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)] more easily than the clearly
erroneous phrase practically unadorned”).  Nevertheless, it may provide some assistance to
practitioners and others if the supreme court would continue to make it a practice to include
in its judicial decisions a general explanation of the degree of deference being given in
particular instances, such as “substantial  deference” or “some deference.”  This guidance is
particularly helpful where two different standards of review such as “manifest weight” and
“substantial  evidence” are being compared.  Although themselves inherently imprecise,
phrases describing degrees of deference may help to act as signals in a way that a term such
as “manifest weight of the evidence” on its own cannot.
219. See supra notes 65–71 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Heft  v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 201 N.E.2d 364, 366 (Ill. 1964) (issue on
administrative review is whether there was substantial evidence to support the agency’s
decision); Mohler v. Dep’t of Labor, 97 N.E.2d 762, 765 (Ill. 1951) (court will not disturb
agency findings of fact unless they are manifestly against the weight of the evidence “or
unless there is no substantial  evidence to support them”); Drezner v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 75
N.E.2d 303, 307–308 (Ill. 1947) (reviewing courts have power to determine if agency
findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence or if there is substantial evidence in
the record in support).
221. 307 N.E.2d 371, 375 (Ill. 1974). 
222. The court restated this position in Kerr v. Police Bd., 319 N.E.2d 478, 478–79 (Ill. 1974),
but  did not elaborate on its reasons for rejecting the substantial evidence rule.
from the less deferential clearly erroneous test used to review findings of fact
by district court judges in the federal system.218 
In administrative law cases, an analysis of the degree of deference
accorded by the manifest weight standard is further complicated by the Illinois
Supreme Court’s wavering stance on the relationship between that standard
and the federal substantial evidence rule.219  Prior to 1974, some Illinois
Supreme Court decisions indicated that manifest weight of the evidence and
substantial evidence were related or perhaps alternative tests.220  In
Basketfield v. Police Board,221 however, the court rejected the appellant’s
contention that the federal substantial evidence standard of review should be
followed.222  In doing so, the court did not explain in any depth why it declined
to follow the substantial evidence rule or how the federal rule differs from the
manifest weight of the evidence standard.  Thus, it is not clear whether the
court in Basketfield was simply trying to minimize the use of alternative labels
for similar standards of review, whether it misunderstood the meaning of
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223. The court may have viewed the substantial  evidence test as equivalent to a reweighing of the
evidence, which it is not. See supra Part I.C.1.  Although it is generally undesirable to use
double negatives to define concepts, the tenor of the “substantial evidence” rule seems to be
better conveyed by the notion that the evidence supporting an agency finding of fact must
“not be insubstantial.”  Cf. 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 3.04, at 3–34 (though
“substantial” implies “ a lot” in common parlance, judges instead mean “more than some” and
may refer more to quality than amount).
224. Whether the supreme court views the manifest weight standard of review as more or less
deferential than the federal substantial evidence standard is not clear from the Basketfield
opinion.  On the one hand, the supreme court stated that “the permissible scope of judicial
inquiry concerning factual determinations by administrative agencies has been limited to
ascertaining if the agency decision was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.”
Basketfield, 307 N.E.2d at 375 (emphasis added).  This passage may indicate that the court
views the manifest weight standard as more deferential than the federal standard.  On the
other hand, the appellant in Basketfield had suggested “adaptation of the Pedrick norm” to
define the federal substantial  evidence rule.  Id. at 375 (citing Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern
R.R. Co., 229 N.E.2d 504 (Ill. 1967)).  In Pedrick, the supreme court held that a directed
verdict or judgment n.o.v. is proper only when “all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect
most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors movant that no contrary verdict
based on that evidence could ever stand.”  Pedrick, 229 N.E.2d at 513–514.  By seeming to
reject the Pedrick requirement that evidence be “overwhelming,” the court may have been
implicitly holding that the manifest weight standard of review is less deferential than the
proffered definition of substantial evidence.  Cf.  Maple v. Gustafson, 603 N.E.2d 508, 512
(Ill. 1992) (“a judgment n.o.v.  may not be granted merely because a verdict is against the
manifest weight of the evidence”).  The remainder of the court’s discussion in Basketfield
does not help to clarify the ambiguity in the court’s reasoning.  Although it went on to state
that it would not hesitate to grant relief if the record did not “disclose evidentiary support”
for the agency’s decision,  307 N.E.2d at 375, the Basketfield court did not indicate what
level of evidentiary support would suffice to preclude reversal of the agency’s decision. 
225. E.g., People ex. rel. Hartigan v. Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 592 N.E.2d 1066, 1075 (Ill. 1992)
(agency findings  of fact will be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence in the record);
Carver v.  Bond/Fayette/Effington Reg’l Bd. of Sch. Trustees, 586 N.E.2d 1273, 1280 (Ill.
1992) (after finding school  board’s decision supported by substantial evidence, court is unable
to say decision was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence); City of Burbank v. Ill.
State Labor Relations Bd., 538 N.E.2d 1146, 1150 (Ill. 1989) (because motive involves a
factual determination, agency’s finding must be accepted on appeal if supported by substantial
evidence); Bd. of Educ. v. Reg’l Bd. of Sch. Tr., 433 N.E.2d 240, 242 (Ill. 1982) (when
agency’s determination is supported by substantial evidence it must be affirmed).  A number
of appellate court decisions also continue to refer to the substantial  evidence rule.  E.g.,
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 692 N.E.2d 1350, 1356 (Ill. App. Ct.
1998) (stating that reviewing court should affirm commission’s findings of fact if supported
by substantial  evidence in the record and defining substantial  evidence as more than a mere
scintilla,  but not necessarily a preponderance of the evidence); Singh v. Dep’t of Prof’l
Regulation, 625 N.E.2d 656, 661 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (agency findings will not be reversed
substantial evidence, 223 or whether the manifest weight standard does in fact
require a different degree of deference to agency findings of fact than does
the federal substantial evidence rule.224  To add to the confusion, the supreme
court has stated in several decisions since 1974 that substantial evidence
supports an agency decision.225
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unless against the manifest weight of the evidence or not supported by substantial evidence
or foundation in the record); Galarza v. Dep’t of Labor, 520 N.E.2d 672, 675 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987) (where agency’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence they will be
reversed).   But see Starkey v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 435 N.E.2d 176, 179–80 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982) (after questioning the reasoning of Basketfield, court concludes it has not been
overrruled).
226. Deference may also be mandated by the constitution, as in the case of jury verdicts, or by
statute.  See supra notes 202–203.
227. E.g., In  re Storment, 786 N.E.2d 963, 969 (Ill. 2002) (deference is accorded findings of fact
by administrative agency because agency is able to observe witnesses’ demeanor, assess
credibility, and evaluate conflicting testimony);  In re Spak, 719 N.E.2d 747, 754 (Ill. 1999)
(agency’s findings regarding witness credibility, resolution of conflicting testimony and other
fact-finding judgments are entitled to “great deference” because agency is able to observe
demeanor and judge credibility); Bazydlo v. Volant, 647 N.E.2d 273, 276–77 (Ill. 1995) (trial
judge is in a position superior to a reviewing court to observe witnesses, judge credibility and
determine weight that testimony should receive); Maple v. Gustafson, 603 N.E.2d 508,
511–12 (Ill. 1992) (it is“unquestionably” the jury’s province to resolve evidentiary conflicts,
assess witness credibility and decide weight of testimony); Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 226
N.E.2d 624, 626 (Ill. 1967) (trial judge as fact finder is in “a position superior to a court of
review” to observe witnesses, determine credibility and weigh evidence).  See also Launius  v .
Bd. of Fire & Police Comm’rs, 603 N.E.2d 477, 481 (Ill. 1992) (it is not the reviewing
court’s function or duty to resolve factual inconsistencies or weigh evidence to determine
where the preponderance lies); Kalata v. Anheuser-Busch Co., 581 N.E.2d 656, 660 (Ill.
1989) (it is function of trial judge in a bench trial to weigh evidence and make findings of
fact) .   See also Flynn v. Cohn, 607 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (Ill. 1992) (trial judge was in best
position to resolve conflicts in expert testimony and determine credibility).
228. Chicago Inv. Corp. v. Dolins, 481 N.E.2d 712, 714 (Ill. 1985) (where findings of fact “must
necessarily be determined” from witnesses’  credibility in close cases, “it is particularly true”
that the reviewing court will defer to the findings of the circuit court).  See also Kalata, 581
N.E.2d at 660 (in close cases where findings of fact must be determined from credibility of
witnesses, reviewing court will defer to trial court’s findings unless against the manifest weight
of the evidence); Zadereka v. Ill. Human Rights Comm’n, 545 N.E.2d 684, 688 (Ill. 1989)
(that findings of fact are entitled to deference “is particularly true of credibility
determinations”).
Regardless of the precise definition and scope of the manifest weight
standard, the proffered reasons for granting deference to the judgments and
findings of fact of juries, trial courts, and administrative agencies are often
functional and are generally similar to many of the reasons advanced by the
federal courts.226  The Illinois Supreme Court has stated on a number of
occasions, for example, that the original fact finder is in the best position to
assess witnesses’ conduct, make credibility determinations, and weigh
conflicting evidence.227  The court has also given some indication that a greater
degree of deference is appropriate in “close cases” where findings of fact are
dependent on assessments of the credibility of witnesses.228  
IV.  MIXED QUESTIONS IN ILLINOIS: FROM BRANSON TO
CARPETLAND
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229. The term “mixed question of fact and law” does, however, appear in Illinois Supreme Court
decisions as early as 1844.  Cook v. Scott, 6 Ill. 333 (1844).  The concept of a mixed
question was discussed in early supreme court cases to delineate the respective provinces of
the trial judge and jury.  Id. (question whether appraiser was disinterested was mixed question
of fact and law within the province of the jury to decide); Wooley v. Fry, 30 Ill. 158, 162
(1863) (whether mortgagee was diligent in taking possession of mortgaged property is a mixed
question of law and fact as to which court determines what time is reasonable and jury says
whether mortgage was foreclosed within that time). 
230. E.g., Kahn v. James Burton Co., 126 N.E.2d 836, 841 (Ill. 1955) (questions of due care,
negligence and proximate cause are “pre-eminently questions of fact” for determination by
jury).
231. E.g., Staufenbiel v. Staufenbiel, 58 N.E.2d 569, 574 (Ill. 1944) (what constitutes delivery of
a deed is a mixed question of law and fact reviewed under manifest weight of the evidence
standard of review).
232. E.g., id.  See also Greene v. Indus. Comm’n, 428 N.E.2d 476, 477 (Ill. 1981) (permissible
conflicting inferences regarding risks taken by a decedent present a mixed question reviewed
under the manifest weight standard).
233. E.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Frankart, 370 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (Ill. 1977) (“where
facts are not in dispute, their legal effect becomes a matter of law”); Puttkammer v. Indus.
Comm’n, 21 N.E.2d 575, 577 (Ill. 1939) (whether deceased received injuries arising out of
employment, where the facts were stipulated, was a question of law).  See also United Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Elder, 427 N.E.2d 127, 129 (Ill. 1981) (characterizations of issues
as mixed questions “should be sparingly applied”; where the facts are clear, the appellate
court’s responsibility is to rule on the legal effect of those facts and there is “no need” for
the fact finder’s services).
Prior to the 1990s, the Illinois Supreme Court generally did not identify
mixed questions of fact and law as a separate category of questions subject to
special analysis on review.229 Rather, the court treated mixed questions within
the traditional fact/law dichotomy, often implicitly230 and occasionally
explicitly.231  Where the court recognized that a “mixed question” existed, it
generally treated the issue as one of “fact” subject to review under the
manifest weight of the evidence standard of review. 232  As in other
jurisdictions, however, the court strove at times to move certain mixed
questions into the “law” category, making them subject to de novo review.  In
many instances, this took place under the guise of the “documentary evidence”
or “undisputed facts” doctrine.233  Beginning in 1995, however, the supreme
court took a fresh look at mixed questions of fact and law in the administrative
law context and eventually announced a new “intermediate” standard of
review.  The process by which that new intermediate standard developed and
the uncertainties regarding the new rule’s meaning and scope are the subject
of both this section and Part V of this article. 
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234. 659 N.E.2d 961 (Ill. 1995).
235. As was characteristic of its focus in later years, the supreme court chose to raise the
possibility of an intermediate standard of review in a case involving appellate review of an
administrative agency decision.  It is not yet clear whether that new intermediate standard will
be applied to circuit court determinations.  See infra notes 280–90; 325 & 352 and
accompanying text. 
236. 659 N.E.2d at 963–64.  The penalty was imposed pursuant to section 13 1/2 of the Illinois
Retailers' Occupation Tax Act, 120 Ill. Rev. Stat. ¶ 452 1/2 (1991) (later repealed and
replaced by 35 ILL. COMP . STAT. ANN. 735/3–7 (West 2003)), which provided for a penalty
against officers of corporations who “willfully” failed to make retailers’ occupat ion tax
payments.  Id.  
237. See Branson, 659 N.E.2d at 963–64; 970.
238. 659 N.E.2d at 964.
239. Branson v. Dep’t of Revenue, 644 N.E.2d 1193 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
A.  Branson and City of Belvidere Introduce a New Intermediate
Standard of Review
Shortly after the O’Neill and Brody article was published, the Illinois
Supreme Court took its first tentative steps toward adoption of a new standard
of review for mixed questions of fact and law in civil cases.  In an opinion
written by Justice McMorrow, the court utilized the case of Branson v.
Department of Revenue234 to indicate its willingness to depart from the
traditional rules for reviewing mixed questions in Illinois.235  However, the
court did not affirmatively adopt a new standard of review in Branson.
Instead, it merely stated in dicta that a new standard for mixed questions would
be appropriate. 
In Branson, the sole shareholder, director, and officer of a corporation
operating a family restaurant appealed a decision by the Illinois Department of
Revenue to assess the officer personally for a tax penalty.  The penalty was
based upon the officer’s willful failure to pay retailers' occupation taxes owed
by the corporation.236  Following a hearing, an administrative law judge
concluded that the revenue department had presented sufficient evidence to
prove that the corporate officer had “voluntarily or intentionally” violated his
duty to remit the corporation's taxes.237  On administrative review of the
department's decision to finalize the tax penalty, the circuit court set aside the
agency's decision on the ground that it was against the manifest weight of the
evidence. 238  On appeal, the appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in
part,239 and the Illinois Supreme Court granted the corporate officer's ensuing
petition for leave to appeal.
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240. The issue concerned the burden of proof as to the willfulness element.  See Branson, 659
N.E.2d at 965–68. 
241. 659 N.E.2d at 969–70.  Acknowledging that agency findings of fact are reviewed under the
manifest weight of the evidence standard, the court explained that this meant that agency
factual determinations are given “substantial deference.”  Id.  In contrast, issues of law are
reviewed de novo  and agency rulings are given “little or no deference.”  Id. at 970.  Elsewhere
in the opinion, the court also cited cases holding that an administrative agency's
determination of an issue of law is relevant, but not binding.  Id. at 965.  The court in
Branson thus ignored or implicitly rejected the more deferential de novo standard previously
applied in some administrative law cases.  See supra notes 187–191. 
242. Branson, 659 N.E.2d at 970.
243. See O’Neill & Brody, supra note 6.
244. 659 N.E.2d at 970.
245. By use of this term, the court presumably meant basic or historical facts.  See supra note
96–97 and accompanying text.
246. 659 N.E.2d at 970.
247. Id.
After reviewing de novo a pivotal question of statutory interpretation,240
the supreme court turned to the question of whether there was sufficient
evidence to support a finding by the administrative law judge that the corporate
officer’s failure to pay the occupation taxes was “willful.”  In identifying the
applicable standard of review, the court first described the fact/law analysis
traditionally used in Illinois to determine whether the standard of review of an
administrative agency decision is deferential or non-deferential.241  The court
then noted that  “the scope of judicial review does not always fit neatly into the
fact/law dichotomy when the issue under review presents a mixed question of
fact and law.”242  Citing generally to the 1995 O'Neill and Brody article,243 the
supreme court pointed out the importance of accurate characterization of the
standard of review for an issue on appeal because it “bears directly upon the
degree of deference given to the trier of fact, which in turn governs the scope
of appellate review.”244  
Turning specifically to the willfulness issue, the supreme court observed
that willfulness appeared to be primarily a question of “fact” because it
required a review of evidentiary facts in the record relating to the taxpayer’s
conduct.  In support of this characterization of the factual component of the
issue, the court pointed to the administrative law judge's listing of “specific
facts”245 from the record in support of her ruling.246  On the other hand, the
supreme court also recognized that “to the extent the willfulness element of the
tax penalty is a term of art, or constitutes a legal conclusion, the exact
characterization of willfulness might be viewed more precisely as a mixed
question of fact and law.”247  In support of its characterization of the legal
component of the question, the court pointed to the administrative law judge’s
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248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 970–71.  The supreme court upheld the appellate division's ruling that the agency's
imposition of penalty liability for some of the months of unpaid taxes was against the
manifest weight of the evidence.  The supreme court also affirmed the appellate division's
holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the agency's imposition of penalty liability
for the remaining months in question.  Id.
251. O'Neill & Brody, supra note 6, at 518 & n. 55.
252. Id.  
253. Id. at 518.  Rather, the authors advocated increased attention to the issue of standards of
review by courts and litigants alike.  See supra notes 2–12 and accompanying text.
statement in the record below that her ruling was based on the “relatively
liberal construction” given the term “wilful” in Illinois judicial opinions.248
Finding that this reference by the administrative law judge to liberal
statutory construction supported an “inference” that a mixed question of fact
and law was posed, the supreme court concluded that the degree of judicial
deference given to the agency’s determination of willfulness should not be
identical to the deference accorded to either a “pure issue of fact” or a “pure
issue of law.”249  The court did not, however, provide any further guidance as
to what level of deference should appropriately be accorded the mixed
question of “willfulness.”  Instead, the court acquiesced in the parties' original
assumption that the issue was governed by the manifest weight of the evidence
standard and devoted the rest of its opinion in Branson to a discussion of
whether that traditional standard had been met.250
  In light of the supreme court’s ultimate reliance on the manifest weight
of the evidence rule in Branson, the court’s dicta concerning mixed questions
seemed at first glance to be gratuitous.  Moreover, the court's very general
observations on the appropriateness of a different standard of review for
mixed questions of fact and law left open the key question of what that
standard should be.  The court did refer in a citation to Professors O’Neill and
Brody’s 1995 article and its discussion of the “arising out of and in the course
of employment” issue from workers’ compensation cases.251  But the Illinois
workers’ compensation cases cited in the article did not recognize the
existence of a mixed question, and instead treated the “arising out of” issue as
a question of pure fact subject to the manifest weight of the evidence
standard.252  Although Professors O'Neill and Brody argued in their article that
the earlier workers’ compensation cases were flawed and that the cases
actually presented mixed questions of fact and law, the authors did not
expressly advocate the adoption of a particular standard of review for such
questions in civil cases.253  Thus, the authorities cited by the Branson court
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254. 692 N.E.2d 295 (Ill. 1998)
255. 692 N.E.2d at 297–99.  
256. 5 ILL. COMP . STAT. ANN. 315/7 (West 1994).  Section 7 of the IPLR Act sets out
circumstances under which a public employer in Illinois has a duty to engage in collective
bargaining with a labor organization that is acting as exclusive representative of a unit of
public employees.  Section 7 states in relevant part that “[a] public employer and the
exclusive representative have the authority and the duty to bargain collectively . . . ‘[T]o
bargain collectively’ means . . . to negotiate in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other conditions of employment, not excluded by Section 4 of this Act.”  Id.  Section 4 of
the IPLR Act provides that public employers are not required to bargain over “matters of
inherent managerial policy,” but are required to bargain collectively as to policy matters
directly affecting “wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment.”  5  IL L .  COMP .
STAT. ANN. 315/4 (West 1994).
257. 692 N.E.2d at 300–01.  Section 10(a)(4) of the IPLR Act provides that it is an unfair labor
practice “to refuse to bargain collectively in good faith with a labor organization which is the
exclusive representative of public employees in an appropriate unit . . . .”  5 ILL. COMP . STAT.
315/10(a)(4) (2003). 
258. Id. at 300.
gave little indication of how the court's recognition of the existence of mixed
questions might affect the standard of review applicable to such questions.
Despite its relatively terse and tentative nature, the supreme court's opinion
in Branson constituted an implicit invitation to future litigants and courts to
raise the issue of a new and different standard of review applicable on appeal
for mixed questions of fact and law.  Picking up on this invitation in another
administrative law case three years later, the Illinois Supreme Court expressly
held in City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board254 that
mixed questions of fact and law should be reviewed under an intermediate
standard falling between the traditional manifest weight of the evidence
standard and the de novo standard.  In so doing, the court adopted a “clearly
erroneous” standard of review, but did not define the scope of that standard.
In City of Belvidere, a local firefighters union filed an unfair labor practice
charge with the Illinois State Labor Relations Board against the City of
Belvidere, protesting the city’s decision to contract with a private ambulance
company to provide paramedic services for the city.255  The union claimed that
the city’s decision involved a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under
Section 7 of the Illinois Public  Labor Relations Act (the “IPLR Act”)256 and
that the city had improperly refused to negotiate with the union.257
After hearings, an administrative law judge ruled that the city’s decision
was not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, and therefore the city’s
refusal to bargain with the union before entering into the contract was not an
unfair labor practice.258  The firefighters’ union filed exceptions to the labor
relations board, contesting the administrative law judge’s recommended
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259. Id.; City of Belvidere v. Ill. State Labor Relations Bd., 670 N.E.2d 337, 341 (Ill. App. 2d
Dist. 1996). 
260. 692 N.E.2d at 300.  The labor relations board rescinded the contract with the private
ambulance company and ordered the City to bargain with the firefighters over paramedic
services.  Id. at 301.
261. 670 N.E.2d 337. 
262. Id. at 341 (citing Freeport v. Ill. State Labor Relations Bd., 554 N.E.2d at 163–64). 
263.  670 N.E.2d at 343–45.
264. 692 N.E.2d at 305.
265. Id. at 301.
266. Id. at 302.
decision and order.259  The board disagreed with the administrative law judge,
finding that the city’s decision was subject to mandatory bargaining, and
therefore the city of Belvidere had committed an unfair labor practice by not
first negotiating the decision with the union.260
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the board on the ground that the
city’s decision did not affect wages, hours or other conditions of the union
members’ employment and therefore was not a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining.261  In so ruling, the appellate court treated the issue on
appeal as a question of law.  After pointing out that administrative
determinations of issues of law are not entitled to the same deference as
administrative findings of fact, the court acknowledged that an appellate court
should nevertheless give substantial deference to a statutory interpretation by
an administrative agency unless it is “clearly wrong.”262  Upon completion of
its review of the record and the board’s ruling, the appellate court concluded
that the board was in fact “clearly wrong.”263
The Illinois Supreme Court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed the
appellate court’s ruling setting aside the decision and order of the board.264  In
an opinion written by Justice Bilandic, the court agreed that the central issue
was whether the city’s decision to provide paramedic services through private
contract affected “wages, hours or other conditions of employment” of the
union firefighters under Section 7 of the IPLR Act.265  But the supreme court
rejected the appellate court’s characterization of the issue as a question of law.
The court also elected not to treat the board’s findings on this issue as findings
of “fact” subject to review under the traditional manifest weight of the
evidence rule.  Instead, the supreme court decided as a threshold matter that
the board’s determination of this question would be treated under a less
deferential standard than manifest weight of the evidence.  Explaining why, the
court reasoned that the board’s finding was partly factual “because it involves
considering whether the facts in this case support a finding that the [c]ity’s
decision affected wages, hours and other conditions of employment.”266  On
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267. Id.  Unlike its approach in Branson, the supreme court did not point to a specific section of
the record where the administrative law judge or agency referred to the question in the
proceedings below as one of legal interpretation.  See supra text accompanying note 248.
268. 692 N.E.2d at 302.
269. Id. (emphasis added).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 305.
272.  O’Neill & Brody, supra note 6, at 512.
273. That inference is weakened, however, by the fact that Professors O’Neill and Brody describe
the federal standard in connection with a discussion of the difference between the standard of
review applicable to findings of fact by juries and that applicable to findings by trial courts.
Id. at 515.  As previously noted, the O’Neill and Brody article does not advocate the adoption
of a clearly erroneous standard for mixed questions in civil cases.  In fact, the article seems
to indicate that a de novo  standard should be applied to many mixed questions in criminal
cases.  See id.  To add to the confusion, the appellate courts in Illinois have at times used the
phrase “clearly erroneous” to describe the standard of review applicable to administrative
agency interpretations of law.  See, e.g., Chicago Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit
Union, 702 N.E.2d 284, 289 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (agency interpretation of act should be
overturned only if it is “clearly erroneous” or constitutes abuse of discretion); Archer-Daniels-
Midlands Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 687 N.E.2d 1144, 1148 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)
(agency’s interpretation of its own rules will not be interfered with by courts unless “clearly
erroneous, arbitrary or unreasonable”).
the other hand, the court observed that the board’s decision also raised a
question of law “because the phrase ‘wages, hours and other conditions of
employment’ is a legal term that requires interpretation.”267  Because the case
involved “an examination of the legal effect of a given set of facts,” the court
concluded that the board’s determination of the key issue was “best
considered” a mixed question of fact and law.268
Having rejected application of the traditional de novo and manifest weight
standards, the Illinois Supreme Court decided that the appropriate standard of
review should be in between these standards “so as to provide some
deference to the Board’s experience and expertise.”269  Accordingly, the
court held that the board’s decision would be reviewed under a “clearly
erroneous” standard.270  Without further explanation of that standard, the court
turned to the merits of the case and ultimately held that the Board’s
determination was clearly erroneous.271
The reasoning of City of Belvidere is somewhat confusing and left several
key questions unanswered.  First, the Illinois Supreme Court did not define
“clearly erroneous,” nor did it state whether or not it intended to adopt the
federal definition of the term.  In support of its decision to change or clarify the
standard of review, the court again cited generally to the 1995 article by
Professors O’Neill and Brody, as it had in Branson.272  Because that article
discusses the federal definition of “clearly erroneous,” one might thus have
inferred that the supreme court intended to adopt the federal standard.273  But
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274. See supra Part I.C.2.
275. The court appeared to consistently downplay or re-characterize the facts on which the board
relied in making its determination and emphasized other facts from the record.  For example,
the board had determined that the city’s decision to subcontract paramedic services to a
private company adversely impacted the firefighters’ conditions of employment by causing
them to respond to fewer emergency calls.  692 N.E.2d at 299.  Based on its review of the
record, the supreme court found, however, that the firefighters’ conditions of employment
were not adversely affected.  The firefighters continued to provide some emergency services
even though they had lost dispatch priority, and no facts indicated any elimination of
positions or reduction in hours and wages.  Id. at  304.   In dissent, Justice Harrison wrote that
“the majority shows no deference whatever to the Board’s experience and understanding of
bargaining.  Purporting to employ a ‘clearly erroneous’ standard, what the majority does is
simply substitute its own judgment for that of the Board.”  692 N.E.2d at 305.  
276. To determine whether the city’s decision to contract with a private ambulance service
affected wages, hours and employment conditions, the supreme court applied a multi-factor
test derived from Westinghouse Electric Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 1574 (1965).  See City of
Belvidere, 692 N.E.2d at 304–05.  The court found that the contract did not affect wages,
hours and employment conditions under the Westinghouse test, and accordingly held that the
board’s decision reaching the opposite conclusion was clearly erroneous.  Id. at 305.
277. See supra  Part II.C.  In the O’Neill and Brody article cited by the court, the authors noted
that the federal appellate courts were “deeply divided” over whether to apply the clearly
erroneous or de novo  standards to mixed questions.  O’Neill and Brody, supra text
accompanying note 6, at 514.  As discussed supra  notes 165–172, other federal appellate
courts apply a bifurcated analysis and some apply a flexible functional analysis.  The supreme
court in City of Belvidere did not discuss either of those alternative approaches.
that inference is difficult to square with the court’s expressed intent in City of
Belvidere to accord  “some deference” to the administrative agency’s
determination, given that the findings of federal district courts are subject to the
federal “clearly erroneous” standard, which generally gives substantial
deference to federal courts’ findings.274  Moreover, in analyzing why the
private ambulance contract in City of Belvidere did not affect wages, hours
or conditions of employment, the court appeared in practice to give little, if any,
deference to the board’s determination, which also seems inconsistent with the
federal clearly erroneous standard.275  In fact, the supreme court’s decision in
City of Belvidere seemed to engage in a rather detailed analysis and
determination of the basic facts in the record that was arguably more
consistent with de novo review than with an intermediate standard.276 
The City of Belvidere opinion also did not explain why the supreme court
elected to follow the lead of those federal courts that apply the clearly
erroneous standard of review to mixed questions of fact and law instead of
opting to follow those federal courts that review most mixed questions de
novo.277  Had the supreme court chosen de novo review of administrative
agency determinations of mixed questions of fact and law, for example, it could
then have continued to exercise its discretion to accord agency determinations
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278. This was the approach taken by the appellate court in City of Belvidere.   See supra text
accompanying note 262; see also supra notes 186–194 and accompanying text.
279. See supra Part I.C.  As discussed supra at notes 40–45, the standard of federal appellat e
review of administrative agency interpretations of law is also often deferential.    
280. See infra notes 350–352 and accompanying text.
281. Both the O’Neill & Brody article and Branson cited approvingly to mixed question cases that
did not involve interpretations of the Administrative Review Law.  See supra notes 251–52
and accompanying text; infra note 351.
282. 735 ILL. COMP . STAT. ANN. 5/3–110 (West 1994).  Section 3–110 of the Administrative
Review Law applies to determinations by the labor relations board pursuant to Section 11(e)
of the IPLR Act.  5  ILL. COMP . STAT. ANN. 315/11(e) (West 1994).  Section 3–110 states:
“some” or even “substantial” deference in a manner consistent with many of
the court’s own prior decisions.278  Thus, articulation of an ill-defined new
standard of review for mixed questions seemed unnecessary.  
The City of Belvidere opinion was also silent as to why the Illinois
Supreme Court chose a standard of review for state administrative law cases
that seemed to be based on the federal standard of appellate review for factual
determinations by federal trial courts in non-jury cases.  This choice seems
particularly curious in light of the fact that the federal standard of review for
administrative agency determinations of both findings of fact and mixed
questions is normally the substantial evidence test, which is generally
considered to be more deferential than the clearly erroneous rule.279   
Finally, the City of Belvidere opinion did not clearly indicate whether the
supreme court intended to apply the clearly erroneous standard of review in
the future to all mixed questions of fact and law, to all administrative agency
determinations of mixed questions, or only to some administrative
determinations.280  On the one hand, a very broad reading of the case might
support the view that the court intended an eventual full-scale change in the
standard of review for all mixed questions raised on appeal (except,
presumably, in the case of jury determinations).  The court’s citation of the
O’Neill and Brody article in City of Belvidere lends some support to such an
expansive reading, as does the court’s reliance on Branson.281
Reading the City of Belvidere case more narrowly, however, it could be
argued that the court was simply interpreting the scope of the statute governing
judicial review of many administrative determinations and was not addressing
mixed questions in all types of cases.  For example, the court began its
discussion of the standard of review in City of Belvidere by explaining that
judicial review of the labor relations board’s decision is governed by Section
3–110 of the Administrative Review Law, which provides that judicial review
of the record of administrative agency determinations extends to all questions
of law and fact.282  The court also noted that Section 3–110 states that
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Scope of review.  Every action to review any final administrative decision shall be
heard and determined by the court with all convenient speed.  The hearing and
determination shall extend to all questions of law and fact presented by the entire
record before the court.  No new or additional evidence in support of or in
opposition to any finding, order, determination or decision of the administrative
agency shall be heard by the court.  The findings and conclusions of the
administrative agency on questions of fact shall be held to be prima facie true and
correct.
See supra note 203.
283. 35 ILL. COMP . STAT. AN N . 5/3–110 (West 1994); 692 N.E.2d at 302.  See supra note 203.
284. City of Belvidere v. Ill. State Labor Relations Bd., 692 N.E.2d 295, 302 (Ill. 1998).  Citing
the Abrahamson and City of Freeport cases, the court explained that factual determinations
by administrative agencies are against the manifest weight of the evidence “where the
opposite conclusion is clearly evident.”  Id.  See supra notes 204–211 and accompanying
text.
285. Unlike the appellate court’s decision and Justice Harrison’s dissent, the supreme court in the
majority opinion in City of Belvidere did not refer to its prior cases according substantial
deference to statutory interpretations by administrative agencies.  See supra notes 187–189
and accompanying text. 
286. 659 N.E.2d 961.  As indicated supra note 272 and accompanying text, the court also included
a see generally citation to the O’Neill and Brody article, supra note 6, which discusses the
standard of review in a variety of civil and criminal cases.
287. See 659 N.E.2d at 969–970 (discussing permissible scope of judicial inquiry into
administrative fact finding under Administrative Review Law).
288. See infra note 351 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 232–233 and accompanying text.
administrative findings of fact under that section are deemed to be prima facie
true and correct.283  After implicitly equating the prima facie true and correct
rule with the manifest weight of the evidence rule,284 the supreme court
compared these traditional standards with the standards for judicial review of
administrative determinations of questions of law, which the court observed are
treated with “less deference” and are “not binding” on a reviewing court.285
The court then analyzed why the question on appeal was a mixed question of
fact and law, citing only to the Branson case.286  Branson also arguably
involved an interpretation of the Administrative Review Act;287 therefore, one
reading of the two cases is that the supreme court intended to apply its
intermediate standard of review for mixed questions to all administrative
agency determinations under the Administrative Review Act.288  
Yet, in any number of administrative law cases decided before Branson
and City of Belvidere, both the supreme court and the intermediate appellate
courts had reviewed issues that seemed to present mixed questions of fact and
law under traditional, albeit inconsistent, standards, at times applying the de
novo standard and at times the manifest weight of the evidence standard.289
Despite the relatively broad language employed in Branson and City of
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290. Following the City of Belvidere decision, some intermediate appellate courts in Illinois
attempted to resolve some of these uncertainties by delineating and applying the clearly
erroneous standard.  In doing so, the courts turned to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and cases construing the phrase “clearly erroneous.”  See, e.g., Rogy’s New
Generation, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 742 N.E. 2d 443 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); Rudolph St.
Galler v. Zehnder, 735 N.E.2d 100 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); Friends of Israel Def. Forces v. Dep’t
of Revenue, 733 N.E.2d 789 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
291. Following City of Belvidere, the Illinois Supreme Court also considered the issues surrounding
the applicable standard of review for mixed questions of fact and law in two criminal cases
raising constitutional issues: In re G.O. , 727 N.E.2d 1003 (Ill. 2000), and People v. Crane,
743 N.E.2d 555 (Ill. 2001).  In those cases, the court implicitly rejected the manifest weight
and clearly erroneous standard and instead adopted a two-tiered analysis.  Under that analysis,
the underlying historical facts are reviewed under the manifest weight of the evidence standard
of review, but the application of the law to the facts is reviewed de novo .   See,  e .g ., 727
N.E.2d at 1008–10. 
292. 763 N.E.2d 272 (Ill. 2001).
293. 776 N.E.2d 166 (Ill. 2002).
Belvidere, it was by no means clear from the two opinions that the court
intended to overrule that entire body of precedent.  Thus, an even narrower
reading of City of Belvidere would limit the holding to the particular
administrative issues on appeal.  In short, the case could be read by litigants
and appellate courts in a variety of ways.290
B.  AFM Messenger Service and Carpetland Raise New Questions
Perhaps recognizing the gaps in its reasoning in City of Belvidere, the
Illinois Supreme Court revisited291 the issue of appellate review of mixed
questions of fact and law in 2001 and 2002 in AFM Messenger Service v.
Department of Employment Security292 and Carpetland U.S.A., Inc. v.
Illinois Department of Employment Security.293  Both cases involved
challenges to administrative agency determinations that personnel retained by
corporations were employees rather than “independent contractors,” thereby
triggering the corporations’ obligation to contribute to the state unemployment
insurance program.  Although the two cases clarified some of the questions
left open in City of Belvidere, they left other significant questions unanswered.
1.  AFM Messenger Service
The first post-City of Belvidere case decided by the Illinois Supreme
Court heralded a significant retreat from the court’s earlier decision to give
only “some deference” to Illinois administrative agency determinations of
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294. See supra text accompanying note 269. 
295. The City of Belvidere decision only adopted the Rule 52(a) standard implicitly.  See text
accompanying notes 272–274 supra. 
296.  763 N.E.2d at 283 (citing 820 ILL. COMP . STAT. ANN. 405/212 (West 2000)). 
297. 763 N.E.2d at 274.
298. Id. at 277–278.
299. The two cases against AFM Messenger Service were consolidated on appellate review.  For
ease of reference, this article follows the court’s example by referring to the two
administrative decisions collectively as the department’s decision or the agency’s
determination.  Id. at 279 n. 1. 
300. AFM Messenger Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 733 N.E.2d 749 (Ill. App. Ct.
2000).
mixed questions of fact and law.294  In AFM Messenger Service, the court for
the first time expressly adopted the relatively deferential federal standard of
review for findings of fact by federal trial courts under Rule 52(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and held that it applied to Illinois
administrative agency determinations of mixed questions of fact and law.295
In so doing, the court gave a partial explanation of its reasons for departing
from its past practice of reviewing such determinations under a de novo or
manifest weight of the evidence standard.  
The issue on appeal in AFM Messenger Service was whether the drivers
for a delivery service company were “independent contractors” under section
212 of the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act (“IUIA”), thereby exempting
the company from the obligation to make unemployment contributions on
behalf of the drivers.  To meet its burden of proof that it was exempt under the
IUIA, the delivery service company had to establish, among other criteria, that
the company’s drivers were engaged in “an independently established trade,
occupation, profession, or business.”296   
Following administrative hearings in two separate cases, the Illinois
Department of Employment Security determined that AFM Messenger
Services had failed to meet its burden of proof.  Holding that the drivers were
employees and did not meet the definition of independent contractor, the
department found the delivery service liable for unpaid unemployment
insurance contributions relating to the drivers’ employment. 297  The agency’s
decisions were affirmed on administrative review by the circuit court, which
held that the decisions were “neither against the manifest weight of the
evidence nor contrary to law.”298  On appeal of the circuit court’s decision, the
appellate court affirmed,299 this time applying the clearly erroneous standard
of review from City of Belvidere.300  
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision.  In an
opinion written by Justice Fitzgerald, the court began its analysis in AFM
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301. 763 N.E.2d at 279 (citing City of Belvidere and Branson). 
302. See supra text accompanying note 268.
303. 456 U.S. 273 (1982).  The Supreme Court stated in Pullman-Standard v. Swint that mixed
questions of law and fact are “questions in which the historical facts are admitted or
established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the
statutory standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the
established facts is or is not violated.”  Id. at 290 n.19.
304. 763 N.E.2d at 280.  The court explained that the agency’s decision was partly factual because
it involved considering whether the basic facts supported the agency’s determination that the
AFM drivers were employees and not independent contractors.  But, the agency’s decision
also involved a question of law because the three requirements for independent contractor
status set forth in the statute were “comprised of legal terms and concepts requiring
interpretation.”  Id. 
305. Id.
306. Id.  See supra note 290.
307. Id. at 280–81.
308. 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).  See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
309. 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).  See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
Messenger Service with a lengthy discussion of the applicable standard of
review.  The court noted that the applicable standard depended on whether the
issue on appeal was a question of fact, a question of law, or a mixed question
of fact and law.301  After referring to its own simple definition of a mixed
question from City of Belvidere,302 the supreme court cited with approval the
longer, but more comprehensive, United States Supreme Court definition from
Pullman-Standard v. Swint.303  The court then concluded that the agency’s
determination that the AFM drivers were not independent contractors
presented a mixed question of fact and law, using an analysis similar to that
employed in City of Belvidere.304
Again citing City of Belvidere in support, the supreme court confirmed
that administrative agency determinations of mixed questions of fact and law
would be reviewed on appeal to determine if they were “clearly erroneous.”
The court conceded that the only guidance it had given in City of Belvidere
as to the meaning of “clearly erroneous” was to place the concept on a
continuum somewhere between the manifest weight and de novo standards.305
Following the approach of some Illinois appellate courts subsequent to City of
Belvidere, 306 the supreme court defined “clearly erroneous” by reference to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a),307 expressly adopting the U.S. Supreme
Court’s interpretation of that rule in United States v. Gypsum.308  
In contrast to its silence in City of Belvidere, the Illinois Supreme Court
in AFM Messenger Services attempted to explain some of the reasons for its
adoption of the clearly erroneous standard of review for administrative agency
determinations of mixed questions of fact and law.  Citing Anderson v.
Bessemer City,309 the court noted that the rationale for applying the deferential
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310. 763 N.E.2d at 281.  See supra notes 126–127 and accompanying text.
311. Id.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 227–228.
313. 763 N.E.2d at 281.   
314. Id.  See supra notes 186–194 and accompanying text.
315. 763 N.E.2d at 281–82 (emphasis supplied).   It is not clear from the decision what the court
meant by “in significant respects,” but the phrase seems to leave open the possibility of
deviations from the federal standard of review.
316. 763 N.E.2d at 282 (citing United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).  After
reviewing the administrative agency record in AFM Messenger Service and analyzing prior
decisions raising the issue of whether alleged independent contractors were engaged in an
independent trade, occupation, profession, or business, the supreme court held that the
administrative agency’s determination that the messenger service’s drivers were not
independent contractors was not clearly erroneous.  763 N.E.2d at 289.
clearly erroneous rule to findings of fact by federal trial judges is not limited to
the trial judge’s superiority in assessing credibility.  The deference is also
based on the expertise that accompanies the trial judge’s fact-finding
experience.310 
The Illinois Supreme Court then explained that the rationale for the
significant deference accorded findings by federal trial court judges under Rule
52(a) “is not unlike” the deference traditionally given by Illinois appellate
courts to decisions by state administrative agencies.311  Although it did not
refer to its past patterns of deference to credibility determinations by
administrative agencies,312 the supreme court did emphasize its past
acknowledgment of “the wisdom of judicial deference to an agency’s
experience and expertise.”313  The court cited a number of its own decisions
dating back to 1988 and noted that even when its standard of review of an
agency’s interpretation of a statute was de novo, it nevertheless
acknowledged the relevancy of the agency’s views.314  In conclusion, the
supreme court observed that the clearly erroneous standard of review it
adopted in City of Belvidere “parallels in significant respects the clearly
erroneous standard under the federal rules.”315  Noting also that the United
States Supreme Court’s definition of “clearly erroneous” furnishes a “practical
guide” for the application of the standard, the court held that “when the
decision of an administrative agency presents a mixed question of law and fact,
the agency decision will be deemed ‘clearly erroneous’ only where the
reviewing court, on the entire record, is ‘left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.’”316
The Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion in AFM Messenger Service seemed
to narrow the potential impact of City of Belvidere substantially.  First, in
attempting to pinpoint where on the continuum of judicial deference the clearly
erroneous rule lay, the court characterized the rule as “significantly
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317. 763 N.E.2d at 281 (citing Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension
Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993)).
318.  763 N.E.2d at 282.
319. One is tempted to reconcile the supreme court’s decisions by concluding that administrative
agency determinations favoring unions are given only some deference, while agency
determinations favoring revenue collection are given substantial  deference.  See 692 N.E.2d
at 305 (Justice Harrison, dissenting).  To the extent that Illinois appellate courts review the
determinations of some administrative agencies with more scrutiny than others, they are not
unique.   See 2  CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, §14.01, at 14–3 (observing that the federal
courts favor some agencies and not others).
320. 763 N.E.2d at 282 (citing its reversal of the administrative agency decision in City of
Belvidere).
321. Id.
322. Id. at 281.  Although the court used a functional analysis and analogy to explain why it was
applying a federal standard applicable to findings by district  judges, it did not explain why
functional factors supported adoption of an intermediate deferent ial standard, rather than the
traditional and more deferential manifest weight of the evidence standard.
323. The court acknowledged its prior decisions applying the manifest weight of the evidence
standard to apparent mixed questions of fact and law.  The court noted, however, that those
decisions predated City of Belvidere, and that the parties in the earlier cases had not raised the
possibility that the determinations under review involved mixed questions.  763 N.E.2d at
282.  Nevertheless, the court did not expressly overrule the prior decisions and seemed to
leave open the possibility that parties could opt for a more or a less deferential standard of
review in a particular case. 
deferential”317 and “largely deferential.”318  In so doing, the court sharply
backed away from its decision in City of Belvidere to give only “some
deference” to the agency.319  Nevertheless, the court added that a “largely
deferential” standard does not mean that a court reviewing an administrative
agency decision must “blindly defer” to that decision.320
The AFM Messenger Service opinion also clarified some issues left
unanswered in City of Belvidere.  For example, the court finally defined what
it meant by “clearly erroneous .”321  Using a functional analysis, the court also
attempted to explain why the deferential federal rule for findings of fact by
federal district court judges should be applied to state administrative agenc y
determinations.322  Nevertheless, the court continued its silence as to why it
had decided to replace its traditional standards of review for mixed
questions.323  The court also failed to explain why it continued to implicitly
reject the extremely deferential federal approach to reviewing administrative
agency determinations of mixed questions in favor of an intermediate standard.
In short, the underlying policy reasons for the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision
to change Illinois standards of review were still not clear.      
AFM Messenger Service also left open the question of the scope of the
new standard of review.  Although the court again used broad language that
seemed to confirm that the clearly erroneous standard would be applied to all
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324. As it did in City of Belvidere, the supreme court began its analysis in AFM Messenger Service
by discussing the Administrative Review Law.  763 N.E.2d at 279.  See supra notes 281–284
and accompanying text.  Although the court’s discussion of the statute seems to imply a
standard of broad applicability, it is still not completely clear whether the City of Belvidere
and AFM Messenger Service decisions apply to all administrative agency determinations of
mixed questions decided under the act or only to some agency determinations.  See infra notes
350–51 and accompanying text.
325. Neither City of Belvidere nor AFM Messenger Service foreclosed the possibility that some
mixed questions might continue to be addressed under a de novo standard of review.  Thus, the
court may intend for the appellate courts to decide whether to apply the clearly erroneous
standard on a case-by-case basis, even in administrative agency cases.  Conversely, the court
may eventually decide expressly that the clearly erroneous standard applies to a l l  or  most
administrative agency and circuit court determinations of mixed questions.  See in fra  notes
350–51 and accompanying text.
326. See, e.g., Chicago Patrolmen’s Ass’n v. Dep’t of Revenue, 664 N.E.2d 52 (Ill. 1996) (agency
determination whether property is tax exempt is reviewed de novo when the facts are not in
dispute).
327. 776 N.E.2d 166, 169 (Ill. 2002).  As in AFM Messenger Service , the court was reviewing an
administrative agency action under the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act, 820 ILL.
COMP . STAT. ANN. 405/212 (West 2000).  See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
328. 776 N.E.2d at 169.
329. Id. 
administrative agency decisions involving mixed questions of fact and law,324
both broader and narrower interpretations of the case were still viable.325  
2.  Carpetland
In its next pronouncement concerning mixed questions of fact and law, the
Illinois Supreme Court raised, but did not clearly answer, a question that had
been broached in the intermediate appellate courts: whether mixed questions
of fact and law should be freely reviewed on appeal when the basic facts in
the case are undisputed.326  Although the Carpetland case purported to apply
the clearly erroneous standard of review to a mixed question, the court’s
searching review of the administrative record and its discussion of how the
statutory test applied to the facts also suggested that the court was in reality
reviewing the administrative agency determination de novo.   
In Carpetland, the issue on appeal was  whether floor measurers and
carpet installers retained by Carpetland U.S.A., a retailer of floor coverings,
were independent contractors or employees under the Illinois Unemployment
Insurance Act.327  After a hearing by a representative of the Department of
Employment Security, the director of the department adopted the hearing
officer’s report and ruled that the measurers and installers were employees,
thereby triggering the company's obligation to pay unemployment insurance
contributions.328  The circuit court affirmed this decision.329
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330. Applying the clearly erroneous rule, an intermediate appellate court had reversed the circuit
court decision, with one judge dissenting.  Carpetland U.S.A., Inc. v. Ill. Dep’t of
Employment Sec., 746 N.E.2d 738 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). 
331. 776 N.E.2d at 177.  See supra note 233.  Following City of Belvidere, some appellate courts
continued to conduct de novo review of mixed questions based on undisputed or stipulated
facts.  See, e.g., Blessing/White, Inc. v. Zehnder, 768 N.E.2d 332, 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)
(where the parties stipulated to the facts and no further fact findings had to be drawn, the
agency’s determination based on facts was to be reviewed de novo).
332. 767 N.E.2d at 177.
333. Id .   The supreme court in Carpetland explained that “[u]nder some circumstances . . . the
issue presented cannot be accurately characterized as either a pure question of fact or a pure
question of law and therefore will be treated as a mixed question, subject to an intermediate
standard of review.”  Id.
334. Id. (emphasis added).
335. Id. at 192.  Justices McMorrow and Freeman dissented in part from the opinion of the
majority of the court, written by Justice Garman.  The dissenting justices would have affirmed
the administrative agency’s determination that both the floor installers and floor measurers
were employees of Carpetland, rather than independent contractors.  Id. at 193–95.
When the case reached the Illinois Supreme Court,330 the parties agreed
that the clearly erroneous standard of review applied to the issue on appeal.
At oral argument, however, the question was raised whether the de novo
standard was more appropriate because the facts were “essentially
undisputed.”331  The Department of Employment Security argued that City of
Belvidere “departed” from prior cases reviewing the application of law to
undisputed facts under a de novo standard.  In a cryptic response, the
supreme court disagreed, stating:  “[I]n City of Belvidere, we did not entirely
abandon the de novo standard in administrative review cases.”332  
The court nevertheless went on to state that the clearly erroneous standard
applied to the issue of whether the workers in Carpetland were independent
contractors, following the precedent set in AFM Messenger Service.333  In
explaining its decision in the latter case, the court stated that “[u]nder the
clearly erroneous standard, we give somewhat less deference to the agency
than we would if the decision related solely to a question of fact, because the
decision is based on fact-finding that is inseparable from the application of law
to fact.”334  After an extensive discussion of the facts in the record, the
statutory and regulatory standards, and the court’s prior cases interpreting
those standards, the court held that the Department of Employment Security’s
decision that Carpetland’s installers were employees was clearly erroneous;
however, the department’s similar decision concerning the company’s floor
measurers was not.335
In several instances in the Carpetland opinion, the supreme court
appeared to substitute its own determinations of “pure” or basic facts for those
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336. For example, the agency had found that all complaints about carpet installation flowed
through Carpetland.  Pointing to testimony by one carpet installer that he left his business
card with customers to facilitate customer reports of problems, the supreme court concluded
that communications through the company were “only one means” by which customers could
register complaints.  Id. at 178. 
337. The agency had, for example, based an inference of employer control on the fact that the
carpet installers had attempted to make themselves available for “any and all” Carpetland
work assignments.  The court found that this fact indicated ambition, not direction or control.
Id. at 181.
338. For example, the court analyzed prior cases interpreting the phrase “usual course of business”
and concluded that the key to the inquiry is whether services are necessary to a business or
merely incidental.  Id. at 186.  At another point in the decision, the court rejected two of the
agency’s proffered legal tests for determining whether a customer’s premises should be
considered part of Carpetland’s place of business.  Id. at 188. 
339. 659 N.E.2d at 961.  See supra text accompanying note 250.
340. Although it preceded its discussion by characterizing the facts as “essentially” undisputed, for
example, the court began its analysis by identifying at least six “misstatements of fact” in the
hearing officer’s report.  Id. at 178.  Concluding that the report was neither complete nor
reliabl e, the court looked to the record as a whole, as well as to the report, for “relevant
underlying facts” to support its decision.  Id. Elsewhere in the opinion, the court noted that
its finding of misstatements was based on a “thorough review” of the record.  The court also
observed that the hearing officer did not question the credibility of any of the witnesses.  Id.
In addition to criticizing the agency’s fact-finding, the court was critical of the fact that the
hearing officer included legal conclusions in the report without supporting authority, id., and
failed to address each of the relevant factors for control under the Administrative Code, id.
at 180.
of the administrative agency.336  In other instances, the court drew inferences
from basic  facts that were directly opposite to those drawn by the agency.337
In yet other instances, the supreme court rejected the agency’s legal
interpretations of the governing statute and prior case law.338  In performing
all of these functions, the court purported to be acting under the clearly
erroneous rule.  Yet it is difficult to escape the impression that the court was
in actuality reviewing the case de novo.
The reasons behind the Illinois Supreme Court’s unwillingness to expressly
revert to a de novo standard of review in Carpetland are not clear.  As in
Branson,339 the court may have been acceding to the parties’ original
characterization of the appropriate standard of review.  Or, despite the
existence of ostensibly “undisputed” facts, the court may have been reluctant
to apply a different standard of review to a mixed question of fact and law so
soon after it had announced the clearly erroneous rule.  Alternatively, the court
may have been concerned that the premise of the proffered “undisputed facts”
exception to the clearly erroneous rule was not met because some of the basic
facts in Carpetland actually were in dispute. 340  Regardless of the reason for
the court’s apparent reluctance to announce an exception to its relatively new
clearly erroneous rule, the court did little in Carpetland to resolve many of the
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341. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
342. See Part II.C. supra.
343. See Part II supra.  There seems to be a general consensus that the traditional linguistic or
definitional approach to standards of review should be supplemented, not completely
abandoned.  See, e.g., Calleros, supra note 74, at 417 (the literary or analytical approach i s
“useful primarily to facilitate discussion” by assigning convenient terms with which to discuss
the applicability of the clearly erroneous rule); Sward, supra note 74, at 3 (“categorization
allows a rough judgment of the level of deference required”).
344. See, e.g., URSULA BENTELE & EVE CARY, APPELLATE ADVOCACY :  PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE 85 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing how standards of review give signals to advocates as
to how to approach a case on appeal or whether to appeal at all).
questions raised in City of Belvidere and AFM Messenger Service about the
full purpose and future applicability of the new intermediate standard of review
for mixed questions.  This raises the pivotal question:  What is the supreme
court ultimately trying to achieve with its adoption of a new standard of review
for at least some mixed questions of fact and law? 
V.  POST CARPETLAND REFLECTIONS
Whether approached at the federal or the state level, standards of review
serve in large part as a critical mechanism for allocating power and
responsibility among the various actors making judicial determinations.341  As
discussed in Part II.A., however, utilization of the traditional concepts of “fact”
and “law” to decide whether the original decision maker or the reviewing court
has primary power and responsibility to decide a particular issue often hides
an inherently uncertain, and ultimately arbitrary, process.  Recognizing a third
category of mixed questions helps to unveil that process, but creates its own
uncertainties.342  Courts and commentators hence increasingly advocate
express use of a functional analysis to provide principled grounds to support
and supplement the traditional fact/law approach to allocating decision-making
power and responsibility.343
It should also be noted that standards of review act as messengers.  For
example, they convey to litigants the likelihood of reversal on appeal, thereby
affecting litigants’ decisions whether or not to appeal and their selection of
issues to raise on appeal. 344  At the same time, standards of review serve as
signals to reviewing courts that, over time, certain outcomes on appeal are
desirable.  In the federal administrative law context, for example, Professor
Verkuil has pointed out that “one might reasonably expect that Congress wants
outcomes, defined in terms of affirmances, remands, and reversals of agency
actions, to vary according to the scope of review chosen (or at least to find
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345. Verkuil, supra note 38, at 682.  The actual outcome of the adoption of a particular standard
of review can, however, be difficult to predict.  In his recent study of the results of appeals
of several types of federal administrative agency determinations subject to differing standards
of appellate review, Professor Verkuil found that the number of reversals of social security
determinations seemed unusually high given the fact that they were reviewed on appeal under
the very deferential substantial  evidence standard of review.  See Verkuil, supra note 38, at
704–06.  He attributed the high reversal rate to a variety of factors, including “entrenched
judicial skepticism” about the fairness or accuracy of agency determinations.  Id. at 707.
Conversely, the number of reversals of Freedom of Information Act requests seemed unusually
low given the fact that they were reviewed de novo on appeal.  Id. at 712–13.  Again,
Professor Verkuil viewed the outcome as attributable to a variety of factors.  Id. at 713;
715–16.  The number of reversals of two other forms of agency determinations were more
consistent with Professor Verkuil’s hypothesized rate of reversal and predictions.  Id. at
710–11; 721–22.  For a description of the “lessons” drawn from this outcomes analysis, see
id. at 724–32.
346. The ultimate outcome of the adoption of the new “clearly erroneous” standard of review is
not clear, and may depend on how far the standard is extended and whether particular mixed
questions have traditionally been reviewed under the de novo or the manifest weight of the
evidence standard of review.  To the extent that mixed questions of fact and law have in the
past been decided under the non-deferential de novo standard of review in Illinois, a shift  to
the deferential clearly erroneous standard could portend significantly more administrative
determinations being upheld on appeal.  If the more expansive reading of the cases prevails,
it may also lead to more affirmances  of circuit court determinations of mixed questions .   To
the extent that mixed questions of fact and law have in the past been reviewed under the very
deferential manifest weight of the evidence standard, however, a potential shift to an almost
universal imposition of the less deferential clearly erroneous standard may lead to at least
marginally more reversals of determinations by administrative agencies and trial courts.  But
see supra note 345 (outcomes may be unpredictable). 
347. See, e.g., O’Neill, High Court Climbs, supra note 6 (concluding that the Illinois Supreme
Court is “[s]tep by step . . . establishing fair and just standards of review for criminal
appeals”).  See supra note 291.
some judicial recognition of these expectations).”345  Similarly, a state
legislature, high court, or other rule-maker is often sending a signal (whether
consciously or not) as to expected outcomes whenever it announces that a
particular standard of review is applicable to a particular type of decision or
issue, or to a particular decision-maker.346  To be optimally effective as signals,
however, standards of review ideally need to be clear and capable of easy and
c onsistent interpretation and application.  It is in this respect that Illinois law
continues to fall short.
Despite improvements in some areas,347 the Illinois Supreme Court
continues to provide confusing and uncertain guidance with respect to
standards of review.  As described in Part IV, one of the major developments
in this regard is the line of cases from Branson to Carpetland that has
introduced a new area of uncertainty as to the treatment of  mixed
questions)at a time when lingering questions exist as to the meaning and scope
of the traditional Illinois standards of review for questions of “fact” and
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348. See Part III supra.
349. See supra note 275.
350. The four principal cases analyzed in Part IV were all governed by Section 3–110 of the
Administrative Review Law, which states that “findings and conclusions of the administrative
agency on questions of fact shall be held to be prima facie true and correct.”  735 ILL. COMP .
STAT. ANN. 5/3–110 (West 2003).  Although it refers in another sentence to “questions of
law and fact,” Section 3–110 does not specify the standard of review for either questions of
law or mixed questions.  See supra note 282.  One possible source of the court’s clearly
erroneous rule is an implicit decision to treat mixed questions as “facts” that are subject to
an alternative construction of the phrase “prima facie true and correct” (which has been
interpreted in the past to refer to the manifest weight of the evidence standard).  See supra
note 203.  Another potential source of the clearly erroneous rule is a discretionary ceding of
the appellate courts’ traditional power of de novo review over some or all administrative
agency determinations of “law” in the form of mixed questions.  See supra Part III.A.  A
third possibility is an implicit decision by the court to treat mixed questions as a separate
category of determinations that falls within a gap in Section 3–110. 
“law.”348  Although continued efforts to improve the treatment of the
traditional standards would also be helpful, one of the paramount goals for the
future should be to work toward clarification of the meaning, scope and
applicability of the new clearly erroneous standard of review, for the reason
that courts and litigants are not accustomed to dealing with it and are less
familiar with the concept of mixed questions generally.  Four steps that the
Illinois Supreme Court might take to carry out this goal are suggested below.
First, it would be helpful to lower courts, agencies and litigants alike to
have a better sense of what outcomes the supreme court was attempting to
achieve when it adopted the clearly erroneous rule.  In City of Belvidere, for
example, was the supreme court attempting to encourage more appeals and
more reversals of determinations by the State Labor Relations Board?  If so,
why?  Or did the court just back into a change in standard of review out of
irritation with the board’s particular actions in the case, as the dissent
suggests?349  Even if the true reason for the adoption of a new standard of
review lies in an affirmative answer to the last question, the resulting change
need not be deemed quixotic  or arbitrary if the court takes the opportunity in
future cases)whether expanding or limiting the applicability of the new rule)
to explain in further depth the purpose and rationale for treating mixed
questions under an intermediate standard of review.
A second step would be to clarify the source of the clearly erroneous rule.
Is it the result of an interpretation of the words “fact” and “law” in Section
3–110 of the Administrative Review Law?350  If so, is that interpretation now
applicable to all appeals of administrative agency determinations of mixed
questions under the Administrative Review Law, or only to some categories
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351. A related question is whether the new intermediate standard of review applies to mixed
questions in administrative law cases that are not decided under the Administrative Review
Law.  Thus far, the Illinois Supreme Court has given some indication that it does not.
Although the issue of whether an injury arises out of employment within the meaning of the
Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILL. COMP . STAT. 305/2–305/30 (2003), is a mixed
question, see O’Neill & Brody, supra note 6, at 518 & n.55, the court has in recent cases
continued to apply the traditional manifest weight of the evidence standard of review, rather
than the new clearly erroneous standard.  See, e.g.,Saunders v. Indus. Comm’n, 727 N.E.2d
247 (Ill. 2000) (applying manifest weight of the evidence standard, without discussion or
analysis).  
352. At least one recent Illinois Supreme Court case indicates that the court may be reluctant to
apply the new intermediate standard of review for mixed questions to decisions by the circuit
courts.  In Eychaner v. Gross, 779 N.E.2d 1115, 1130 (Ill. 2002), the supreme court held that
a circuit court determination that a trust did not exist would not be disturbed unless it was
against the manifest weight of the evidence.  The supreme court thus rejected the position
taken by the appellate court that the issues presented in  Eychaner were mixed questions
subject to review under the intermediate clearly erroneous standard of review.  Eychaner v.
Gross, 747 N.E.2d 969, 978 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001), rev’d 779 N.E.2d 1115.  Although the
supreme court’s explanation of the legal elements of a trust indicates that the issue of the
existence of a trust is a mixed question, the court, without explanation, appeared to label the
issue as a question of “fact” only.  779 N.E.2d at 1131–32.  Although its reasoning is not
completely clear, the court seemed to ground its decision on functional concerns, emphasizing
throughout the opinion that the trial court’s determination that a trust did not exist was
heavily based on assessments of witness credibility.  Id. at 1130, 1138, 1139, 1141.  Because
a critical element supporting the existence of a trust is intent to create one, application of
a deferential standard of review in Eychaner is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s functional
approach to determining the applicable standard of review for mixed questions raising
questions of intent.  See supra note 170 and accompanying text.  Nevertheless, it is not clear
why the court in Eychaner implicitly deems the manifest weight standard of review to be
more appropriate than the new and also deferential clearly erroneous test. 
of determinations (as yet undefined) under that statute?351  If the decision to
review mixed questions in administrative cases under the clearly erroneous
standard is essentially discretionary, what factors should guide the appellate
courts in deciding whether and how to exercise that discretion?
A third important step would be to clarify whether some or all
determinations of mixed questions of fact and law by circuit court judges are
reviewable under the new intermediate standard)either by analogy to
administrative determinations of mixed questions or because of similar
functional concerns.352  Before reaching any decision to expand the application
of the clearly erroneous rule to mixed questions outside the administrative law
context, however, it would be desirable for the court to consider the
appropriateness of alternative standards of review for mixed questions.  For
example, one potential alternative is to use a bifurcated analysis, in which the
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353. Following the Supreme Court’s lead in so-called constitutional fact cases, Illinois courts are
now using this bifurcated approach in some cases involving constitutional issues.  See supra
notes 147–61; 291.  Some courts also apply a bifurcated approach to mixed questions that
do not raise constitutional issues.  See, e.g., Graves v. Chief Legal Counsel, 762 N.E.2d 722,
724 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (contending that the clearly erroneous test for mixed questions has
been replaced by a bifurcated analysis, citing the cases described in note 291 infra).
Comprehensive use of the bifurcated analysis in the state system may be hampered by the fact
that circuit court judges, unlike their federal counterparts, are not required to prepare separate
written findings of fact.  See PARNESS, supra note 6, §12–2, at 288 (no Illinois statute, rule,
or case requires that judgments in civil bench trials be based on special findings of fact or
conclusions of law).
354. See supra text accompanying notes 166–172.
355. 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 2.13, at 2–77; supra notes 166–72 and accompanying
text.  The Ninth Circuit’s approach may also tend to validate the existing treatment in
Illinois of particular mixed questions such as negligence.  See supra text accompanying  no te
171.
356. To help guide the lower courts in applying a functional test of this nature, the supreme court
might establish a presumption for handling mixed questions in the middle of the fact/law
continuum. See, e.g . , 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 7, § 2.13, at 2–77 (because line
drawing for mixed questions in the middle of the continuum is “almost impossible,” an
alternative would be “a consistent, though perhaps arbitrary, presumption”); Louis, supra
note 21, at 1013 (general rule presumptively favoring either fact finders or reviewing courts
in deciding mixed questions, “with whatever controls and exceptions” as are necessary, “is all
that is practically possible”).  To avoid confusion with evidentiary presumptions, such a rule
treating mixed questions as presumptively “legal” or presumptively “factual” could be
characterized as a “review presumption.”
357. For one example of a confusing summary of Illinois standards of review, see Chicago Transit
Authority v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 702 N.E.2d 284, 289 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (using
“clearly erroneous” to describe the standard of review applicable to both a question of
statutory construction and a mixed question).  Some courts have jumbled together the clearly
underlying basic facts are reviewed deferentially, but the application of the law
to the facts is reviewed de novo.353     
Another alternative is to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s “functional approach,”
in which reviewing courts determine whether a particular mixed question is
essentially factual or whether it requires the court to consider legal concepts
and to exercise judgment about values.354  Mixed questions that are essentially
factual would be reviewed under either the manifest weight standard or the
clearly erroneous standard, depending on the overall outcome the court wishes
to encourage.  Mixed questions that are heavily intertwined with legal
interpretations and issues would be reviewed de novo.  Although it can be
difficult at times to apply in practice, this approach has the advantage of
flexibility355 and also tends to protect the appellate court’s law-making powers
to a greater degree than would a wholly deferential standard of review.356 
A fourth and final step would be to give further guidance to those appellate
courts that have expressed confusion or skepticism concerning the meaning,
scope and applicability of the Illinois “clearly erroneous” rule.357  For example,
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erroneous rule and other standards of review.  See, e.g., Enesco Corp. v. Doherty, 731 N.E.2d
888, 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (court concludes that agency’s determination of mixed question
was “clearly erroneous, against the manifest weight of the evidence”); Northwest Mosquito
Abatement Dist. v. Ill. State Labor Relations Bd., 708 N.E.2d 548, 553 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)
(citing City of Belvidere’s clearly erroneous rule, the court explained that the agency’s
resolution of mixed question is to be affirmed “if reasonable, consistent with labor law and
based on findings supported by substantial  evidence”).  Some courts have also expressed
puzzlement over what a mixed question is.  See, e.g.,  Swank v. Dep’t of Revenue, 785 N.E.2d
204, 212 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“we have a diffi cult time imagining any case not involving the
examination of the legal effect of a given set of facts”).  See also infra note 358.
358.  In DuPage County Board. v. Department of Revenue, 790 N.E.2d 918, 922 (Ill. App. Ct.
2003), the court observed that “[w]hat the ‘clearly erroneous’ test actually means . . .)what
it requires a court of review to do)is perhaps ill-defined.”  After citing the Illinois Supreme
Court’s definition of “clearly erroneous” from the Carpetland case, the appellate court noted
that “[t]his suggests that the test is essentially reducible to reasonableness and is thus, for all
practical purposes, as deferential as the ‘manifest weight’ test used for purely factual issues.”
Id.  The court then mis-characterized the clearly erroneous standard as “extremely
deferential,” citing the Seventh Circuit “dead fish” test.  Id.; see supra note  80.   See also
Chicago Teachers Union v. Ill. Educ. Relations Bd., 2003 WL 22533408, at *9 (Ill. App. Ct.
Nov. 7, 2003) (citing “dead fish” test with approval).  Cf. School District  of Wisconsin Del l s
v. Z.S. ex. rel. Littlegeorge, 295 F.3d 671, 674 (7th Cir.  2002) (“the cognitive limitations
that judges share with other mortals may constitute an insuperable obstacle to making
distinctions any finer than that of plenary versus deferential review.”).
359. See supra Part I.C.2.
360. See supra note 218.
361. See supra text accompanying notes 311–14.
at least one court has concluded that the manifest weight of the evidence and
clearly erroneous standards of review are essentially the same, relying on a
Seventh Circuit definition of “clearly erroneous” that is colorful, but quite
misleading.358  At some point, therefore, it would reduce confusion if the
supreme court would clarify which of the various and sometimes conflicting
federal court interpretations or explanations of the term “clearly erroneous”
are applicable to mixed questions in Illinois.359  To the extent feasible, it would
also help if the court would attempt to discourage further unnecessary glosses
on the meaning of “clearly erroneous” by the lower appellate courts on the
ground that a proliferation of explanations often tends to generate more fog
than light.360  
In carrying out many of the foregoing steps, it would be particularly
beneficial for the court to expand the type of functional analysis it undertook
in AFM Messenger Service when it referred to the importance of
administrative agency expertise.361  Using federal decisions as a general guide,
for example, the court might identify and articulate its expectations as to how
the clearly erroneous rule or other selected standards of review for mixed
questions will impact the allocation of resources between the courts and
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362. See supra notes 133–34; 140-44.
363. In such cases, the original fact finder’s superior ability to make credibility determinations is
also not implicated as a general rule.  See supra notes 123–25.
364. See Calleros , supra note 74, at 423–24 (“The precise meaning and scope of an abstract
statement of law often is clarified only on repeated applications of the legal rule to the facts
of different cases, adding flesh to the bones of abstraction”; appellate review of mixed
questions thus “facilitates development of the legal rule, in furtherance of the appellate
court’s institutional  function”).  The importance of this aspect of common law development
administrative agencies and, if relevant, between the circuit courts and
appellate courts.
In undertaking an expanded functional analysis, however, the court should
take into account the ways in which the state’s institutional history, structure,
and needs differ from the federal model.  For example, the pressures on the
time and resources of state and federal trial and appellate court judges may be
different, thereby affecting decisions about the optimal allocation of resources.
The Illinois appellate courts’ perception of the average level of competency
and impartiality of the original decision makers may also lead the courts to
exercise a greater or lesser degree of scrutiny in carrying out their error-
correction function than do the federal appellate courts.  In any event, an
optimally fair judicial system would not abandon or diminish the corrective
function of the appellate courts except to the extent necessary to
accommodate limitations on resources and reduce costs in time and money for
the litigants themselves.362  Where appellate courts are in a position to review
mixed questions without straining time and resources, such as in many cases
with undisputed or stipulated facts, the interests of fairness represented by the
corrective function may therefore militate toward non-deferential, rather than
deferential, review of mixed questions.363 
In short, a recommendation that the supreme court take steps to clarify the
scope and applicability of the new intermediate standard of review is not
necessarily a recommendation to change the existing standard of review for
many mixed questions, particularly those that are currently reviewed de novo.
To the extent that resources permit and comparative expertise is
accommodated, a presumption favoring non-deferential review of mixed
questions tends to maximize the state appellate courts’ central role in “making
law” in areas where the legislature has not stepped in or where there are gaps
in statutes or rules that must be filled in by judicial interpretation.  By leaning
toward non-deferential review of mixed questions of fact and law, the
appellate courts would thus ensure that they adequately fulfill their primary role
of ensuring the coherence and consistency of those legal rules that develop
over time through the application of law to facts, as is characteristic of and
central to the common law.364  
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was stressed by Judge Friendly in Mamiye Bros. v. Barber Steamship Lines, Inc., 360 F.2d 774,
776–78 (2d Cir.  1966) (applying a de novo standard of review to a district court finding of
lack of negligence). 
365. Junior v. Texaco, Inc., 688 F.2d 377, 379 (5th Cir. 1982).
366. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
VI.  CONCLUSION
Some of the original goals of Professors O’Neill and Brody when they
proposed a requirement that appellants include a discussion of the standard of
review in their briefs appear to have been met.  Appellate court decisions,
including those of the Illinois Supreme Court, seem at times to be focusing
more attention on the choice and application of standards of review.  There is
more “serious discussion” of the issue, and there are greater attempts at
articulating the reasons for choosing a particular standard.  Nevertheless, many
appellate decisions continue to devote time and space to only cursory or, at
times, even confusing discussions of the standard of review.  Other decisions
continue to omit any reference to or discussion of the standard of review
applicable to particular issues, leaving it to the reader to infer from the context
which standard of review was applied.  Where the courts have turned to the
development of a new standard of review, the process has been uncertain, as
discussed in Parts IV and V.  Thus, Illinois courts’ treatment of mixed
questions of fact and law and other issues on appeal continues to be “mixed
up” both in description and practice.
The lingering confusion over the appropriate choice and application of
standards of review for mixed questions is not, however, unique to Illinois
courts.  Aspects of the federal standard of review for mixed questions of fact
and law have been described, for example, as a “Serbonian bog.”365
Nevertheless, it is incumbent on the appellate courts to continue to try to guide
both decision makers and litigants through that bog by articulating the meaning
and scope of the standards of review as clearly as possible.
To maintain faith in the integrity of the appellate system, it is also important
for the appellate courts to endeavor to apply the selected standards as
consistently as possible.  But, a perfectly understandable and a perfectly
applied system of appellate review is inherently unattainable and probably
undesirable.  In this regard, the admonition of Justice Frankfurter in Universal
Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board366 still rings true:
A formula for judicial review . . . may afford grounds for certitude but cannot
assure certainty of application.  Some scope for judicial discretion in applying
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the formula can be avoided only by falsifying the actual process of judging
or by using the formula as an instrument of futile casuistry.  It cannot be too
often repeated that judges are not automata.  The ultimate reliance for the fair
operation of any standard is a judiciary of high competence and character
and the constant play of an informed professional critique upon its work.
